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Glossary
This glossary is compiled according to the Lead Authors 
of the Report drawing on glossaries and other resources 
available on the websites of the following organizations, 
networks and projects: Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action, 
United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and World 
Resources Institute.
Baseline/reference: The state against which change is 
measured. In the context of transformation pathways, the 
term ‘baseline scenarios’ refers to scenarios that are based 
on the assumption that no mitigation policies or measures will 
be implemented beyond those that are already in force and/or 
are legislated or planned to be adopted. Baseline scenarios 
are not intended to be predictions of the future, but rather 
counterfactual constructions that can serve to highlight the 
level of emissions that would occur without further policy 
effort. Typically, baseline scenarios are then compared 
to mitigation scenarios that are constructed to meet 
different goals for greenhouse gas emissions, atmospheric 
concentrations or temperature change. The term ‘baseline 
scenario’ is used interchangeably with ‘reference scenario’ 
and ‘no policy scenario’. In much of the literature the term 
is also synonymous with the term ‘business as usual (BAU) 
scenario’, although the term ‘BAU’ has fallen out of favour 
because the idea of ‘business as usual’ in century-long 
socioeconomic projections is hard to fathom.
Bioenergy: Energy derived from any form of biomass such 
as recently living organisms or their metabolic by-products
Cancun pledge: During 2010, many countries submitted their 
existing plans for controlling greenhouse gas emissions to 
the Climate Change Secretariat and these proposals were 
formally acknowledged under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Developed 
countries presented their plans in the shape of economy-
wide targets to reduce emissions, mainly up to 2020, while 
developing countries proposed ways to limit their growth of 
emissions in the shape of plans of action.
Carbon dioxide emission budget (or carbon budget): For 
a given temperature rise limit, for example a 1.5°C or 2°C 
long-term limit, the corresponding carbon budget reflects 
the total amount of carbon emissions that can be emitted 
for temperatures to stay below that limit. Stated differently, 
a carbon budget is the area under a carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emission trajectory that satisfies assumptions about limits 
on cumulative emissions estimated to avoid a certain level of 
global mean surface temperature rise.
Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e): A way to place emissions 
of various radiative forcing agents on a common footing 
by accounting for their effect on climate. It describes, for a 
given mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amount 
of CO2 that would have the same global warming ability, when 
measured over a specified time period. For the purpose of 
this report, greenhouse gas emissions (unless otherwise 
specified) are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases 
listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e 
assuming a 100-year global warming potential.
Carbon intensity: The amount of emissions of CO2 released 
per unit of another variable such as gross domestic product, 
output energy use, transport or agricultural/forestry products.
Carbon offset: See Offset.
Carbon price: The price for avoided or released CO2 or CO2e 
emissions. This may refer to the rate of a carbon tax or the 
price of emission permits. In many models that are used to 
assess the economic costs of mitigation, carbon prices are 
used as a proxy to represent the level of effort in mitigation 
policies.
Carbon tax: A levy on the carbon content of fossil fuels. 
Because virtually all of the carbon in fossil fuels is ultimately 
emitted as CO2, a carbon tax is equivalent to an emission tax 
on CO2 emissions.
Co-benefits: The positive effects that a policy or measure 
aimed at one objective might have on other objectives, 
without yet evaluating the net effect on overall social welfare.
Co-benefits are often subject to uncertainty and depend on, 
among others, local circumstances and implementation 
practices. Co-benefits are often referred to as ancillary 
benefits.
Conditional NDC: NDC proposed by some countries that are 
contingent on a range of possible conditions, such as the 
ability of national legislatures to enact the necessary laws, 
ambitious action from other countries, realization of finance 
and technical support, or other factors.
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Conference of the Parties (COP): The supreme body of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
It currently meets once a year to review the Convention’s 
progress.
Current policy trajectory: This trajectory is based on 
estimates of 2020 emissions considering projected economic 
trends and current policy approaches including policies at 
least through 2015. Estimates may be based on either official 
data or independent analysis.
Deforestation: Conversion of forest to non-forest.
Economic mitigation potential: The mitigation potential, 
which takes into account social costs and benefits and social 
discount rates, assuming that market efficiency is improved 
by policies and measures and barriers are removed.
Downcycling: A form of recycling that involves reusing 
materials in less demanding applications, accepting reduced 
performance of the material in terms of specifications 
such as hardness, tensile strength, or ductility. In its new 
application, the downcycled material replaces a material of 
lower economic value than the original application.
Emissions gap: The difference between the greenhouse 
gas emission levels consistent with a specific probability 
of limiting the mean global temperature rise to below 2°C 
or 1.5°C in 2100 above pre-industrial levels and the GHG 
emission levels consistent with the global effect of the NDCs, 
assuming full implementation from 2020.
Emission pathway: The trajectory of annual greenhouse gas 
emissions over time.
Global warming potential: An index representing the 
combined effect of the differing times greenhouse gases 
remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness in 
absorbing outgoing infrared radiation.
Greenhouse gases: The atmospheric gases responsible 
for causing global warming and climatic change. The major 
greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) 
and nitrous oxide (N2O). Less prevalent, but very powerful, 
GHGs are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
Integrated assessment models: Models that seek to 
combine knowledge from multiple disciplines in the form 
of equations and/or algorithms in order to explore complex 
environmental problems. As such, they describe the full 
chain of climate change, from production of greenhouse 
gases to atmospheric responses. This necessarily includes 
relevant links and feedbacks between socio-economic and 
biophysical processes.
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC): INDCs 
are submissions from countries describing the national 
actions that they intend to take to reach the Paris Agreement’s 
long-term temperature goal of limiting warming to well below 
2°C. Once a country has ratified the Paris Agreement, its INDC 
is automatically converted to its NDC (see below), unless it 
chooses to further update it. INDCs are thus only used in this 
publication in reference to countries that have not yet ratified 
the Paris Agreement.
Kigali Amendment: The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer aims 
for the phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) by cutting 
their production and consumption.
Kyoto Protocol: An international agreement, standing on 
its own, and requiring separate ratification by governments, 
but linked to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol, among other 
things, sets binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions by industrialized countries.
Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF): A 
greenhouse gas inventory sector that covers emissions and 
removals of greenhouse gases resulting from direct human-
induced land use, land use change and forestry activities.
Likely chance: A likelihood greater than 66 percent chance. 
Used in this assessment to convey the probabilities of 
meeting temperature limits.
Last-mile solution: A solution designed for the movement of 
people and goods to the final destination of a multi-staged 
journey. In a public transportation system, this refers to the 
last leg of the journey.
Lock-in: Lock-in occurs when a market is stuck with a 
standard even though participants would be better off with 
an alternative.
Mitigation: In the context of climate change, a human 
intervention to reduce the sources, or enhance the sinks of 
greenhouse gases. Examples include using fossil fuels more 
efficiently for industrial processes or electricity generation, 
switching to solar energy or wind power, improving the 
insulation of buildings and expanding forests and other ‘sinks’ 
to remove greater amounts of CO2 from the atmosphere.
Monitoring, reporting and verification: A process/concept 
that potentially supports greater transparency in the climate 
change regime.
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): Submissions 
by countries that have ratified the Paris Agreement which 
presents their national efforts to reach the Paris Agreement’s 
long-term temperature goal of limiting warming to well below 
2°C. New or updated NDCs are to be submitted in 2020 and 
every five years thereafter. NDCs thus represent a country’s 
current ambition/target for reducing emissions nationally.
Non-state and subnational actors: ‘Non-state and 
subnational actors’ includes companies, cities, subnational 
regions and investors that take or commit to climate action.
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Offset (in climate policy): A unit of CO2e emissions that 
is reduced, avoided, or sequestered to compensate for 
emissions occurring elsewhere.
Product lightweighting: A process of creating lighter 
products through designs that require less material or 
substitute heavier material with lighter and/or less energy-
intensive materials. Lighter material alternatives, both in 
weight or volume, can generate substantial energy savings in 
the transport and building sectors.
Ride sharing/car sharing: Two forms of arrangements in which 
two or more people share a vehicle for transportation. In ride 
sharing, also known as carpooling, the driver takes a passenger 
along for a ride that the driver gains utility from as well, often 
for commutes or long distance trips. This arrangement is 
distinguishable from ride hailing or ride sourcing, both of 
which are a form of taxi service. In car sharing, a person hires 
a car from another for a limited duration of time without the 
owner to undertake the desired trip. 
Scenario: A description of how the future may unfold based 
on ‘if-then’ propositions. Scenarios typically include an initial 
socio-economic situation and a description of the key driving 
forces and future changes in emissions, temperature or other 
climate change-related variables.
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP): Scenarios of 
projected socioeconomic global changes up to 2100. They 
are used to derive greenhouse gas emissions scenarios 
associated with different climate policies scenarios.
Source: Any process, activity or mechanism that releases a 
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse 
gas or aerosol into the atmosphere.
Sustainable development: Development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.
Technical mitigation potential: Such potential is estimated 
for given scenarios assuming full implementation of the best 
available pollutant reduction technology, as it exists today, 
by 2030 independent of their costs but considering the 
technical lifetime of technologies and other key constraints 
(e.g., cultural acceptance) that could limit applicability of 
certain measures in specific regions.
Uncertainty: A cognitive state of incomplete knowledge that 
can result from a lack of information or from disagreement 
about what is known or even knowable. It may have many 
types of sources, from imprecision in the data to ambiguously 
defined concepts or terminology, or uncertain projections of 
human behaviour. Uncertainty can therefore be represented 
by quantitative measures (for example a probability density 
function) or by qualitative statements (for example reflecting 
the judgement of a team of experts).
Unconditional NDCs: NDCs proposed by countries without 
conditions attached.
2020 pledge: See Cancun pledge.
Emissions Gap Report 2019
XII
Emissions Gap Report 2019
XIII
Foreword
Each year for the last decade, the UN Environment 
Programme’s Emissions Gap Report has compared where 
greenhouse gas emissions are headed, against where they 
should be to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. 
Each year, the report has found that the world is not doing 
enough. Emissions have only risen, hitting a new high of 55.3 
gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent in 2018. The UNEP Emissions 
Gap Report 2019 finds that even if all unconditional 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris 
Agreement are implemented, we are still on course for a 
3.2°C temperature rise. 
Our collective failure to act strongly and early means that we 
must now implement deep and urgent cuts. This report tells 
us that to get in line with the Paris Agreement, emissions 
must drop 7.6 per cent per year from 2020 to 2030 for the 
1.5°C goal and 2.7 per cent per year for the 2°C goal. The 
size of these annual cuts may seem shocking, particularly for 
1.5°C. They may also seem impossible, at least for next year. 
But we have to try. 
We have to learn from our procrastination. Any further delay 
brings the need for larger, more expensive and unlikely cuts. 
We need quick wins, or the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement 
will slip out of reach. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) has warned us that going beyond 1.5°C will 
increase the frequency and intensity of climate impacts, such 
as the heatwaves and storms witnessed across the globe in 
the last few years. We cannot afford to fail. 
The Climate Action Summit has increased momentum to 
address this global challenge. Now, in this critical period, the 
world must deliver concrete, stepped-up action. To deliver 
the cuts we need, nations have to raise the ambition of their 
current pledges over fivefold for the 1.5°C goal when they 
revise their NDCs in 2020. To reach the 2°C goal, they must 
triple ambition. They must then immediately follow up with 
policies and strategies to implement their promises. 
The report tells us that the major transformation of our 
societies and economies we need can still happen. Political 
and societal focus on the climate crisis is at an all-time 
high, with youth movements holding us to account. There 
are many ambitious efforts from governments, cities, 
businesses and investors. There are plentiful options 
for rapid and cost-effective emission reductions. A shift 
to renewable energy and energy efficiency in the power, 
buildings and transport sectors, for example, could deliver 
reductions of over 16 gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent each 
year by 2050. Using materials such as iron, steel and cement 
more efficiently also offers opportunities.
This report gives us a stark choice: set in motion the radical 
transformations we need now, or face the consequences 
of a planet radically altered by climate change. I hope that 
its findings inspire governments to step forward with the 
increased climate ambition the world so desperately needs.
Inger Andersen
Executive Director
United Nations Environment Programme
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Introduction
This is the tenth edition of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report. It provides 
the latest assessment of scientific studies on current and 
estimated future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 
compares these with the emission levels permissible for 
the world to progress on a least-cost pathway to achieve 
the goals of the Paris Agreement. This difference between 
“where we are likely to be and where we need to be” has 
become known as the ‘emissions gap’.
Reflecting on the ten-year anniversary, a summary 
report, entitled Lessons from a decade of emissions gap 
assessments, was published in September for the Secretary-
General’s Climate Action Summit. 
The summary findings are bleak. Countries collectively failed 
to stop the growth in global GHG emissions, meaning that 
deeper and faster cuts are now required. However, behind 
the grim headlines, a more differentiated message emerges 
from the ten-year summary. A number of encouraging 
developments have taken place and the political focus on 
the climate crisis is growing in several countries, with voters 
and protestors, particularly youth, making it clear that it is 
their number one issue. In addition, the technologies for 
rapid and cost-effective emission reductions have improved 
significantly. 
As in previous years, this report explores some of the 
most promising and applicable options available for 
countries to bridge the gap, with a focus on how to create 
transformational change and just transitions. Reflecting on 
the report’s overall conclusions, it is evident that incremental 
changes will not be enough and there is a need for rapid and 
transformational action.
The political context in 2019 has been dominated by 
the United Nations Secretary-General’s Global Climate 
Action Summit, which was held in September and brought 
together governments, the private sector, civil society, local 
authorities and international organizations.
The aim of the Summit was to stimulate action and in 
particular to secure countries’ commitment to enhance their 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) by 2020 and aim 
for net zero emissions by 2050.
According to the press release at the end of the Summit, 
around 70 countries announced their intention to submit 
enhanced NDCs in 2020, with 65 countries and major 
subnational economies committing to work towards 
achieving net zero emissions by 2050. In addition, several 
private companies, finance institutions and major cities 
announced concrete steps to reduce emissions and shift 
investments into low-carbon technologies. A key aim of 
the Summit was to secure commitment from countries 
to enhance their NDCs, which was met to some extent, 
but largely by smaller economies. With most of the G20 
members visibly absent, the likely impact on the emissions 
gap will be limited. 
As regards the scientific perspective, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued two special reports 
in 2019: the Climate Change and Land report on climate 
change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land 
management, food security and greenhouse gas fluxes 
in terrestrial ecosystems, and the Ocean and Cryosphere 
in a Changing Climate report. Both reports voice strong 
concerns about observed and predicted changes resulting 
from climate change and provide an even stronger scientific 
foundation that supports the importance of the temperature 
goals of the Paris Agreement and the need to ensure 
emissions are on track to achieve these goals.
This Emissions Gap Report has been prepared by an 
international team of leading scientists, assessing all 
available information, including that published in the context 
of the IPCC special reports, as well as in other recent 
scientific studies. The assessment production process 
has been transparent and participatory. The assessment 
methodology and preliminary findings were made available 
to the governments of the countries specifically mentioned 
in the report to provide them with the opportunity to 
comment on the findings.
1. GHG emissions continue to rise, despite scientific warnings and political 
commitments.
 ▶ GHG emissions have risen at a rate of 1.5 per cent 
per year in the last decade, stabilizing only briefly 
between 2014 and 2016. Total GHG emissions, 
including from land-use change, reached a record 
high of 55.3 GtCO2e in 2018.
 ▶ Fossil CO 2 emissions from energy use and 
industry, which dominate total GHG emissions, 
grew 2.0 per cent in 2018, reaching a record 37.5 
GtCO2 per year. 
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 ▶ There is no sign of GHG emissions peaking in the 
next few years; every year of postponed peaking 
means that deeper and faster cuts will be required. 
By 2030, emissions would need to be 25 per cent 
and 55 per cent lower than in 2018 to put the 
world on the least-cost pathway to limiting global 
warming to below 2˚C and 1.5°C respectively.
 ▶ Figure ES.1 shows a decomposition of the average 
annual growth rates of economic activity (gross 
domestic product – GDP), primary energy use, 
energy use per unit of GDP, CO2 emissions per unit 
of energy and GHG emissions from all sources 
for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and non-OECD members. 
 ▶ Economic growth has been much stronger in 
non-OECD members, growing at over 4.5 per cent 
per year in the last decade compared with 2 per 
cent per year in OECD members. Since OECD and 
non-OECD members have had similar declines in 
the amount of energy used per unit of economic 
activity, stronger economic growth means that 
primary energy use has increased much faster in 
non-OECD members (2.8 per cent per year) than in 
OECD members (0.3 per cent per year). 
 ▶ OECD members already use less energy per unit 
of economic activity, which suggests that non-
OECD members have the potential to accelerate 
improvements even as they grow, industrialize 
and urbanize their economies in order to meet 
development objectives.
 ▶ While the global data provide valuable insight for 
understanding the continued growth in emissions, 
it is necessary to examine the trends of major 
emitters to gain a clearer picture of the underlying 
trends (figure ES.2). Country rankings change 
dramatically when comparing total and per capita 
emissions: for example, it is evident that China now 
has per capita emissions in the same range as the 
European Union (EU) and is almost at a similar level 
to Japan.
 ▶ Consumption-based emission estimates, also 
known as a carbon footprint, that adjust the 
standard territorial emissions for imports and 
exports, provide policymakers with a deeper 
insight into the role of consumption, trade and 
the interconnectedness of countries. Figure ES.3 
shows that the net flow of embodied carbon is 
from developing to developed countries, even 
as developed countries reduce their territorial 
emissions this effect is being partially offset by 
importing embodied carbon, implying for example 
that EU per capita emissions are higher than 
Chinese when consumption-based emissions are 
included. It should be noted that consumption-
based emissions are not used within the context 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).
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Figure 2.1 — Global greenhouse gas emissions from all sources.
Figure 2.2 —  Average annual growth rates of key drivers of CO2 emissions (left of dotted line) and components of 
greenhouse gas emissions (right of dotted line) for the OECD and the non-OECD.
Figure ES.1. Average annual growth rates of key drivers of global CO2 emissions (left of dotted line) and components of 
greenhouse gas emissions (right of dotted line) for OECD and non-OECD members
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2. G20 members account for 78 per cent of global GHG emissions. Collectively, they are on track 
to meet their limited 2020 Cancun Pledges, 
but seven countries are currently not on track 
to meet 2030 NDC commitments, and for a 
further three, it is not possible to say. 
 ▶ As G20 members account for around 78 per cent 
of global GHG emissions (including land use), they 
largely determine global emission trends and the 
extent to which the 2030 emissions gap will be 
closed. This report therefore pays close attention to 
G20 members.
 ▶ G20 members with 2020 Cancun Pledges are 
collectively projected to overachieve these by about 
1 GtCO2e per year. However, several individual G20 
members (Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, the Republic 
of Korea, South Africa, the United States of America) 
are currently projected to miss their Cancun Pledges 
or will not achieve them with great certainty. 
Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have not made 
2020 pledges and pledges from several countries 
that meet their targets are rather unambitious.
 ▶ Australia is carrying forward their overachievement 
from the Kyoto period to meet their 2020 Cancun 
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Figure 2.3 a+b —  The top emitters of greenhouse gases, excluding land-use change emissions due to lack of reliable 
country-level data, on an absolute basis (left) and per capita basis (left). 
Figure ES.2. Top greenhouse gas emitters, excluding land-use change emissions due to lack of reliable country-level data, 
on an absolute basis (left) and per capita basis (right)
Pledge and counts cumulative emissions between 
2013 and 2020. With this method, the Australian 
Government projects that the country will 
overachieve its 2020 pledge. However, if this ‘carry-
forward’ approach is not taken, Australia will not 
achieve its 2020 pledge. 
 ▶ On the progress of G20 economies towards their 
NDC targets, six members (China, the EU28, India, 
Mexico, Russia and Turkey) are projected to meet 
their unconditional NDC targets with current 
policies. Among them, three countries (India, 
Russia and Turkey) are projected to be more than 
15 per cent lower than their NDC target emission 
levels. These results suggest that the three 
countries have room to raise their NDC ambition 
significantly. The EU28 has introduced climate 
legislation that achieves at least a 40 per cent 
reduction in GHG emissions, which the European 
Commission projects could be overachieved 
if domestic legislation is fully implemented in 
member states. 
 ▶ In contrast, seven G20 members require further 
action of varying degree to achieve their NDC: 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, South Africa and the United States of 
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Figure ES.3. CO2 emissions allocated to the point of emissions (territorial) and the point of consumption, for absolute 
emissions (left) and per capita (right)
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Figure 2.4 a+b —  CO2 emissions allocated to the point of emissions (territorial) and the point of consumption, 
for absolute emissions (left) and per capita (right).
America. For Brazil, the emissions projections 
from three annually updated publications were all 
revised upward, reflecting the recent trend towards 
increased deforestation, among others. In Japan, 
however, current policy projections have been close 
to achieving its NDC target for the last few years. 
 ▶ Studies do not agree on whether Argentina, 
Indonesia and Saudi Arabia are on track to meet 
their unconditional NDCs. For Argentina, recent 
domestic analysis that reflects the most recent 
GHG inventory data up to 2016 projects that the 
country will achieve its unconditional NDC target, 
while two international studies project that it will 
fall short of its target. For Indonesia, this is mainly 
due to uncertainty concerning the country’s land 
use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) 
emissions. For Saudi Arabia, the limited amount of 
information on the country’s climate policies has 
not allowed for further assessments beyond the 
two studies reviewed.
 ▶ S ome G20 members are  cont inuously 
strengthening their mitigation policy packages, 
leading to a downward revision of current policy 
scenario projections for total emissions over 
time. One example is the EU, where a noticeable 
downward shift has been observed in current 
policy scenario projections for 2030 since the 
2015 edition of the Emissions Gap Report.
3. Although the number of countries announcing net zero GHG emission targets 
for 2050 is increasing, only a few countries 
have so far formally submitted long-term 
strategies to the UNFCCC.
 ▶ An increasing number of countries have set net 
zero emission targets domestically and 65 
countries and major subnational economies, 
such as the region of California and major cities 
worldwide, have committed to net zero emissions 
by 2050. However, only a few long-term strategies 
submitted to the UNFCCC have so far committed 
to a timeline for net zero emissions, none of which 
are from a G20 member.
 ▶ Five G20 members (the EU and four individual 
members) have committed to long-term zero 
emission targets, of which three are currently in 
the process of passing legislation and two have 
recently passed legislation. The remaining 15 
G20 members have not yet committed to zero 
emission targets.
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Table ES.1. Global total GHG emissions by 2030 under different scenarios (median and 10th to 90th percentile range), 
temperature implications and the resulting emissions gap
Scenario
(rounded to 
the nearest 
gigaton)
Number 
of 
scenarios 
in set
Global 
total 
emissions 
in 2030 
[GtCO2e]
Estimated temperature outcomes Closest 
corresponding
IPCC SR1.5 
scenario class
Emissions Gap in 2030 
[GtCO2e] 
50% 
probability
66% 
probability
90% 
probability
Below 
2.0°C 
Below 
1.8°C
Below 
1.5°C in 
2100
2005-policies 6
64 
(60–68)
Current 
policy
8
60 
(58–64)
18 
(17–23)
24 
(23–29)
35 
(34–39)
Unconditional 
NDCs
11
56 
(54–60)
15 
(12–18)
21 
(18–24)
32 
(29–35)
Conditional 
NDCs
12
54 
(51–56)
12 
(9–14)
18 
(15–21)
29 
(26–31)
Below 2.0°C
(66% 
probability)
29
41 
(39–46)
Peak:  
1.7-1.8°C 
In 2100:
1.6-1.7°C
Peak:  
1.9-2.0°C 
In 2100:
1.8-1.9°C
Peak:  
2.4-2.6°C 
In 2100:
2.3-2.5°C
Higher-2°C 
pathways
Below 1.8°C
(66% 
probability) 
43
35 
(31–41)
Peak:  
1.6-1.7°C 
In 2100:
1.3-1.6°C
Peak:  
1.7-1.8°C 
In 2100:
1.5-1.7°C
Peak:  
2.1-2.3°C 
In 2100:
1.9-2.2°C
Lower-2°C 
pathways
Below 1.5°C 
in 2100
and peak 
below 
1.7°C (both 
with 66% 
probability) 
13
25 
(22–31)
Peak:  
1.5-1.6°C
In 2100:
1.2-1-3°C
Peak:  
1.6-1.7°C
In 2100:
1.4-1.5°C
Peak:  
2.0-2.1°C
In 2100:
1.8-1.9°C
1.5°C with 
no or limited 
overshoot
4. The emissions gap is large. In 2030, annual emissions need to be 15 GtCO2e lower than 
current unconditional NDCs imply for the 2°C 
goal, and 32 GtCO2e lower for the 1.5°C goal.
 ▶ Estimates of where GHG emissions should be in 
2030 in order to be consistent with a least-cost 
pathway towards limiting global warming to the 
specific temperature goals have been calculated 
from the scenarios that were compiled as part of the 
mitigation pathway assessment of the IPCC Special 
Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C report. 
 ▶ This report presents an assessment of global emissions 
pathways relative to those consistent with limiting 
warming to 2°C, 1.8°C and 1.5°C, in order to provide a 
clear picture of the pathways that will keep warming in 
the range of 2°C to 1.5°C. The report also includes an 
overview of the peak and 2100 temperature outcomes 
associated with different likelihoods. The inclusion of the 
1.8°C level allows for a more nuanced interpretation and 
discussion of the implication of the Paris Agreement’s 
temperature targets for near-term emissions. 
 ▶ The NDC scenarios of this year’s report are based 
on updated data from the same sources used for 
the current policies scenario and is provided by 12 
modelling groups. Projected NDC levels for some 
countries, in particular China and India, depend on 
recent emission trends or GDP growth projections 
that are easily outdated in older studies. Thus, studies 
that were published in 2015, before the adoption of 
the Paris Agreement, have been excluded in this year’s 
update. Excluding such studies has had little impact 
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pathways limiting warming to below 2°C and 1.5°C is 
large (see Figure ES.4). Full implementation of the 
unconditional NDCs is estimated to result in a gap of 
15 GtCO2e (range: 12–18 GtCO2e) by 2030, compared 
with the 2°C scenario. The emissions gap between 
implementing the unconditional NDCs and the 1.5°C 
pathway is about 32 GtCO2e (range: 29–35 GtCO2e). 
 ▶ The full implementation of both unconditional and 
conditional NDCs would reduce this gap by around 
2–3 GtCO2e. 
 ▶ If current unconditional NDCs are fully implemented, 
there is a 66 per cent chance that warming will be 
limited to 3.2°C by the end of the century. If conditional 
NDCs are also effectively implemented, warming will 
likely reduce by about 0.2°C. 
on the projected global emission levels of the NDC 
scenarios, which are very similar to those presented 
in the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2018.
 ▶ With only current policies, GHG emissions are 
estimated to be 60 GtCO2e in 2030. On a least-cost 
pathway towards the Paris Agreement goals in 2030, 
median estimates are 41 GtCO2e for 2°C, 35 GtCO2e 
for 1.8°C, and 25 GtCO2e for 1.5°C.
 ▶ If unconditional and conditional NDCs are fully 
implemented, global emissions are estimated to 
reduce by around 4 GtCO2e and 6 GtCO2e respectively 
by 2030, compared with the current policy scenario.
 ▶ The emissions gap between estimated total global 
emissions by 2030 under the NDC scenarios and under 
Figure ES.4. Global GHG emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap by 2030
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Figure 3.1 —  Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030 
(median estimate and 10th to 90th percentile range).
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5. Dramatic strengthening of the NDCs is needed in 2020. Countries must increase 
their NDC ambitions threefold to achieve the 
well below 2°C goal and more than fivefold to 
achieve the 1.5°C goal. 
 ▶ The ratchet mechanism of the Paris Agreement 
foresees strengthening of NDCs every five years. Parties 
to the Paris Agreement identified 2020 as a critical next 
step in this process, inviting countries to communicate 
or update their NDCs by this time. Given the time lag 
between policy decisions and associated emission 
reductions, waiting until 2025 to strengthen NDCs will 
be too late to close the large 2030 emissions gap. 
 ▶ The challenge is clear. The recent IPCC special reports 
clearly describe the dire consequences of inaction 
and are backed by record temperatures worldwide 
along with enhanced extreme events. 
 ▶ Had serious climate action begun in 2010, the cuts 
required per year to meet the projected emissions 
levels for 2°C and 1.5°C would only have been 0.7 per 
cent and 3.3 per cent per year on average. However, 
since this did not happen, the required cuts in 
emissions are now 2.7 per cent per year from 2020 for 
the 2°C goal and 7.6 per cent per year on average for 
the 1.5°C goal. Evidently, greater cuts will be required 
the longer that action is delayed.
 ▶ Further delaying the reductions needed to meet 
the goals would imply future emission reductions 
and removal of CO2 from the atmosphere at such a 
magnitude that it would result in a serious deviation 
from current available pathways. This, together 
with necessary adaptation actions, risks seriously 
damaging the global economy and undermining food 
security and biodiversity.
6. Enhanced action by G20 members will be essential for the global mitigation effort.
 ▶ This report has a particular focus on the G20 members, 
reflecting on their importance for global mitigation 
efforts. Chapter 4 in particular focuses on progress 
and opportunities for enhancing mitigation ambition 
of seven selected G20 members – Argentina, Brazil, 
China, the EU, India, Japan and the United States of 
America – which represented around 56 per cent of 
global GHG emissions in 2017. The chapter, which was 
pre-released for the Climate Action Summit, presents 
a detailed assessment of action or inaction in key 
sectors, demonstrating that even though there are a 
few frontrunners, the general picture is rather bleak.
 ▶ In 2009, the G20 members adopted a decision to 
gradually phase out fossil-fuel subsidies, though no 
country has committed to fully phasing these out by a 
specific year as yet.
 ▶ Although many countries, including most G20 
members, have committed to net zero deforestation 
targets in the last few decades, these commitments 
are often not supported by action on the ground.
 ▶ Based on the assessment of mitigation potential 
in the seven previously mentioned countries, a 
number of areas have been identified for urgent and 
impactful action (see table ES.2). The purpose of the 
recommendations is to show potential, stimulate 
engagement and facilitate political discussion of 
what is required to implement the necessary action. 
Each country will be responsible for designing their 
own policies and actions.
7. Decarbonizing the global economy will require fundamental structural changes, 
which should be designed to bring multiple 
co-benefits for humanity and planetary 
support systems.
 ▶ If the multiple co-benefits associated with closing 
the emissions gap are fully realized, the required 
transition will contribute in an essential way to 
achieving the United Nations 2030 Agenda with its 
17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
 ▶ Climate protection and adaptation investments 
will become a precondition for peace and 
stability, and will require unprecedented efforts to 
transform societies, economies, infrastructures 
and governance institutions. At the same time, 
deep and rapid decarbonization processes imply 
fundamental structural changes are needed within 
economic sectors, firms, labour markets and trade 
patterns. 
 ▶ By necessity, this will see profound change in how 
energy, food and other material-intensive services 
are demanded and provided by governments, 
businesses and markets. These systems of 
provision are entwined with the preferences, actions 
and demands of people as consumers, citizens and 
communities. Deep-rooted shifts in values, norms, 
consumer culture and world views are inescapably 
part of the great sustainability transformation.
 ▶ Legitimacy for decarbonization therefore requires 
massive social mobilization and investments in 
social cohesion to avoid exclusion and resistance 
to change. Just and timely transitions towards 
sustainability need to be developed, taking 
into account the interests and rights of people 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, of 
people and regions where decarbonization requires 
structural adjustments, and of future generations.
 ▶ Fortunately, deep transformation to close the 
emissions gap between trends based on current 
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Argentina
 ● Refrain from extracting new, alternative fossil-fuel resources
 ● Reallocate fossil-fuel subsidies to support distributed renewable electricity-generation
 ● Shift towards widespread use of public transport in large metropolitan areas
 ● Redirect subsidies granted to companies for the extraction of alternative fossil fuels to building-sector measures
Brazil
 ● Commit to the full decarbonization of the energy supply by 2050
 ● Develop a national strategy for ambitious electric vehicle (EV) uptake aimed at complementing biofuels and at 100-
per cent CO2-free new vehicles
 ● Promote the ‘urban agenda’ by increasing the use of public transport and other low-carbon alternatives
China
 ● Ban all new coal-fired power plants
 ● Continue governmental support for renewables, taking into account cost reductions, and accelerate development 
towards a 100 per cent carbon-free electricity system
 ● Further support the shift towards public modes of transport
 ● Support the uptake of electric mobility, aiming for 100 per cent CO2-free new vehicles
 ● Promote near-zero emission building development and integrate it into Government planning
European Union
 ● Adopt an EU regulation to refrain from investment in fossil-fuel infrastructure, including new natural gas pipelines
 ● Define a clear endpoint for the EU emissions trading system (ETS) in the form of a cap that must lead to zero emissions
 ● Adjust the framework and policies to enable 100 per cent carbon-free electricity supply by between 2040 and 2050
 ● Step up efforts to phase out coal-fired plants
 ● Define a strategy for zero-emission industrial processes
 ● Reform the EU ETS to more effectively reduce emissions in industrial applications
 ● Ban the sale of internal combustion engine cars and buses and/or set targets to move towards 100 per cent of new 
car and bus sales being zero-carbon vehicles in the coming decades
 ● Shift towards increased use of public transport in line with the most ambitious Member States
 ● Increase the renovation rate for intensive retrofits of existing buildings
India
 ● Plan the transition from coal-fired power plants
 ● Develop an economy-wide green industrialization strategy towards zero-emission technologies
 ● Expand mass public transit systems
 ● Develop domestic electric vehicle targets working towards 100 per cent new sales of zero-emission cars
Japan
 ● Develop a strategic energy plan that includes halting the construction of new freely emitting coal-fired power plants, 
as well as a phase-out schedule of existing plants and a 100 per cent carbon-free electricity supply
 ● Increase the current level of carbon pricing with high priority given to the energy and building sector
 ● Develop a plan to phase out the use of fossil fuels through promoting passenger cars that use electricity from 
renewable energy 
 ● Implement a road map as part of efforts towards net-zero energy buildings and net-zero energy houses
USA
 ● Introduce regulations on power plants, clean energy standards and carbon pricing to achieve an electricity supply 
that is 100 per cent carbon-free 
 ● Implement carbon pricing on industrial emissions 
 ● Strengthen vehicle and fuel economy standards to be in line with zero emissions for new cars in 2030
 ● Implement clean building standards so that all new buildings are 100 per cent electrified by 2030
Table ES.2. Selected current opportunities to enhance ambition in seven G20 members in line with ambitious climate 
actions and targets 
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policies and achieving the Paris Agreement can be 
designed to bring multiple co-benefits for humanity 
and planetary support systems. These range, for 
example, from reducing air pollution, improving human 
health, establishing sustainable energy systems and 
industrial production processes, making consumption 
and services more efficient and sufficient, employing 
less-intensive agricultural practices and mitigating 
biodiversity loss to liveable cities. 
 ▶ This year’s report explores six entry points for 
progressing towards closing the emissions gap 
through transformational change in the following 
areas: (a) air pollution, air quality, health; (b) 
urbanization; (c) governance, education, employment; 
(d) digitalization; (e) energy- and material-efficient 
services for raising living standards; and (f) land use, 
food security, bioenergy. Building on this overview, a 
more detailed discussion of transitions in the energy 
sector is presented in chapter 6.
8. Renewables and energy efficiency, in combination with electrification of end uses, 
are key to a successful energy transition and 
to driving down energy-related CO2 emissions. 
 ▶ The necessary transition of the global energy sector 
will require significant investments compared with a 
business-as-usual scenario. Climate policies that are 
consistent with the 1.5°C goal will require upscaling 
energy system supply-side investments to between 
US$1.6 trillion and US$3.8 trillion per year globally on 
average over the 2020–2050 time frame, depending 
on how rapid energy efficiency and conservation 
efforts can be ramped up. 
 ▶ Given the important role that energy and especially the 
electricity sector will have to play in any low-carbon 
transformation, chapter 6 examines five transition 
options, taking into account their relevance for a wide 
range of countries, clear co-benefit opportunities and 
potential to deliver significant emissions reductions. 
Each of the following transitions correspond to a 
particular policy rationale or motivation, which is 
discussed in more detail in the chapter:
 ● Expanding Renewable Energy for electrification. 
 ● Phasing out coal for rapid decarbonization of the 
energy system.
 ● Decarbonizing transport with a focus on electric 
mobility.
 ● Decarbonizing energy-intensive industry.
 ● Avoiding future emissions while improving energy 
access.
 ▶ Implementing such major transitions in a number 
of areas will require increased interdependency 
between energy and other infrastructure sectors, 
where changes in one sector can impact another. 
Similarly, there will be a strong need to connect 
demand and supply-side policies and include 
wider synergies and co-benefits, such as job 
losses and creation, rehabilitation of ecosystem 
ser vices, avoidance of reset tlements and 
reduced health and environmental costs as a 
result of reduced emissions. The same applies 
for decarbonizing transport, where there will be 
a need for complementarity and coordination of 
policies, driven by technological, environmental 
and land-use pressures. Policies will need to be 
harmonized wherever possible to take advantage 
of interdependencies and prevent undesirable 
outcomes such as CO2 leakage from one sector 
to another.  
 ▶ Any transition at this scale is likely to be extremely 
challenging and will meet a number of economic, 
political and technical barriers and challenges. 
However, many drivers of climate action have 
changed in the last years, with several options 
for ambitious climate action becoming less 
costly, more numerous and better understood. 
First, technological and economic developments 
present oppor tunit ies to decarbonize the 
economy, especially the energy sector, at a cost 
that is lower than ever. Second, the synergies 
between climate action and economic growth 
and development objectives, including options 
for addressing distributional impacts, are better 
understood. Finally, policy momentum across 
various levels of government, as well as a surge in 
climate action commitments by non-state actors, 
are creating opportunities for countries to engage 
in real transitions.
 ▶ A key example of technological and economic 
trends is the cost of renewable energy, which is 
declining more rapidly than was predicted just 
a few years ago (see figure ES.5). Renewables 
are currently the cheapest source of new power 
generation in most of the world, with the global 
weighted average purchase or auction price for 
new utility-scale solar power photovoltaic systems 
and utility-scale onshore wind turbines projected 
to compete with the marginal operating cost of 
existing coal plants by 2020. These trends are 
increasingly manifesting in a decline in new coal 
plant construction, including the cancellation of 
planned plants, as well as the early retirement of 
existing plants. Moreover, real-life cost declines 
are outpacing projections. 
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Table ES.3. Summary of five energy transition options
A short summary of the main aspects of each transition is presented in table ES.3.
Option Major components Instruments Co-benefits Annual GHG emissions 
reduction potential 
of renewables, 
electrification, energy 
efficiency and other 
measures by 2050
Renewable 
energy 
electricity 
expansion
 ● Plan for large shares 
of variable renewable 
energy
 ● Electricity becomes 
the main energy 
source by 2050, 
supplying at least 50 
per cent of total final 
energy consumption 
(TFEC)
 ● Share of renewable 
energy in electricity up 
to 85 per cent by 2050
 ● Transition
 ● Flexibility measures 
to take on larger 
shares of variable 
renewable energy
 ● Support for 
deployment of 
distributed energy
 ● Innovative 
measures: cost 
reflective tariff 
structures, targeted 
subsidies, reverse 
auctions, net 
metering
 ● Greater efficiency 
in end-use energy 
demand
 ● Health benefits
 ● Energy access and 
security
 ● Employment
 ● Power sector: 8.1 
GtCO2
 ● Building sector:  
2.1 GtCO2
 ● District heat and 
others: 1.9 GtCO2
Coal phase-
out
 ● Plan and implement 
phase-out of coal
 ● Coal to renewable 
energy transition
 ● Expand carbon capture 
usage and storage 
systems
 ● Improve system-wide 
efficiency
 ● Regional support 
programmes
 ● Tax breaks, 
subsidies
 ● Carbon pricing
 ● Moratorium policies
 ● De-risking of clean 
energy investments
 ● Relocation of coal 
workers (mines and 
power plants)
 ● Lower health 
hazards (air, water, 
land pollution)
 ● Future skills and 
job creation
Share of the power 
emissions reduction 
from a coal phase-
out: 4 GtCO2 (range: 
3.6– 4.4 GtCO2), with 
1 GtCO2 from the 
OECD and 3 GtCO2 
from the rest of the 
world
Decarbonize 
transport
 ● Reduce energy for 
transport
 ● Electrify transport
 ● Fuels substitution 
(bioenergy, hydrogen)
 ● Modal shift
 ● Pathways for non-
motorized transport
 ● Standards for 
vehicle emissions
 ● Establishing of 
charging stations
 ● Eliminating of 
fossil-fuel subsidies
 ● Investments in 
public transport
 ● Increased public 
health from more 
physical activity, 
less air pollution 
 ● Energy security
 ● Reduced fuel 
spending
 ● Less congestion
Electrification of 
transport: 6.1 GtCO2 
Decarbonize 
industry
 ● Demand reduction 
(circular economy, 
modal shifts and 
logistics)
 ● Electrify heat 
processes
 ● Improve energy 
efficiency
 ● Direct use of biomass/
biofuels
 ● Carbon pricing
 ● Standards and 
regulations, 
especially on 
materials demand 
reduction
 ● Energy security
 ● Savings and 
competitiveness
 ● Industry: 4.8 GtCO2 
Avoid future 
emissions and 
energy access
 ● Link energy access 
with emission 
reductions for 3.5 
billion energy-poor 
people
 ● Fit and auctions
 ● Standards and 
regulations
 ● Targeted subsidies
 ● Support for 
entrepreneurs
 ● Better access
 ● Meet basic needs 
and SDGs
 ● N/A
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Figure 6.1 —  Here we're missing the headline and description of the figure
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Figure ES.5. Changes in global levelized cost of e rgy for key renewable nergy technologies, 2010-2018
9. Demand-side material efficiency offers substantial GHG mitigation opportunities that 
are complementary to those obtained through 
an energy system transformation. 
 ▶ While demand-side material efficiency widens the 
spectrum of emission mitigation strategies, it has 
largely been overlooked in climate policymaking 
until now and will be important for the cross-sectoral 
transitions.
 ▶ In 2015, the production of materials caused GHG 
emissions of approximately 11.5 GtCO2e, up from 
5  GtCO2e in 1995. The largest contribution stems 
from bulk materials production, such as iron and 
steel, cement, lime and plaster, other minerals mostly 
used as construction products, as well as plastics and 
rubber. Two thirds of the materials are used to make 
capital goods, with buildings and vehicles among the 
most important. While the production of materials 
consumed in industrialized countries remained within 
the range of 2–3 GtCO2e, in the 1995–2015 period, 
those of developing and emerging economies have 
largely been behind the growth. In this context, it is 
important to keep in mind the discussion about the 
point of production and points of consumption (see 
figure ES.6).
 ▶ Material efficiency and substitution strategies affect 
not only energy demand and emissions during material 
production, but also potentially the operational energy 
use of the material products. Analysis of such strategies 
therefore requires a systems or life cycle perspective. 
Several investigations of material efficiency have 
focused on strategies that have little impact on 
operations, meaning that trade-offs and synergies 
have been ignored. Many energy efficiency strategies 
have implications for the materials used, such as 
increased insulation demand for buildings or a shift to 
more energy-intensive materials in the lightweighting 
of vehicles. While these additional, material-related 
emissions are well understood from technology studies, 
they are often not fully captured in the integrated 
assessment models that produce scenario results, 
such as those discussed in this report.
 ▶ In chapter 7, the mitigation potential from demand-side 
material efficiency improvements is discussed in the 
context of the following categories of action:
 ● Product lightweighting and substitution of high-
carbon materials with low-carbon materials to reduce 
material-related GHG emissions associated with 
product production, as well as operational energy 
consumption of vehicles.
 ● Improvements in the yield of material production and 
product manufacture.
 ● More intensive use, longer life, component reuse, 
remanufacturing and repair as strategies to obtain 
more service from material-based products.
Emissions Gap Report 2019
XXV
83
  Em
issions G
ap Report 2019
Chapter 4 – Trends And Bridging the gap: Strengthening NDCs and domestic policies
Figure 7.1 —  Here we're missing the headline and description of the figure
0
5
10
G
tC
O
e
11.5
GtCOe
11.5 GtCOe
Construction
5.0
Machinery
2.0
Metal products
0.9
Transport
equipment
0.9
Electronics
0.3
Other products
1.0
Services
0.6
Final use
0.81.4 Plastic and rubber
0.9 Wood products
1.1 Other minerals
0.4 Glass
2.9 Cement
0.5 Other metals
0.6 Aluminium
3.7 Iron and steel
Figure ES.6. GHG emissions in GtCO2e associated with materials production by material (left) and by the first use of 
materials in subsequent production processes or final consumption (right) 
 
 ● Enhanced recycling so that secondary materials 
reduce the need to produce more emission-intensive 
primary materials.  
 ▶ These categories are elaborated for housing and 
cars, showing that increased material efficiency can 
reduce annual emissions from the construction and 
operations of buildings and the manufacturing and 
use of passenger vehicles, thus contributing a couple 
of gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent in emission 
reductions to the global mitigation effort by 2030.
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This tenth edition of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report provides an 
independent scientific assessment of how countries’ 
climate pledges and actions are affecting the global 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) trend, comparing it with 
the emission reductions necessary to limit global warming 
to well below 2°C and 1.5°C in accordance with the Paris 
Agreement. This difference between where we are likely to 
be by 2030 and where we need to be has become known as 
the ‘emissions gap’. 
To mark the 10-year anniversary, a publication summarizing 
the lessons from a decade of emissions gap assessments 
(Christensen and Olhoff 2019) was published to support the 
United Nations Secretary-General’s Climate Action Summit 
in September 2019. This publication shows that despite a 
decade of increased focus on climate change, global GHG 
emissions have not been curbed and the emissions gap is 
now larger than ever. It is clear that the world cannot afford 
another decade lost. Unless mitigation action and ambition 
are increased immediately and profoundly through enhanced 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and supported 
by ambitious long-term mitigation strategies, it will not be 
possible to avoid exceeding the 1.5°C goal, and it will become 
increasingly challenging to achieve the well below 2°C goal.
At the Climate Action Summit, countries and regions 
announced their intention to improve national and subnational 
action. For example, 70 countries agreed to submit enhanced 
NDCs by 2020, with the number of commitments to zero GHG 
and carbon emission targets at some point during the second 
half of this century increasing from around 20 countries 
and eight regions before the Summit to 71 countries and 
11 regions after the Summit. However, these countries and 
regions account for just 15 per cent of global emissions, 
indicating that the scale and pace of climate commitments 
and action is still far from what is required to keep the Paris 
Agreement goals within reach.
The challenge for the twenty-fifth session of the Conference 
of the Parties (COP  25) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the year 
to follow is thus to bring about the necessary move from 
incremental to transformational climate ambition and action. 
The year 2020, which is when countries are requested to 
submit new or updated NDCs and invited to communicate 
long-term mitigation strategies as part of the UNFCCC 
process, will be defining in this regard. 
As in previous years, this Emissions Gap Report has been 
prepared by an international team comprising 57 leading 
scientists from 33 expert institutions across 25 countries, 
assessing all available information, including that published 
in the context of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) special reports. The assessment process 
has been overseen by a distinguished steering committee 
and has been transparent and participatory. The assessment 
methodology and preliminary findings were made available 
to the governments of the countries specifically mentioned in 
the report to provide them with the opportunity to comment 
on the findings.
The report is organized into seven chapters, including this 
introduction, and is structured on the questions that guided 
the 2018 Talanoa Dialogue: Where are we? Where do we want 
to go? How do we get there? In this way, chapter 2 focuses on 
where we are, providing an updated assessment of the status 
and trends of current and projected global GHG emissions, 
and the progress of G20 members towards their Cancun 
Pledges for 2020 and their NDC targets for 2030.
Addressing the issue of where we want to go and comparing 
it with where we are likely to be, chapter 3 assesses what the 
gap between estimated global emissions will be by 2030 if 
NDCs are fully implemented, as well as the range consistent 
with the well below 2°C and 1.5°C temperature goals. The 
chapter also considers what the temperature implications 
will be at the end of the century if current policies are 
continued, and whether global emissions by 2030 will be 
permissible if the current level of ambition of NDCs is not 
increased.
Finally, the second part of the report examines how the 
gap can be bridged. Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive 
overview of recent ambitious climate actions by national and 
subnational governments as well as non-state actors, and 
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a detailed overview of policy progress and opportunities for 
enhanced mitigation ambition for selected G20 members. 
With the aim of informing the Climate Action Summit and the 
preparation of new and updated NDCs, a special pre-release 
version of chapter 4 was published in time for the Summit. 
The chapter illustrates that collectively, the G20 members 
have not yet taken on transformative commitments at the 
breadth and scale necessary, highlighting that despite many 
positive developments, commitments are still far from what 
is required. Chapter 5 details the key transformations that 
are needed to align global trends with the Paris Agreement 
goals and how such transformational pathways in many 
cases can be synergistic with achieving other development 
priorities, including the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). Global transformation of energy systems is crucial 
for bridging the emissions gap. Chapter 6 reviews five 
transition options that are relevant for many countries, 
can be designed to achieve development and mitigation 
goals simultaneously and are associated with significant 
emission reduction potentials. Finally, chapter 7 assesses 
how material efficiency strategies for residential buildings 
and cars can contribute to bridging the gap. 
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter assesses the latest trends in greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions as well as progress of G20 economies 
towards both the Cancun pledges for 2020 and Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) for 2025 and 2030. The 
chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 takes stock 
of the current global GHG emissions status and trends. 
Section 2.3 provides an assessment of whether G20 
members are on track to meet their Cancun pledges and 
NDC targets, while section 2.4 summarizes recent policy 
developments of individual G20 economies. This section 
also serves as a basis for chapter 4, which explores 
opportunities for additional GHG emissions reductions 
that could be considered in the NDC update process 
by 2020 and beyond. Section 2.5 provides an overview 
of submitted long-term low emissions development 
strategies to date.
In the 2019 report, all GHG emission figures are expressed 
using the 100-year global warming potentials (GWPs) from 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
1 This change was made to be more in line with the decisions made at the COP in Katowice. Parties agreed on the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) for 
reporting reasons at COP 24 in Katowice. A full switch to AR5 GWP was not yet possible because the literature is still not up to date on this decision. 
2 GHG emissions are 1.8 GtCO2e higher than the emissions estimate in 2017 presented in recent UNEP Emissions Gap Reports. This is mainly due to 
the impact of GWPs (1.5 GtCO2e) and the change in LUC emissions (-0.7 GtCO2e), whereas the yearly change in 2018 contributes 1.0 GtCO2e.
3 GHG emissions are based on EDGARv5 (Olivier and Peters 2019) and LUC emissions are from Houghton and Nassikas (2017). In this report, GWPs 
from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report are used (25 for CH4 and 298 for N2O). This yields total GHG emissions that are 1 GtCO2e higher in 1970 
and 1.5 GtCO2e higher in 2018.
Fourth Assessment Report1, unless otherwise noted, 
whereas United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
Emissions Gap Report 2018 used Global Warming Potential 
(GWP) values of IPCC Second Assessment Report.
2.2 Current global emissions: status  
and trends
Total GHG emissions grew 1.5 per cent per year in the last 
decade (2009 to 2018) without land-use change (LUC) 
and 1.3 per cent per year with LUC, to reach a record 
high of 51.8 GtCO2e in 2018 without LUC emissions and 
55.3 GtCO2e2 in 2018 with LUC. GHG emissions growth 
was 2.0 per cent in 2018 and there is no sign of a peak in 
any of the GHG emissions3 (figure 2.1). GHG emissions 
have grown every year since the global financial crisis in 
2009, with only slightly lower growth in 2015 due to big 
declines in coal use in both the United States of America 
and China. Fossil CO2 emissions, from both energy use 
and industry, dominate total GHG emissions and reached 
a record 37.5 GtCO2 per year in 2018, after growing 1.5 
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per cent per year in the last decade and 2.0 per cent in 
20184. The growth in fossil CO2 emissions was due to 
robust growth in energy use (2.9 per cent in 2018). CO2 
emissions from LUC are about 7 per cent of total GHGs 
and have large uncertainty and inter-annual variability, 
remaining relatively flat over the last decade (IPCC 2019). 
Methane (CH4) emissions, the next most important GHG, 
grew at 1.3 per cent per year in the last decade and 1.7 per 
cent in 2018. Nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions are growing 
steadily, at 1.0 per cent per year in the last decade and 
0.8 per cent in 2018. Fluorinated gases (SF6, HFCs, PFCs) 
are growing the fastest, at 4.6 per cent per year in the last 
decade and 6.1 per cent in 2018.
GHG emissions are growing globally, despite progress 
in climate policy, as the countries where emissions are 
declining are not able to offset the growth in emissions 
in other countries. A recent study found that there are 18 
developed economies where CO2 emissions are declining 
(Le Quéré et al. 2019), the United States of America and 
some European countries. We extend several aspects 
of that analysis to compare Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD 
economies. Figure 2.2 shows a decomposition of the 
growth in economic activity (Gross Domestic Product, 
GDP), primary energy use, the energy use per unit of GDP, 
the CO2 emissions per unit of energy, and GHG emissions 
4 In this report, CO2 emissions from fossil-fuels and industry grew 2.0 per cent in 2018, using EDGARv5 (Olivier and Peters 2019). The Global Carbon 
Budget estimates 2018 fossil-fuel and industry emissions to grow 2.1 per cent (Friedlingstein et al. 2019), while for combustion-related emissions 
only, the Institute of Economic Affairs estimated growth of 1.7 per cent (IEA 2019) and BP estimated growth of 2.0 per cent (BP 2019).
from all sources, for OECD (blue) and non-OECD (orange) 
economies. Economic activity has been much stronger in 
non-OECD economies, growing at over 4.5 per cent per year 
in the last decade compared to just 2 per cent per year in 
OECD economies. Since the OECD (1.7 per cent per year) 
and non-OECD (2 per cent per year) economies have had 
similar declines in the amount of energy used per unit of 
economic activity, economic growth means that that energy 
use has grown much faster in non-OECD economies (2.8 per 
cent per year) than OECD economies (0.3 per cent per year). 
OECD economies already use less energy per unit economic 
activity, suggesting that non-OECD economies have the 
potential to accelerate improvements.
Declining or flat energy use makes it easier for non-fossil 
energy sources, like wind and solar, to displace fossil fuels in 
the energy system. The flat energy use in OECD economies 
is one key reason that emissions have decreased in those 
regions (Le Quéré et al. 2019), with the declines accelerated 
due to a declining amount of CO2 emitted per unit of energy 
use (-0.8 per cent per year). In non-OECD economies, 
slightly more CO2 is emitted per unit of energy in the last 
decade (0.2 per cent per year growth), meaning that CO2 
emissions have grown slightly faster than energy use. In 
non-OECD economies, the rapid deployment of solar and 
wind power has not been strong enough to displace fossil 
fuels, particularly in countries with growing energy use and 
13
  Em
issions G
ap Report 2019
Chapter 4 – Trends And Bridging the gap: Strengthening NDCs and domestic policies
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
20182015201020051990 1995 2000
G
lo
ba
l g
re
en
ho
us
e 
ga
s 
em
is
si
on
s 
(G
tC
O
e
)
Land-use change (LUC)
Fluorinated gases (F-gas)
NO
CH
Fossil CO
Av
er
ag
e 
an
nu
al
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
(%
 p
er
 y
ea
r)
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
GH
G 
Flu
ori
na
ted
 ga
se
s
N
O
CH

CO
 w
/o
 LU
C
Ca
rbo
n i
nte
ns
ity
En
erg
y i
nte
ns
ity
Pr
im
ary
 en
erg
y
GD
P (
PP
P)
Growth rate non-OECD: 2009–2018
Growth rate OECD: 2009–2018
Figure 2.1 — Global greenhouse gas emissions from all sources.
Figure 2.2 —  Average annual growth rates of key drivers of CO2 emissions (left of dotted line) and components of 
greenhouse gas emissions (right of dotted line) for the OECD and the non-OECD.
Figure 2.1. Global greenhouse gas emissions from all sources
Source: Olivier and Peters (2019), Houghton and Nassikas (2017) for land-use change emissions, and Friedlingstein et al. (2019) for updates 
from 2016 to 2018
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globally. In total, OECD economies have seen CO2 emissions 
decline by -0.4 per cent per year in the last decade, while 
non-OECD economies have seen emissions growing at 
nearly 3 per cent per year. In the near term, it is expected that 
energy use will continue to grow in non-OECD economies, 
but more rapid improvements in energy intensity, together 
with deployment of low-carbon energy sources, could lead 
to an earlier peak and then decline in CO2 emissions.
GHG emissions are dominated by CO2, but the non-CO2 
emissions represent over 34 per cent of total GHG emissions 
including LUC. OECD economies have only seen very limited 
growth in CH4 and N2O, but rapid growth in fluorinated gases, 
leading to an overall slight decline in GHG emissions. Non-
OECD economies have seen strong growth in all non-CO2 
GHGs, leading to an overall increase in GHG emissions of 2.5 
per cent per year in the last decade. While CO2 dominates 
GHG emissions, reductions in other components can help 
achieve an earlier peak in GHG emissions.
While global emissions statistics provide important 
information on collective progress, they mask the dynamics 
at the country level (figure 2.3). The top four emitters (China, 
EU28, India and the United States of America) contribute 
to over 55 per cent of the total GHG emissions over the 
last decade excluding LUC, the top seven (including Japan, 
Russia and international transport) account for 65 per cent, 
while G20 members contribute 78 per cent. China emits 
more than one-quarter (26 per cent) of global emissions 
(excluding LUC), and despite contributing significantly to the 
slowdown in global emissions from 2014 to 2016, emissions 
in the country are now rising again, growing 2.5 per cent in the 
last decade and 1.6 per cent in 2018 to reach a record high 
13.7 GtCO2e in 2018. The United States of America emits 13 
per cent of global GHG emissions, with a gradual decline in 
GHG emissions of 0.1 per cent per year in the last decade, 
but an increase of 2.5 per cent in 2018 due to increased 
energy demand from an unusually warm summer and cold 
winter. The European Union emits 8.5 per cent of global GHG 
emissions and has had a steady decline of 1 per cent per year 
in the last decade and a decline of 1.3 per cent in 2018. India, 
accounting for 7 per cent of global emissions, continues to 
have rapid growth in emissions of 3.7 per cent per year in the 
last decade and 5.5 per cent in 2018. The Russian Federation 
(4.8 per cent) and Japan (2.7 per cent) are the next largest 
emitters, with international transport (aviation and shipping) 
representing around 2.5 per cent of GHG emissions. If LUC 
emissions were included, the rankings would change, with 
Brazil likely to be the largest emitter.
The ranking of countries changes dramatically when 
considering per capita emissions (figure 2.3, right), but 
less so when allocating emissions to consumption (figure 
2.4). Consumption-based emissions, also known as a 
carbon footprint, adjusts the standard territorial emissions. 
As figure 2.4 shows, developed countries import more 
emissions than they export, with the opposite holding true 
in developing countries. In the 2000s, there was a growing 
gap between consumption-based emissions in developed 
countries and their territorial emissions. This gap was larger 
than the reductions made under the Kyoto Protocol (Peters 
et al. 2011). Since the global financial crisis in 2008, the 
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Figure 2.2. Average annual growth rates of key drivers of global CO2 emissions (left of dotted line) and components of 
greenhouse gas emissions (right of dotted line) for OECD and non-OECD conomies
Source: Olivier and Peters (2019) and Global Carbon Project (Friedlingstein et al. 2019) for energy and economic data
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Source: Olivier and Peters (2019), Houghton and Nassikas (2017) for land-use change emissions, and Friedlingstein et al. (2019) for updates 
from 2016 to 2018
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Figure 2.4 a+b —  CO2 emissions allocated to the point of emissions (territorial) and the point of consumption, 
for absolute emissions (left) and per capita (right).
Figure 2.3. The top emitters of greenhouse gases, excluding land-use change emissions due to lack of reliable country-level 
data, on an absolute basis (left) and per capita basis (right)
Figure 2.4. CO2 emissions allocated to the point of emissions (territorial) and the point of consumption, for absolute 
emissions (left) and per capita (right)
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gap has stabilized, and even declined. China contributed to 
most of the growth in the 2000s, but also the stabilization in 
the 2010s (Pan et al. 2017). Consumption-based emission 
estimates allow policymakers to focus on different policy 
levers and may help deal with carbon leakage under 
stringent climate policies.
2.3 Assessment of G20 Member 
progress towards Cancun pledges 
and NDC targets
GHG emissions projections were compiled and reviewed 
to assess the emission levels expected for G20 members 
under existing policies (“Current policies scenario”) and 
whether they would meet their respective emissions 
reduction targets for 2020 and 2030. We followed the 
methodology of den Elzen et al. (2019) to enable a fair 
comparison of projections from different data sources, 
including both official data sources published by the G20 
governments as well as sources published by independent 
research institutions.
Up-to-date emissions projections published since 
November 2018 were collected from countries’ recently 
published National Communications, the third biennial 
reports of seven G20 members, several other new national 
studies and the independent global studies Climate Action 
Tracker (Climate Action Tracker 2019d), the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) of the European Commission (Keramidas et 
al. 2018) and PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency (Kuramochi et al. 2018) for the current policies 
scenario and NDC scenario projections (see appendix A, 
available online, for scenario definitions). Several studies 
on current policies scenario projections from the UNEP 
Emissions Gap Report 2018 data set were excluded, 
as these were concluded not to be representative 
of the policies implemented to date (mostly those 
published before 2017, depending on the G20 Member). 
All data sources are presented in appendix A. Current 
policies scenario projections from studies without NDC 
quantification were compared to official NDC emission 
values in absolute terms or – when official NDC emission 
values are not available – to the median estimates of NDC 
emission levels across independent studies.
This section should be read with some important caveats 
in mind (den Elzen et al. 2019). First, whether a country 
is projected to achieve or miss its emissions reduction 
targets with existing policies depends on both the ambition 
level of the targets, which this study does not assess, and 
the strength or stringency of existing policy packages. 
Therefore, countries projected to achieve their NDCs with 
existing policies are not necessarily undertaking more 
mitigation action than countries that are projected to miss 
them. Chapter 3 of this report and the literature (Rogelj 
et al. 2010; 2016) are clear that the NDCs are collectively 
far from sufficient to keep warming to 2°C, let alone 
1.5°C, and thus all countries have to raise the ambition 
of their current NDCs significantly. According to the Paris 
Agreement, countries are obligated to regularly update and 
strengthen their NDCs. The assessment conducted in this 
section is based on current NDCs, recognizing that they 
are to be revised and should be strengthened considerably 
by 2020 to meet the climate goal of the Paris Agreement. 
Second, current policies scenario projections are subject 
to the uncertainty associated with macroeconomic trends, 
such as GDP and population growth and technology 
developments, as well as with the impact of policies. Some 
Cancun pledges and NDCs are also subject to uncertainty 
of future GDP growth and other underlying assumptions.
It is also worth noting that the current policies scenario 
projections do not reflect the likely impact of all policies 
implemented to date for a number of reasons. First, there 
is always a time lag between the date a new policy measure 
was implemented and the date a scenario study that 
considered this new policy was published. Second, it often 
takes time for research institutions to assess whether a 
new policy measure would be effectively implemented to 
achieve its intended objective, resulting in an even larger 
time lag. Third, GHG emissions projection models have 
limitations on the types of policies they can incorporate, 
which may result in an under- or overestimation of 
projected emissions.
On the progress of G20 economies towards their 2020 
pledges, they are collectively (those who have Cancun 
pledges) projected to overachieve their Cancun pledges by 
about 1 GtCO2e per year based on the assessments from the 
Climate Action Tracker (Climate Action Tracker 2019d) and 
PBL (Kuramochi et al. 2018), the two studies that annually 
update both the 2020 pledge emission levels and current 
policies scenario projections. However, several individual 
G20 members (Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, Republic of 
Korea, South Africa, the United States of America) are 
currently projected to miss their Cancun pledges or will 
not achieve them with great certainty. In Australia, the 
Government projects that they would overachieve their 
2020 pledge based on their carbon budget approach that 
accounts for cumulative emissions between 2013 and 
2020 (Australia, Department of the Environment and Energy 
2018). Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have not made 
2020 pledges.
On the progress of G20 economies towards their NDC 
targets, six members: China, the EU28, India, Mexico, Russia 
and Turkey, are projected to meet their unconditional NDC 
targets with current policies (table 2.1). Among them, the 
current policies scenario emissions projections for three 
countries (India, Russia and Turkey) are projected to be 15+ 
per cent lower than the NDC target emission levels. These 
results suggest that the three countries have room for raising 
their NDC ambitions significantly. The EU28 has introduced 
climate legislation that achieves at least 40 per cent GHG 
reductions and is projected by the European Commission 
(European Commission 2018b) to overachieve these, if 
domestic legislation is fully implemented (figure 2.5).
Emissions Gap Report 2019
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Figure 2.5. Greenhouse gas emissions (all gases and sectors) of the G20 and its individual members by 2030 under different 
scenarios and compared with historical emissions
Figure 2.5a.
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The change in assessment results for he EU28 from our 
2018 report is partially due to the differences in whether 
and how the new policy packages adopted in recent months 
were considered in GHG emissions projections (see also the 
EU28 section and an earlier paragraph in this section). All 
three independent studies (Climate Action Tracker, JRC and 
PBL) do not take the recently adopted policy packages into 
account. Also, along with official publications, the European 
Environment Agency (EEA 2018) projects emissions based 
on Member state-level policies5 and the third Biennial Report 
of 2017 (“With Current Measures” scenario), which projects 
that the EU28 would remain short of achieving its NDC 
target, and does not cover policies implemented in last two 
years. By contrast, the reference scenario in the 2018 analysis 
produced by the European Commission supporting the long-
term vision document, which reflects recent European Union 
(EU)-level policies and assumes their full implementation, 
projects that the EU28 could reduce its GHG emissions by 48 
per cent from 1990 levels including LULUCF. For this reason, 
the EU28 has been classified as projected to overachieve its 
NDC target in table 2.1, even though the independent studies 
do not project the EU28 to achieve its NDC target (figures 2.5 
and 2.6), as they are not fully updated.
5 Member States who are at different stages when it comes to implementing domestic measures to meet EU legislation. It is logical that progression 
is achieved in these projections over time as Member States take additional actions.
Seven G20 members require further action of varying degree 
to achieve their NDC targets: Australia, Brazil (new, changed 
compared to UNEP (2018)), Canada, Japan (new), Republic 
of Korea, South Africa and the United States of America. 
For Brazil, the projections from three annually updated 
publications were all revised upward, reflecting, among 
others, the recent turn of trends on deforestation. Japan’s 
current policies projections have been on the borderline of 
achieving the NDC target for the last few years.
Studies do not agree on whether Argentina, Indonesia and 
Saudi Arabia (new) are on track to meet their unconditional 
NDCs. For Argentina, a recent domestic analysis that 
reflects the most recent GHG inventory data up to 2016 
(Keesler, Orifici and Blanco 2019) projects that the 
unconditional NDC target – which was revised in 2016 with 
a more ambitious one – will be achieved including scenarios 
that are less optimistic (see annex B for details), while two 
other international studies project that the country will 
fall short of achieving its unconditional NDC with existing 
policies. For Indonesia, the lack of agreement is mainly 
due to the uncertainty on land-use, LUC and forestry 
(LULUCF) emissions. For Saudi Arabia, the limited amount 
Emissions Gap Report 2019
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of information on the country’s climate policies did not allow 
for further assessments beyond the two studies reviewed.
Some G20 members are continuously strengthening their 
mitigation policy packages, leading to a downward revision of 
current policies scenario projections over time. One example 
is the EU, where a noticeable downward shift in current 
policies scenario projections for 2030 has taken place since 
the 2015 edition of the UNEP Emissions Gap Report (see 
section on the EU28 below for recent policy developments).
Figure 2.5 provides a detailed comparison of estimated 
emissions under current policies scenarios as estimated by 
official and independent sources and the NDC scenario for 
all G20 members except for the EU Member States, mapping 
these against 1990, 2010 and 2015 emissions. For each of 
the G20 members, average (median when more than five 
studies) GHG emission projections have been calculated 
for current policies and full implementation of the NDC, 
following the approach of den Elzen et al. (2019), the results 
of which were presented in the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 
2018 (UNEP 2018) including climate change. Countries will 
meet again at the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
As mentioned, average GHG emission projections are presented 
for the current policies scenarios in figure 2.5 and 2.6, whereas 
the assessment in table 2.1 is based solely on the number of 
independent studies that support a given country finding. As a 
result, some countries may be classified as projected to meet 
their NDC target according to the number of studies available 
(table 2.1), while they may be projected to miss their NDC 
Figure 2.5b.
Notes: For reporting reasons, the emission projections for China, the EU28, India and the United States of America are shown in figure 2.5a 
and the other countries shown in figure 2.5b, using two different vertical axes.
The current policies and NDC scenario estimates are based on average GHG emission projections. The findings regarding whether countries 
are projected to over- or underachieve their NDC targets under current policies may therefore differ from the assessment in table 2.1, which 
is based solely on the number of independent studies. 
As a conservative assumption, South Africa is not considered as having a firm commitment to peak, since there is no guarantee that the 
conditions upon which they made the pledge will be met.
* For the United States of America, the unconditional NDC is for 2025. For Brazil, we refer to the indicative target for 2030.
** South Africa’s NDC is based on an emissions trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO2e including LULUCF over the 
2025–2030 period.
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target based on the average emission projections under the 
current policies scenario (and vice versa).
To supplement the findings presented above, table 2.2 
presents projected per capita GHG emissions under 
current policies and NDC targets based on independent 
studies in both absolute and relative terms (compared to 
2010 levels) for all G20 members excluding the four EU 
Member States. We find that nine G20 members, including 
China, are projected to emit more than 10 tCO2e per capita 
annually (approximately the levels in 2010 for EU28 and 
Japan) in 2030 under current policies and seven members 
could even achieve levels under unconditional NDC targets. 
Among OECD members6, the EU28 performs well in both 
6 Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Turkey, the United States. 
absolute and per capita emission levels in 2030 and in their 
change rates compared to 2010 levels, even though the 
consumption-based emissions are considerably higher, as 
shown in figure 2.4. Mexico also performs well in terms 
of the projected development of per capita emissions 
under both current policies and NDC scenarios. As table 
2.2 shows, emissions per capita annually in 2030 under 
the unconditional NDC targets are projected to decline 
between 2010 and 2030 in all G20 economies except 
China, India, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey. There are also large differences in per 
capita emission levels. The per capita emissions of India 
are about half the G20 average, whereas Saudi Arabia 
reaches three times the G20 average.
Table 2.1. Assessment of progress towards achieving the unconditional NDC targets for the G20 under current policies 
based on independent studies
Notes: The assessment is based on the number of independent studies that support the findings (except for the EU28, see the note below 
and the section analysis). These are compared to the available studies, as indicated in brackets.
1. We also examined current policies scenario projections from official publications. The number of publications that support the above 
findings based on independent studies are Australia: 1 of 1; Canada: 2 of 2; Russia: 1 of 1; South Africa: 1 of 1; the United States of 
America: 1 of 1. For the EU28, three official publications disagree (see footnote 3).
2. The Climate Action Tracker indicates that upper-end projections would miss the NDC target range.
3. The EU assessment result is based on projections fully implementing adopted EU climate and energy legislation (European Commission 
2018b). For the EU28, among the three independent studies and three official studies, the evaluation was made based on a study by 
PBL that took into account the best recently adopted policy packages (Kuramochi et al. 2018) and projections from the most recent 
official analysis by the European Commission (European Commission 2018b).
4. South Africa’s current policies scenario projections were compared to the upper-bound estimate of the NDC range.
Projected to meet the unconditional 
NDC target with currently implemented 
policies
Expected to meet the unconditional NDC target 
with additional policy measures and/or stricter 
enforcement of existing policies
Uncertain or 
insufficient 
information
Overachievement 
of the target by 
more than 15 per 
cent, suggesting 
a weak target
Overachievement 
of the target by less 
than 15 per cent 
Projected emissions 
0–15 per cent above the 
NDC target
Projected emissions 15 
per cent or more above 
the NDC target
 ● India  
(6 of 6 studies)
 ● Russia  
(3 of 3 studies) 1)
 ● Turkey  
(3 of 3 studies)
 ● China  
(3 of 5 studies, 
one uncertain) 2)
 ● EU28  
(1 of 3 studies, 
one uncertain) 
1),2),3)
 ● Mexico  
(2 of 3 studies)
 ● Australia  
(3 of 4 studies) 1)
 ● Japan  
(2 of 3 studies)
 ● South Africa  
(3 of 3 studies) 1), 4)
 ● Brazil  
(4 of 4 studies)
 ● Canada  
(3 of 3 studies) 1)
 ● Republic of Korea  
(3 of 3 studies)
 ● United States of 
America (2025)  
(5 of 5 studies) 1)
 ● Argentina  
(1 of 3 studies 
projected 
to meet the 
unconditional 
NDC; updated 
NDC in 2016)
 ● Indonesia 
(3 studies 
disagree)
 ● Saudi Arabia 
(2 studies 
disagree)
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 Country Share in global GHG 
emissions in 2017 
excluding LULUCF and 
including LULUCF (in 
brackets) 1)
Projected per capita GHG emissions including LULUCF in 2030 
(tCO2e/cap) and change rates from 2010 levels (in brackets) 2) 3) 4)
Current policies scenario 
(central estimates 5) of 
independent studies) 
Unconditional NDC (official 
values whenever available, 
otherwise central estimates of 
independent studies)
Argentina 0.8% (0.9%) 10.6 (+4%) 10.2 (-1%)
Australia 1.2% (1.1%) 17.5 (-34%) 15.1 (-43%)
Brazil 2.3% (2.9%) 7.1 (-1%) 5.3 (-26%)
Canada 1.6% (1.8%) 16.0 (-17%) 12.6 (-35%)
China 26.8% (25%) 10.2 (+35%) 10.3 (+37%)
EU28 9.0% (7.9%) 6.1 (-31%) 5.9 (-33%)
India 7.0% (7.1%) 3.1 (+100%) 3.7 (+138%)
Indonesia 1.7% (4.9%) 7.4 (+56%) 7.1 (+50%)
Japan 3.0% (2.9%) 8.8 (-8%) 8.6 (-10%)
Mexico 1.5% (1.5%) 5.4 (-9%) 5.3 (-10%)
Republic of Korea 1.6% (1.3%) 13.4 (+10%) 9.7 (-20%)
Russia 4.6% (4.3%) 15.0 (+61%) 18.5 (+99%)
Saudi Arabia 1.5% (1.4%) 22.7 (+16%) 22.2 (+14%)
South Africa 1.1% (1.1%) 10.2 (-3%) 7.8 (-26%)
Turkey 1.2% (1.0%) 7.3 (+63%) 10.4 (+132%)
USA 13.1% (12.5%) 16.5 (-14%) 11.5 (-40%)
Table 2.2. – Overview of G20 Member status and progress, including on Cancun pledges and NDC targets*
*Emission figures include LULUCF, unless otherwise noted.
Notes: 
1. Olivier and Peters (2018), excluding LULUCF/including LULUCF. LULUCF emissions based on the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) data (Food and Agriculture Organization Corporate Statistical Database [FAOSTAT] 2018). 
2. The population projections are based on the medium fertility variant of the United Nations Population Prospects 2019 edition (United 
Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs [UN DESA] 2019). 
3. For comparison, the G20 average per capita emissions in 2010 was 7.2 tCO2e/cap based on national GHG inventory reports submitted 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (supplemented by EDGAR and FAO (Kuramochi et al. 2018)). 
Assumptions on LULUCF emissions presented in appendix A, table A - 2. 
4. Median estimates are used when more than five studies are available, otherwise average estimates.
5. Historical data based on the second Biennial Report.
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Figure 2.6 presents the additional effort needed according to 
estimates based on independent studies and shows that the 
main contributions would need to come in particular from the 
United States of America. If we assume a linear interpolation 
between the NDC target year (2025) and the 2050 United 
States of America long-term target (80 per cent reduction 
below 2005 levels indicated in the longterm low-carbon 
development strategy (LTS) document – see section 2.5) to 
estimate an indicative 2030 target, the required additional 
emissions reductions would halve if the 2030 target remained 
at the same level as for 2025, instead of progressing linearly 
towards its 2050 target as assumed in our analysis. The three 
countries that are projected to significantly overachieve their 
unconditional NDC targets (by more than 15 per cent), i.e. 
India, Russia and Turkey, are expected to together exceed 
their NDC targets by about 1.5 GtCO2e in 2030 with current 
policies (compared to about 1 GtCO2e in the UNEP Emissions 
Gap Report 2018). By contrast, the emission gaps are 
noticeably larger than in the 2018 assessment for the two 
large LULUCF emitters, i.e. Brazil and Indonesia, reflecting 
the recent increase of historical emissions and the political 
uncertainties in the two countries.
Overall, this study indicates that current policies of 
G20 members collectively fall short of achieving the 
unconditional NDCs. The total GHG emissions for G20 
members are projected to be 41.0 GtCO2e/year (range: 
35.1 to 47.6 GtCO2e/year), which is slightly lower than the 
projections by den Elzen et al. (2019) after correcting for 
different GWPs.
G20 members as a whole will need to reduce their GHG 
emissions further by about 1.1 GtCO2e/year by 2030 to achieve 
unconditional NDC target emission levels and by about 2.9 
GtCO2e/year to achieve conditional NDC target emission 
levels. If we exclude the 1.6 GtCO2e/year overachievement of 
unconditional NDCs by India, Russia and Turkey and assume 
that these countries will follow their current policies trajectory 
rather than that implied by their unconditional NDCs (as done in 
many NDC scenario projections from global models presented 
in chapter 3), then the G20 economies are collectively short 
of the unconditional NDCs by about 2.7 GtCO2e/year against 
unconditional NDCs and by about 3.7 GtCO2e/year against 
conditional NDCs in 2030. The estimated difference between 
the current policies scenario and NDC scenario projections for 
G20 members remains similar to that in the UNEP Emissions 
Gap Report 2018, but some G20 members (i.e. the EU and 
South Africa) have lower current policies projections than in 
the 2018 report (UNEP 2018), whereas others have higher 
projections (i.e. Brazil, and to a lesser extent, China).
2.4 Recent policy developments of G20 
members
This section presents selected policy developments 
observed recently in individual G20 members and their 
potential implications on GHG emissions, where information 
is available. Information on main sector-level policies in 
selected G20 members is presented in chapter 4 and in 
appendix B, which is available online.
Box 2.1. Comparing emission values across chapters 
To compare these G20 estimates with the G20 shares 
of the global greenhouse gas emissions estimates 
of the current policies scenarios and 1.5- and 
2°C-consistent global emission levels, as presented 
in chapter 3, we need to discuss the LULUCF CO2 
emissions. Given the difference in estimating the 
“anthropogenic sink” between countries and the 
global integrated assessment modelling community 
(Grassi et al. 2017), the LULUCF CO2 estimates 
included here based on inventory data are not 
necessarily directly comparable with countries’ 
land-use CO2 emissions estimates at the global 
level used by the global model community. Grassi et 
al. (2017) find a current ±3 GtCO2e/year difference 
in global LULUCF net emissions between country 
reports (such as greenhouse gas inventories and 
National Communications) and scenarios studies 
(as reflected in IPCC reports). Among the many 
possible reasons for these differences, Grassi et al. 
(2017) suggest that a key factor – which deserves 
further analysis – relates to what is considered 
“anthropogenic forest sink”. At least two-thirds of 
the difference of 3 GtCO2e, about 2 GtCO2e, could be 
attributed to the G20 members.
The G20 total emissions projections for 2030 alone 
would be about 43 GtCO2e/year, after correcting 
for the anthropogenic sink, which would exceed 
the 2°C-consistent global emission levels of the 
integrated assessment models presented in chapter 
3. This G20 projected emissions level in 2030 is 
about 72 per cent of global emissions of the current 
policies (60 GtCO2e) in 2030 seen in chapter 3, which 
is close to the 78 per cent share of G20 in the global 
emissions in 2018. It is lower in 2030, which was to be 
expected, given the increasing share of non-G20 and 
in-time international aviation and shipping emissions 
until 2030.
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Argentina
Unconditional NDC target projection: Uncertain or 
insufficient information
Argentina submitted its first NDC in 2015 and a revised 
version in 2016 where the country unconditionally committed 
to emit no more than 483 MtCO2e/year in 2030. Since then, 
the country has established a National Climate Change 
Cabinet integrated by most of the ministries to design a 
low-carbon strategy and ensure the coherence of policies 
and measures. Under this institutional framework, the 
ministries have prepared a set of sectoral plans describing 
the mitigation policies and measures to be implemented to 
reach the NDC goals (Argentina, National Climate Change 
Cabinet 2019).
Policies and measures in the energy sector include the 
construction of several large-scale hydropower plants, 
7 One of these three nuclear power plants, Atucha II, is already operational. The other two are currently under development.
three new nuclear power plants7, various types of large-
scale renewable energy power plants such as wind, solar 
PV and biomass, smaller renewable energy systems for 
distributed generation and residential solar water heaters. 
Implementation of these actions is behind schedule 
(Compañía Administradora del Mercado Mayorista Eléctrico 
S.A. [CAMMESA] 2019), mainly due to difficulties accessing 
financial resources (Gubinelli 2018). The weak infrastructure 
for electricity transportation is also a major barrier for the 
expansion of renewable, grid-connected power plants 
(Mercado Eléctrico 2019; Singh 2019). At the same time, 
the heavily subsidized exploitation of non-conventional 
fossil fuels from the Vaca Muerta reservoir is adding GHG 
emissions in a magnitude similar to the estimated emissions 
reductions of the renewable energy plan (Iguacel 2018). The 
initial exploration and future exploitation of offshore oil and 
natural gas is adding to the burden (Baruj and Drucaroff 
2018; Boletín Oficial de la República Argentina 2019).
Figure 2.6. Additional emissions reduction effort required in 2030 per G20 Member to achieve NDC targets, based on 
current policies scenario projections of independent studies
Note: The NDC scenario projections from global models presented in chapter 3 assume that the countries that overachieve their NDCs 
follow their current policies trajectory. The calculations for the United States of America are based on an interpolation between its 2025 
NDC and the 2050 long-term target (80 per cent reduction from 2005 levels) and for Brazil, they are based on its indicative 2030 target. As 
the current policies estimates of the independent studies are based on average GHG emission projections, the findings regarding whether 
countries are projected to over- or underachieve their unconditional NDC targets may therefore differ from the assessment in table 2.1, 
which is based solely on the number of independent studies.
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Policies and measures have been developed for the 
industry and transport sectors such as energy efficiency, 
recycling and reuse of waste, renewable energy generation 
for self-consumption, promotion of low-emission urban 
mobility and public transport, intercity railroad restoration 
and efficiency improvements in road and railway 
freight transportation. Some of these actions are being 
implemented (for example, the initial implementation of 
hybrid and electric buses in large cities and the use of 
alternative fuels in cement kilns), while some other actions 
are behind schedule. In relation to agriculture, forestry 
and land-use, the key sectors for Argentina in relation to 
their contribution to GDP and to GHG emissions, sectoral 
plans have been presented with policies and measures 
such as conservation and restoration of native forests, 
sustainable forest management and fire prevention, 
increasing the forested area and promoting bioenergy from 
different biomasses. In addition to the measures proposed, 
Argentina urgently needs to revise the technologies and 
practices it has been using for decades in agricultural 
production to avoid further soil degradation and the impact 
on health of rural and suburban populations caused by 
using agrochemicals (Instituto National de Tecnología 
Agropecuaria (n.d).; Panigatti 2010). It also needs to 
provide the due amount of funding to finance the law that 
protects native forests and keep under control the rate of 
deforestation that increased in 2017 after several years of 
declination (Argentina, Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo 
Sustentable 2018).
Australia
Unconditional NDC target projection: Emissions 0–15 per 
cent above target 
With the re-election of Australia’s conservative Government 
in May, there has been no recent material change in 
Australian climate policy. This will make achieving its NDC 
of a 26 per cent to 28 per cent emissions reduction below 
2005 levels by 2030 challenging. However, it appears 
that the Australian Government intends to use carry-over 
permits from the Kyoto Protocol to do so, and uses a carbon 
budget approach that accounts for cumulative emissions 
between 2021 and 2030 in order to assess progress against 
its NDC (Australia, Department of the Environment and 
Energy 2018). The dropping of the proposed National Energy 
Guarantee in 2018 and that the renewable energy target 
will not be raised for years after 2020 up to 2030 (Clean 
Energy Regulator 2018) leaves Australia with no major policy 
tool to encourage emission reductions from the electricity 
sector in the short to medium term. There has been a 1.4 
billion Australian dollar commitment to a 2 GW expansion 
of the Snowy Mountains hydroelectric project; however, 
the emission reductions stemming from this project are 
not expected to occur until well after 2030 (Marsden Jacob 
Associates 2018). In 2017, the Government’s advisory 
body, the Climate Change Authority, concluded that other 
policies would be needed to deliver the structural changes 
necessary for Australia to decarbonize (Climate Change 
Authority 2017).
The latest projection published by the Government shows 
that emissions would remain largely unchanged up to 2030 
(Australia, Department of the Environment and Energy 2018; 
Climate Action Tracker, 2019a). To date, much of the support 
from the Government’s signature climate policy, the recently 
renamed “Climate Solutions Fund”, has gone to LUC projects 
(Clean Energy Regulator 2017). The current Government 
decided earlier in 2019 to provide an additional 2 billion 
Australian dollars to the Climate Solutions Fund. The Australian 
Government estimates that these measures will contribute to 
an additional 100 MtCO2e of emissions reductions by 2030 
(Australia, Department of the Environment and Energy 2019).
Brazil
Unconditional NDC target projection: Emissions at least 15 
per cent above target
After the strong reduction in deforestation rates from 
2004 (18,900 km2) to 2012 (4,656 km2), the deforestation 
rate grew again to 7,900 km2 in 2018 (+70 per cent). 
Preliminary numbers indicate that in the first semester of 
2019 deforestation rates continued to grow relative to the 
same period of 2018. President Bolsonaro significantly 
reduced the Ministry of Environment’s budget for climate-
change related activities; transferred the body responsible 
for identifying, defining, and registering Indigenous Territory 
to the Ministry of Agriculture; relaxed the rules for converting 
environmental fines into alternative compensations; 
extended deadlines for adequacy to registries that supported 
enforcement measures; and abolished most committees 
and commissions for civil participation and social control 
in the Federal Government (Climate Action Tracker 2019b).
Given the key role of the LULUCF sector in Brazil’s NDC, 
which aims to reduce the country’s GHG emissions by 37 
per cent below 2005 levels by 2025 and to an indicative 
level of 43 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030, and given 
the huge global importance of its forests for environmental 
services, biodiversity and carbon sequestration, the Brazilian 
Government urgently needs to strengthen mitigation action 
in this sector. Official projections still show a decreasing 
trend (Programa Despoluição de Bacias Hidrográficas 
[PRODES] 2019), which is contrary to the observed trend. 
If environmental regulations and deforestation control 
policies are reversed or suspended, net emissions from 
deforestation could increase by 850-1,500 MtCO2e/year by 
2030 (Rochedo et al. 2018).
Despite the negative developments in climate policy and 
emissions regarding the forestry sector, Brazil has made 
progress in the energy sector. Market developments between 
2015 and September 2019 seem to favour renewable energy 
over fossil fuels. Although fossil capacity was eligible in the 
latest auctions, no coal and only 4 GW of gas-fired power 
generation have been contracted since 2015 in comparison 
to 10 GW of renewables per cent. Wind has been the most 
competitive technology with concessions of 4 GW, followed by 
solar (3.3 GW), hydro (1.6 GW), and biomass (1.0 GW) (Brazil, 
Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency [ANEEL] 2019).
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In the transport sector, the Government has launched the 
RenovaBio programme (Decree No. 9.308) that aims to 
increase the amount of biofuel in the national energy mix and 
has already led to an additional production of 31.9 million m3 
in 2016 and 2017 (Brazil, Ministry of Science, Technology, 
Innovation and Communications 2019); therefore the biofuel 
production in the country will probably meet the indicative 
targets mentioned in Brazil’s NDC. President Bolsonaro also 
signed the first concession for the rail transport sector in 
10 years. The project allows cargo to be transported from 
the Midwest and flow through both the Port of Itaqui (in 
the north) and the Port of Santos (in the southeast) (Brazil, 
Investment Partnerships Program 2019). The Federal 
Government plans to significantly increase the share that 
railway transport constitutes in the next eight years (from 
15 per cent to 29 per cent).
Canada
Unconditional NDC target projection: Emissions at least 15 
per cent above target
In its NDC, Canada pledged to reduce its GHG emissions 
by 30 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030. With Royal 
Assent of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act in 
December 2018, carbon pricing will be in place across 
all Canadian provinces and territories by September 
2019, except the Province of Alberta, but is facing court 
challenges from a number of provinces (Climate Action 
Tracker 2019c). Alberta repealed its carbon tax in May 
2019, however the federal carbon price will be applied 
to that Province in January 2020 (Province of Alberta 
Queen’s Printer 2019; Vigliotti 2019). The adoption of 
performance standards on coal and gas-fired power 
stations at the end of 2018 means Canada is on track to 
meet its 2030 coal phase-out commitment, although it is 
expected that many coal-fired plants will be replaced with 
natural gas variants, creating a risk of future stranded 
assets (Climate Action Tracker 2017; Government of 
Canada, 2018b; 2018a). The 2019 federal budget included 
a 300 million Canadian dollar investment in zero-emission 
vehicles, while the Government has set sales targets of 10 
per cent by 2025, 30 per cent by 2030, and 100 per cent 
by 2040 (Canada, Transport Canada 2019). According to 
Canada’s Greenhouse Gas and Air Pollutant Emissions 
Projections (2018), when taking into account currently 
announced federal, provincial and territorial policies and 
measures, Canada’s emissions in 2030 are projected at 
592 Mt – or 223 Mt lower than what was projected before 
the adoption of the Pan-Canadian Framework for Clean 
Growth and Climate Change. 
China
Unconditional NDC target projection: Overachievement of 
the target by less than 15 per cent
China’s NDC targets include capping CO2 emissions 
around 2030 and making an effort to cap them earlier, as 
well as a 20 per cent share of non-fossil fuels in the total 
primary energy demand (based on the conversion factor 
of the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics for renewable 
energy and nuclear power generation). Further targets 
include reducing the carbon intensity of its GDP by 60 per 
cent to 65 per cent below 2005 by 2030 and increasing 
forestry stock by 4.5 billion m3 by 2030 compared to the 
2005 level.
Since 2017, China’s National Energy Administration (NEA) 
has developed a warning system for investment in coal 
power plants, which evaluates the risks of new coal 
power projects based on investment returns, electricity 
demand and environmental concerns. The system rates 
the feasibility of coal power projects in 38 regions as bad, 
moderate or good. New coal investment is banned, in 
principle, in regions with a bad rating. In April 2019, the 
NEA published the latest risk rating, which reduces the 
number of regions that ban new coal investment from 24 
to 21 (NEA of China 2019). The change may encourage 
coal power development and slow down power sector 
decarbonization.
China’s renewable energy and new energy vehicle (NEV) 
has experienced exponential growth in the past decade, 
in part thanks to generous subsidies. As the costs of the 
technologies fall and markets mature, China has started 
to phase down relevant subsidies. The Government 
suspended the approval of all new subsidized solar PV 
projects in May 2018 (NEA, National Development and 
Reform Commission [NDRC]; Ministry of Finance [MOF] 
of China 2019) and issued new regulations to reduce 
subsidies for solar and wind projects in 2019 (NDRC 
of China 2019a; 2019b.). The country also slashed the 
subsidy standard of 50 per cent for new energy cars in 
2019 and plans to stop subsidies by the end of 2020 (He 
and Cui 2019). In the short-term, the efforts would result 
in a rush to develop renewable power projects or purchase 
new energy cars before phase-out of subsidies. In the 
midterm, utility-scale solar PV and onshore wind power 
can reach grid-parity by 2021 (Hang 2019; Tu et al. 2019). 
In fact, China has already approved 21 GW of wind and 
solar projects without subsidy (Hill 2019). The new policy 
will also accelerate the marketization of the NEV industry 
in China (Xiao 2019). In summary, the recent subsidy 
reform is a necessary step for the large-scale adoption of 
renewable energy and NEV in China.
EU28
Unconditional NDC target projection: Overachievement 
of the target by less than 15 per cent
The EU has adopted climate legislation to implement its 
NDC target of a 40 per cent reduction below 1990 levels by 
2030. It has reviewed its EU emission trading system and 
increased its annual reduction of the cap. It has set national 
emission reduction targets for Member States for the 
sectors not covered in the EU emissions trading system. 
It has put in place legislation that ensures accounted 
LULUCF emissions are not resulting in a decrease of the 
EU’s sink. Combined, these legislations meets the at least 
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40 per cent greenhouse gas reduction target of the NDC. 
In recent months, the EU has implemented a number of 
important accompanying measures that would lead to 
an overachievement of its NDC target. The adoption of 
the new renewable energy directive (Directive 2018/2002; 
RED II) and the new energy efficiency directive (Directive 
2018/2002) (European Commission 2018c) with the 
respective goals of increasing the share of renewables 
in the energy mix and improving energy efficiency – if 
effectively implemented – would lead to emissions 
reductions of at least 45 per cent by 2030 relative to 1990 
(European Commission 2018a). These two directives were 
parts of the package of measures called Clean Energy for 
all Europeans presented by the European Commission 
in November 2016. With the adoption of the Electricity 
Regulation and Electricity Directive by the Council in May 
2019, European institutions finalized the work on this 
package, which also included a directive focusing on energy 
efficiency in the building sector (adopted in May 2018), and 
a Governance Regulation which obligates Member States 
to present National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) 
describing measures they are going to implement to 
contribute to meeting the EU’s energy and climate goals. 
Collectively, the current draft NECPs are projected to fall 
short of both renewable and energy efficiency targets 
(European Commission 2019b). Final NECPs, taking on-
board recommendations by the European Commission 
and featuring greater ambition where necessary, are due 
by the end of 2019.
Significant progress has also been made in the transport 
sector in which the adoption of CO2 emissions standards 
for passenger cars and vans in December 2018 was 
followed by standards for new heavy-duty vehicles in early 
2019. According to the legislation, average emissions from 
passenger vehicles sold by each manufacturer in 2030 will 
have to be 37.5 per cent lower for new cars and 31 per cent 
lower for new vans compared to 2021 levels (European 
Council 2019). Emissions from new heavy-duty vehicles 
should decrease by 15 per cent in the second half of the 
next decade and by 30 per cent in 2030 and beyond – in 
both cases in comparison to 2019 (European Commission 
2019a). These regulations, however, may need to be 
strengthened after 2030 if net zero GHG emissions by 
2050 as proposed by the European Commission (European 
Commission 2018a) are to be achieved.
Furthermore, an increasing number of countries are 
committing to the phase-out of coal-fired power plants; 
Finland has agreed on a phase-out of coal-fired power 
plants by 2029 (Europe Beyond Coal 2019) and Germany 
is discussing a phase-out (a commission advised it to 
do so by 2038) (Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Energy [BMWi] 2019). Other Member States 
that committed to, or announced coal phase-outs, include 
Austria (2025), Denmark (2030), France (2021), Ireland 
(2025), Italy (2025), the Netherlands (2030), Portugal 
(2030), Sweden (2022) and the United Kingdom (2025) 
(Europe Beyond Coal 2019).
India
Unconditional NDC target projection: Overachievement of 
the target by more than 15 per cent, suggesting a weak target
India’s NDC has three numeric targets for 2030: reduce 
emissions intensity by 33 per cent to 35 per cent from 2005 
levels, achieve an installed power capacity of 40 per cent 
from non-fossil fuel sources and create an additional carbon 
sink of 2.5–3.0 GtCO2e from forest and tree cover. India 
has continued its efforts towards achieving its renewable 
and intensity targets, though the previous year saw no 
substantial course change. In 2018, renewable deployment 
exceeded conventional fuels (Buckley and Shah 2019), though 
is projected to remain short of the 175 GW target by 2022 
(Vembadi, Das and Gambhir 2018; Buckley and Shah 2019). 
The deployment of renewables has been let down by unclear, 
inconsistent taxation and import duty norms (Buckley and 
Garg 2019; Buckley and Shah 2019). Interrelated factors have 
stymied India’s uptake of fossil fuel infrastructure, including 
a financial crisis that has led multiple coal power plants to 
be deemed as non-performing or stressed assets (India, 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Energy 2018). In 
addition, the National Clean Air Programme released in 2019 
aims to reduce PM2.5 and PM10 concentrations by 25 per cent 
to 30 per cent, and provides additional motivation to shut 
down old coal power plants (India, Ministry of Environment, 
Forest and Climate Change [MoEFCC] 2019b).
India has simultaneously continued its efforts to broaden 
energy access. India reported the 100 per cent electrification 
of households in early 2019 (India, Ministry of Power 2019), 
with likely implications for the future of India’s energy demand. 
The Kisan Urja Suraksha evam Utthaan Mahabhiyan (KUSUM) 
scheme launched in early 2019 is aimed at promoting solar 
energy in rural areas with the target to install 26 GW of solar 
agricultural pumps by 2022 (India, Cabinet Committee on 
Economic Affairs 2018). India also released an India Cooling 
Action Plan in 2019 to provide cooling services while keeping 
their GWP minimal by reducing energy and refrigerant demand 
(MoEFCC 2019a).
India has also begun deliberating policies to electrify public and 
private modes of transport. The second phase of the Faster 
Adoption and Manufacturing of (Hybrid &) Electric Vehicles 
(FAME) was launched in 2019, aiming to support the uptake 
of electric two-wheelers, three-wheelers, four-wheelers and 
buses, with projected cumulative savings of 7.2 MtCO2e (India, 
Cabinet on Economic Affairs 2018). India is also deliberating 
upon targets to ban sales of all fossil fuel powered two-, three- 
and four-wheeler vehicles in the next decade. India also aims 
to electrify all its broad gauge railway routes by 2021–2022 
(India, Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs 2018).
Indonesia
Unconditional NDC target projection: Uncertain or 
insufficient information
Indonesia’s NDC sets an unconditional 29 per cent and a 
conditional 41 per cent (with sufficient international support) 
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reduction target on the country’s GHG emissions below 
business-as-usual by 2030. The National Energy Policy 
referred to in Indonesia’s NDC aims to increase the share of 
renewable energy in the total primary energy supply to 23 
per cent by 2025 from the current 6.5 per cent (Republic of 
Indonesia, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources [MEMR] 
2017), but this target will likely not be met and the country’s 
heavy reliance on coal-fired power will likely continue under 
current policy measures (Climate Action Tracker 2019e). 
The new Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) 2019–
2028 adopted in January 2019 (Republic of Indonesia 2019) 
also envisages the installation of almost 40 GW of fossil-fired 
power plants, about 27 GW of which being coal-fired, in the 
next 10 years. It is estimated that this 27 GW of coal-fired 
power alone would annually emit up to 200 MtCO2e over the 
next 40 years, unless they are decommissioned before the 
end of their lifetime.
In the land-use sector, Presential Instruction No 8 of 2018 
(President of the Republic of Indonesia 2018) presents a three-
year moratorium on the entire licensing process for palm oil 
plantations and an order for the relevant central Government 
ministries and regional governments to conduct a massive 
review of oil palm licensing data (Mongabay 2018). A recent 
Presidential Instruction also made the temporary moratorium 
on forest-clearing permits for logging and plantations issued 
in 2011 permanent, but the historical development of land-
use GHG emissions casts doubt on the effectiveness of 
these measures (Jong 2019). Although the Global Forest 
Watch (2018) reported in 2017 that Indonesia was one of 
the few tropical nations to reduce its deforestation rates in 
2017, this was likely due, in part, to the national peat drainage 
moratorium (Norway, Ministry of Climate and Environment 
2016), in effect since 2016.
Japan
Unconditional NDC target projection: Emissions 0–15 per 
cent above target 
Under its NDC, Japan aims to reduce its GHG emissions 
by 26 per cent by 2030 from 2013 levels. Japan’s total 
GHG emissions seem to have peaked in the fiscal year 
(FY) of 2013 before decreasing for four consecutive 
years. In the power sector, decarbonization efforts are 
being strengthened only incrementally. In March 2019, 
the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) announced three 
new actions to accelerate decarbonization progress in 
the power sector (MOE 2019), among which is stricter 
enforcement of environmental impact assessments on 
planned coal-fired power plants. However, the downsides 
are the overall limited effectiveness of the measures, as 
the MOE cannot veto the plans, and that coal-fired power 
plants already under construction will be unaffected by 
this action.
As for renewables, the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Act will apply from April 2020 and will also be applicable 
to large-scale solar PV projects with capacities greater 
than 40 MW (or greater than 30 MW following a screening 
process based on the current status of land-use on the 
project site) (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
[METI] 2019b). The Government has also started reviewing 
the scope of renewable projects to be supported under 
the feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme, which contributed to the 
large increase of solar PV capacity in the last years, to 
control the increasing surcharge (METI 2019c). These 
new rules are likely to secure proper business disciplines 
for solar PV in Japan, despite curbing the speed at which 
large-scale solar projects can be deployed after the 
full installation of capacity with FIT approval. For wind 
power, the new law put into effect on 1 April 2019 (METI 
2019a) allows offshore wind power developers to occupy 
a registered area up to 30 years after consultation with 
relevant ministries and local stakeholders. This will 
promote the development of offshore wind farms. 
For the transport sector, a panel under the METI published 
an interim report on the long-term strategy for car 
manufacturing (METI 2018), which establishes a long-
term goal to reduce tank-to-wheel CO2 emissions by 80 
per cent below 2010 levels by 2050 for all new vehicles 
produced by Japanese car manufacturers and by 90 per 
cent by 2050 for new passenger vehicles. The goal for new 
passenger vehicles assumes a near 100 per cent share 
of electrified vehicles (including hybrids, plug-in hybrids, 
battery electric vehicles and fuel cell electric vehicles). 
With CEOs of major car manufacturers such as Toyota, 
Nissan and Honda all being members of the panel, the 
development of these long-term goals can be considered 
an important step towards decarbonization of Japan’s 
transport sector.
Mexico
Unconditional NDC target projection: Overachievement of 
the target by less than 15 per cent
Mexico’s NDC makes an unconditional commitment to 
reduce GHG emissions by 22 per cent below business-as-
usual in 2030, implying a net emissions peak from 2026, 
and a conditional commitment to reduce emissions by 
36 per cent below business-as-usual in 2030. Mexico’s 
new Administration has stalled years of progress in the 
energy sector with decisions that threaten to reverse 
progress made towards enhanced climate action through, 
for example, Mexico’s General Climate Change law of 
2012 (Mexico, Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso 
de la Unión 2012) or its Energy Transition law of 2015 
(Mexico, Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la 
Unión 2015). The National Electricity Outlook (PRODESEN) 
2019–2033 adopted in June 2019 (Mexico, Ministry of 
Energy 2019) limits deeper deployment of clean energy 
(including efficient cogeneration) beyond the 35.1 per cent 
by 2024 target (24.12 per cent in June 2018) by increasing 
fossil fuel-fired generation, reducing wind power and not 
increasing solar power growth rates. Furthermore, the 
Ministry has cancelled the 2018 long-term power auction 
and cut-off the transmission lines to evacuate renewable 
energy. There have been no announcements of further 
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auctions. Despite the recognition of the importance of 
reducing GHG emissions and increasing renewable energy 
deployment, the National Development Plan adopted in 
June 2019 (Mexico, Diario Oficial de la Federación 2019) 
adds a new additional refinery with the aim to increase 
gasoline, diesel and fuel oil production.
After postponing Mexico’s 2018 long-term energy auction 
round – a policy scheme introduced in 2015 after the 
country’s energy reform that aimed to increase its clean 
energy share – President Lopez Obrador cancelled the 
fourth auction round in January 2019 Mexico, Centro 
Nacional de Control de Energía 2018). Although the first 
three rounds of electricity auctions had led to a substantial 
amount of new renewable energy projects (Notimex 
2019), President Lopez Obrador’s plans for the power 
sector include the modernization of gas and coal-fired 
power plants previously planned for retirement and the 
construction of a 700 MW coal-fired plant in the short and 
midterm (Solís 2018a, 2018b).
President Obrador has also presented a National Refining 
Plan aimed at “rescuing” Mexico’s oil industry and achieving 
energy independence through the rehabilitation of six 
oil refineries and the construction of a new one in Dos 
Bocas, Tabasco, and a plan for constructing a railroad in 
the Yucatan peninsula (known as the Maya Train project) 
(Government of Mexico 2019). These three infrastructure 
projects have faced national and international criticism 
(see, for example, Gurría (2019)).
Republic of Korea 
Unconditional NDC target projection: Emissions at least 15 
per cent above target
Dynamic discussions are taking place in the Republic of 
Korea in relation to the adequacy of its 2030 power sector 
emissions target. In its NDC, the Republic of Korea has 
committed to reducing its GHG emissions to 37 per cent 
below business-as-usual or to 536 MtCO2e per year by 
2030 (UNFCCC 2018), and initially set up a road map in 
2016 to achieve this target. However, the plan in the initial 
road map to procure 96 MtCO2e per year of international 
credits was subject to environmental integrity and 
economic feasibility-related criticism. In July 2018, the 
road map was amended, stating that 16  MtCO2e  per 
year will be reduced by international credits rather than 
96 MtCO2e per year (Republic of Korea, Ministry of 
Environment 2018). 
Another important change to the road map was that 
contemplated emission reductions from the power sector 
were reduced from 64.5 MtCO2e per year to 23.7 MtCO2e 
per year (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Environment 
2018), which is mainly attributable to the Moon Jae-
In Administration’s nuclear policy, under which 8.8 GW 
of new nuclear power plant construction projects were 
cancelled. The amended GHG road map stated that 
an additional emission reduction requirement of 34.1 
MtCO2e per year may be imposed on the power sector 
depending on further discussions, which mostly relates 
to how ambitiously the country will decommission its 
operational coal power plant fleet by 2030. The additional 
34.1  MtCO2e per year reduction issue has become the 
centre of national climate and energy policy discussions 
and was one of most contentious topics when establishing 
the Third Energy Framework Plan, under which the country 
aims to increase its renewables share in total electricity 
generation from 7.6 per cent in 2017 to 35 per cent by 2040 
and to phase down coal and nuclear power (KBS 2019). 
Air pollution concerns, originating from the South 
Chungcheong Province, where approximately 18 GW of coal 
power plants (half of the Republic of Korea’s coal power 
fleet) are located, may expedite the speed of coal power 
plant retirements and lead to more ambitious reductions 
from the country’s power sector. In early 2019, opposition 
from this Province led to the suspension of retrofits of 4.5 
GW of coal power plants (Chosunilbo 2019; Chung 2019). 
If the retrofits were implemented, the life period of these 
power plants would have extended to until around 2040. 
The Governor of South Chungcheong Province has also 
committed to decommissioning coal power plants that are 
older than 25 years, which, if successful, will result in 14 
units being decommissioned by 2026 (Powering Past Coal 
Alliance 2018). 
Russia 
Unconditional NDC target projection: Overachievement of 
the target by more than 15 per cent, suggesting a weak target 
Russia pledged to limit GHG emissions by 15–25 per cent 
below 1990 levels by 2020 and by 25–30 per cent below 
1990 levels by 2030, and recently announced that it will 
ratify the Paris Agreement (United Nations 2019). While 
the ratification date is uncertain, a draft Decree of the 
President on a new 2030 emission reduction target is to be 
prepared by December 2019, with a draft implementation 
plan to achieve the 2030 target expected in the first half of 
2020 (UNFCCC 2019b). The Russian Action Plan mandates 
the drafting of a “low-carbon strategy until 2050” by the 
end of 2019 (Sauer and Collett-White 2019). However, no 
mention of the preparation of this draft has yet been made. 
The fact that only draft documents are expected provides 
a weak basis for tracking and assessing progress, as 
they may just contain principles and approaches without 
concrete mitigation measures and GHG targets. In 
December 2018, the Government introduced new draft 
legislation that would establish a cap-and-trade system 
for major carbon emitters by 2025 (Sauer and Collett-
White 2019). 
Saudi Arabia
Unconditional NDC target projection: Uncertain or 
insufficient information
In its NDC, Saudi Arabia commits to reducing emissions 
by up to 130 MtCO2e per year below business-as-usual 
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by 2030 through actions that contribute to economic 
diversification and adaptation. The country’s actions 
to mitigate climate change are driven by its motive to 
diversify its economy (Al-Sarihi 2019). In 2016, Saudi 
Arabia published its Vision 2030, which included a 
renewable energy target of 9.5 GW by 2023 and a phase-
out of fossil fuel subsidies (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
2016). However, the implementation of this vision has 
been delayed for both renewable energy and the fossil fuel 
price reform (Nereim 2017; Krane 2019). Most recently, in 
March 2018, Saudi Arabia and the SoftBank Group signed 
a memorandum of understanding to build a 200 GW solar 
plant, the largest single solar project worldwide, as part of 
Vision 2030 (Nereim and Cunningham 2018). However, the 
expected tenders to implement the plan have been delayed 
since January 2019 (Bellini 2019). Outside the power 
sector, the Public Investment Fund announced in October 
2018 its intention to locate an electric vehicle industry in 
Saudi Arabia, following an agreement to invest more than 
US$1 billion in an United States of America-based electric 
vehicle manufacturer (Torchia et al. 2018).
South Africa 
Unconditional NDC target projection: Emissions 0–15 per 
cent above target 
 
In its Cancun Pledge, South Africa aims to reduce its GHG 
emissions by 34 per cent below business-as-usual in 2020, 
and commits to achieving a peak, plateau and decline of 
GHG emissions in its NDC, with emissions peaking between 
2020 and 2025, before plateauing at 398–614 MtCO2e per 
year between 2025 and 2030.
The South African Government released the long-awaited 
draft of its Integrated Resource Plan (Republic of South 
Africa, Department of Energy 2018) in August 2018. The 
revised plan aims to decommission 35  GW of Eskom’s 
currently operational coal generation capacity (42 GW) by 
2050, with 12 GW of this decommissioned by 2030, another 
16 GW by 2040, and a further 7 GW by 2050 (Republic of 
South Africa, Department of Energy 2018). The 5.7  GW 
of coal capacity currently under construction would be 
completed and another 1 GW of new coal capacity would 
be commissioned by 2030. The significant volume of 
coal capacity to be decommissioned by 2030 and beyond 
marks a significant shift away from previous planning. The 
Government has not yet communicated a timeline for the 
Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) update’s final adoption as 
of September 2019. 
South Africa approved a carbon tax in February 2019, 
which covers fossil fuel combustion emissions, industrial 
processes and product-use emissions, and fugitive 
emissions (Reuters 2019). The tax has been implemented 
since June 2019, but a basic tax-free threshold for around 
60 per cent of emissions and additional allowances for 
specific sectors means that tax exemptions will apply for 
up to 95 per cent of emissions during the first phase until 
2022 (KPMG 2019).
In addition, South Africa released a draft climate change 
bill in June 2018 for public comment (Republic of South 
Africa, Department of Environmental Affairs 2018), but the 
Government has not yet communicated a timeline for the 
law’s final adoption as of July 2019. The draft law aims 
to establish a Ministerial Committee on Climate Change 
to oversee and coordinate activities across all sector 
departments. Under the proposed legislation, the Minister 
of Environmental Affairs together with the Ministerial 
Committee on Climate Change would have to set sectoral 
emission targets for each GHG emitting sector in line with 
the national emission target every five years.
Turkey
Unconditional NDC target projection: Overachievement of 
the target by more than 15 per cent, suggesting a weak target 
In its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), 
Turkey aims to limit its GHG emissions to 21 per cent 
below business-as-usual or to 959 MtCO2e per year in 2030 
(excluding LULUCF). Turkey’s current emissions are on this 
trajectory. The energy sector is at the centre of the country’s 
low-carbon transition debate, representing more than 85 per 
cent of its total GHG emissions in 2017, with 40 per cent 
of all energy sectors emissions resulting from electricity 
generation. 
At the start of 2018, Turkey put in place an ambitious 
National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) for the 
2017–2023 period, which aims to reduce the its total energy 
demand (in primary terms) by 14 per cent compared with the 
2017 level. The six-year plan includes the six sectors that 
supply and demand energy, covering a comprehensive list 
of 55 actions. The renewable energy FIT mechanism that 
will still be available for new projects until the end of 2020 
was successful in raising the wind and solar PV share in 
total electricity demand to 10 per cent (and around a third of 
the total demand supplied from renewables). Following the 
global trend, Turkey is diversifying its policy portfolio. Since 
2017, three rounds of auctions have taken place for onshore 
wind (twice) and solar PV with favourable prices and local 
content requirements. The Government has indicated that 
auctions will be the key mechanism for renewable energy 
investments in the coming decade.
The Government has set an ambitious plan for new coal-
fired power plants, with purchase guarantees and subsidies 
to investors. Among the G20 members, Turkey ranks third 
for new coal-fired power plant capacity being planned (37 
GW), following China and India (as at January 2019). This 
is twice as much as Turkey’s current operational capacity. 
However, planned capacities are not being constructed 
due to a lack of financing, with around only 1 GW currently 
under construction. More than 40 GW in planned coal-fired 
power plant capacity was cancelled over the 2010–2018 
period. Nuclear energy has been on Turkey’s agenda as an 
alternative source for many years. The country’s first nuclear 
power plant is planned to have four 1.2 GW reactors, with the 
first reactor planned to start operation by 2023.
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United States of America
Unconditional NDC target projection: Emissions at least 15 
per cent above target
The current NDC target for the United States of America is 
to reduce emissions by 26–28 per cent from 2005 levels 
by 2025. However, President Trump’s Government is taking 
actions to move the country’s emissions trajectory in the 
opposite direction, cutting environmental regulations in 
favour of giving more freedom to industry. The Trump 
Administration recently issued the final Affordable 
Clean Energy (ACE) rule, its replacement for the Obama 
Administration’s Clean Power Plan, which was meant to 
reduce emissions from power plants in order to achieve 
the country’s NDC target. While the Clean Power Plan 
would have reduced power sector emissions by roughly 
32 per cent, the ACE rule is expected to reduce them by 
roughly 1 per cent (Natural Resources Defense Council 
[NRDC] 2018). 
The Trump Administration has also frozen the vehicle 
emissions and fuel economy standards for cars and light 
trucks until 2026, meaning that the average fuel economy 
will remain at 35 miles per gallon (mpg), rather than rising 
to 54 mpg. According to analysis by the Rhodium Group, 
this will increase emissions from the transportation 
sector by 28–83 MtCO2e per year by 2030, with the 
ultimate amount dependent upon the effect of oil prices 
on consumption (Larsen et al. 2019). However, a group 
of automakers recently struck a deal with the state of 
California to strengthen standards for gas mileage and 
emissions from their vehicles (Van Sant 2019). 
However, despite the Trump Administration’s actions, 
market trends have resulted in a significant drop in 
emissions over the past decade. The country’s energy-
related CO2 emissions fell by 14 per cent between 2005 
and 2017, while the economy grew by 20 per cent (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration [EIA] 2018). Action at 
state and local levels has also grown significantly since 
President Trump’s announcement that the United States 
of America would leave the Paris Agreement. A group 
of 25 governors representing over half of the country’s 
population and US$11.7 trillion in GDP have joined the U.S. 
Climate Alliance, a coalition committed to reducing GHG 
emissions in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement 
(U.S. Climate Alliance 2019). 
2.5  Preparation of long-term strategies 
and the way forward
Another important ongoing policy process is the preparation 
of long-term low emissions development strategies under 
the Paris Agreement. As of October 2019, only seven G20 
members (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America) had submitted 
their strategies to the UNFCCC and another two (the EU28 and 
South Africa) had published their draft strategies (UNFCCC 
2019a). Of the seven long-term strategies submitted by G20 
members to the UNFCCC, only Japan committed to achieving 
long-term net zero GHG emissions as early as possible in the 
second half of this century, though France and the United 
Kingdom have passed bills that commit to net zero GHG 
emissions by 2050. A few other members, including the EU28, 
are in the process of revising their domestic and international 
long-term goals. For non-annex I G20 members, there have 
been some indications to suggest that they would establish 
long-term strategies that contain timelines for achieving net 
zero GHG emissions. For comparison, to keep warming below 
1.5°C in 2100 with a 66 per cent chance, global total net CO2 
emissions would need to be reduced to zero by around 2050 
(IPCC 2018). There is an increasing number of countries that 
have set or are in the process of setting net zero emissions 
targets domestically (Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit 2019). 
More long-term strategies are expected to be submitted to the 
UNFCCC in the coming months, which will provide a better 
understanding of the level of collective long-term ambition 
and how it will affect the pathways towards achieving the 
Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature goals. It will also be 
important to scrutinize the consistency between the (revised) 
NDCs and long-term strategies to ensure that countries’ long-
term low-carbon development pathways are feasible. 
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter updates the annual assessment of the 
emissions gap in the year 2030. Consistent with 
previous reports, the emissions gap in 2030 is defined 
as the difference between projected emissions under full 
implementation of the nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs) and emissions under least-cost pathways that are 
in line with the Paris Agreement goals of limiting global 
average temperature increase to well below 2°C and 
pursuing to limiting it to 1.5°C. The chapter first presents 
the various scenarios used for the assessment of the 
emissions gap (section 3.2), that is, reference scenarios, 
NDC scenarios and scenarios consistent with limiting 
global warming to a specific temperature limit. The next 
section updates the 2030 emissions gap (section 3.3). This 
is followed by a discussion of the temperature implications 
of the emissions gap (section 3.4) and the potential impact 
of non-state actions on the gap (section 3.5).
3.2 Scenarios considered for the 2030 
gap assessment
This section will provide an update on the scenarios 
considered for the year-2030 gap assessment which 
comprise reference scenarios, NDC scenarios and least-cost 
mitigation scenarios consistent with specific temperature 
targets.
3.2.1  Reference scenarios and updates
Reference scenarios are used as benchmarks against 
which progress in emission reductions can be tracked. 
Two reference scenarios are considered: the 2005 policies 
scenario and the current policy scenario.
1  This scenario is the same as the “no policy scenario” of previous reports. 
The 2005 policies scenario projects global greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions assuming no new climate policies 
are put in place from around 2005 onwards1. For 2019, 
the data for this scenario are updated and based on 
projections from six modelling studies that are also used 
for the current policy scenario projections from the same 
data source (the CD-LINKS Scenario Database, version 
1.0) to maintain consistency (McCollum et al. 2018). 
Data for this scenario was available from the following 
international modelling groups: International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA using the MESSAGE–
GLOBIOM model), Joint Research Centre (JRC using 
the POLES model), National Institute for Environmental 
Studies (NIES using the Asia-Pacific Integrated [AIM] 
model), PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency (PBL using the IMAGE model), Potsdam Institute 
for Climate Impact Research (PIK using the REMIND–
MAgPIE model) and RFF–CMCC European Institute on 
Economics and the Environment (RFF–CMCC using the 
WITCH model).
The current policy scenario projects GHG emissions 
assuming all currently adopted and implemented policies 
(defined as legislative decisions, executive orders, or 
equivalent) are realized and that no additional measures 
are undertaken. Updated data from eight modelling groups 
were available for this scenario. These include updated 
estimates from four modelling groups also considered 
in the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2018 (United Nations 
Environment Programme [UNEP] 2018): Climate Action 
Tracker (CAT) (CAT 2019), JRC (Tchung-Ming et al. 2018), 
PBL (CD-LINKS Scenario Database) (McCollum et al. 
2018), and the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2018). In 
addition, four new modelling groups (IIASA, NIES, PIK and 
RFF–CMCC) provided data for this scenario, available in 
the CD-LINKS Scenario Database (McCollum et al. 2018).
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3.2.2 NDC scenarios and updates
The NDC scenarios estimate the levels of global total 
GHG emissions that are projected as a result of the 
implementation of the mitigation actions pledged by 
countries in their NDCs. In line with previous gap reports, 
two NDC scenarios are considered: the unconditional and 
the conditional NDC scenario. The unconditional NDC 
scenario assumes countries only implement the mitigation 
actions specified in their NDCs that have no conditions 
attached. Parties that do not have an NDC or solely have a 
conditional target in their NDC are assumed to follow their 
current policy scenario. The conditional NDC scenario 
assumes full achievement of Parties’ mitigation pledges 
(both the conditional and unconditional actions listed as 
part of the mitigation contribution in their NDCs). Parties 
that do not have conditional mitigation targets in their NDC 
follow their unconditional target. Appendix A.1 (available 
online) provides a full overview of the studies considered 
for the reference and NDC scenarios.
The NDC scenario of the 2019 report is based on updated 
data from the same data sources as the current policies 
scenario and is provided by 12 modelling groups. Projected 
NDC levels for some countries, in particular China and 
India, depend on recent emission trends or gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth projections that quickly become 
outdated. Therefore, studies that were published in 2015, 
before the adoption of the Paris Agreement, have been 
omitted from the 2019 update. The emission projections of 
China and India for the current policies and NDC scenarios 
have been lowered in most studies that have updated 
projections of current policies on an annual basis, such 
as IEA, Climate Action Tracker, PBL and JRC. For China in 
particular, the projected peak level of CO2 emissions has 
also decreased in the most recent studies compared to 
projections published in 2015. Nevertheless, the impact 
of excluding studies published before 2015 is small. The 
projected global emissions levels of the NDC scenarios 
are very similar to the levels assessed in the 2018 UNEP 
Emissions Gap Report2.
3.2.3  Least-cost mitigation scenarios consistent 
with the Paris Agreement’s temperature 
limits and updates in light of the IPCC Special 
Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C
Estimates of where GHG emissions should be in the year 
2030 in order to be consistent with a least-cost pathway 
towards limiting global warming to specific temperature 
limits are calculated from the scenarios that were compiled 
as part of the mitigation pathway assessment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report 
2 Assuming 100-year global warming potential (GWP) values of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) for both datasets.
3 More specifically, least-cost pathways are calculated with integrated assessment models (that is, models that combine representations of the 
energy, economic, land and environment systems), and distribute the emission reductions across regions, sectors and gases in such a way that the 
global discounted reduction costs are minimized over time and the climate target is achieved with varying probability (see also box 3.1 in the UNEP 
Emissions Gap Report 2017).
on Global Warming of 1.5°C (IPCC SR1.5) (Rogelj et al. 2018), 
and are available online (Huppmann et al. 2018a; Huppmann 
et al. 2018b). Similar to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 
2018, least-cost mitigation pathways – or pathways that 
aim at limiting warming to specific temperature limits at 
the lowest overall cost3 – are selected and grouped into 
three temperature scenario groups according to their 
maximum cumulative CO2 emissions from 2018 onwards. 
This approach ensures that all scenarios in a specific 
temperature scenario group result in similar maximum 
warming and that there is limited overlap between the 
various groups. Moreover, this approach is consistent with 
the approach of the IPCC SR1.5 that groups scenarios in 
different categories based on their maximum temperature 
outcome (IPCC 2018; Rogelj et al. 2018).
Peak warming is achieved around the time of net-zero 
CO2 emissions (Ricke and Caldeira 2014; Joos et al. 2013; 
Zickfeld and Herrington 2015) and current technical 
assessments of mitigation pathways show that some 
degree of carbon-dioxide removal (CDR) is required to 
compensate for ongoing emissions in sectors that are hard 
to decarbonize (IPCC 2018; Rogelj et al. 2018). After peak 
warming, global temperature rise could potentially be slowly 
reversed through the continued deployment of global CDR 
to achieve net negative CO2 emissions (Allen et al. 2018; 
Zickfeld, MacDougall and Matthews 2016; Tokarska and 
Zickfeld 2015). However, CDR deployment at such scales 
is associated with important risks, as highlighted in earlier 
UNEP Emissions Gap Reports (for example, UNEP (2010)) 
and other assessment (de Coninck et al. 2018; Roy et al. 
2018; Fuss et al. 2018).
The three temperature scenario groups describe a range 
of pathways that keep warming in the range of below 
2°C–1.5°C and allow the identification of the consequences 
of strengthened or weakened action at various degrees of 
ambition, from limiting warming to roughly around 2°C over 
potential interpretations of “well below 2°C”, to pursuing to 
limit warming to 1.5°C, and their corresponding emission 
reductions (see table 3.1). Each scenario considers a 
least-cost climate change mitigation pathway that starts 
reductions from 2020. The temperature outcomes of these 
scenarios are estimated using the climate model set up 
used in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (Meinshausen et 
al. 2009; Meinshausen, Raper and Wigley 2011; Rogelj et al. 
2014; Clarke et al. 2014).
 ▶ Below 2.0°C scenario:  This scenario limits 
maximum cumulative CO2 emissions from 2018 
until the time net-zero CO2 emissions are reached 
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(or until 2100 if net-zero is not reached before4) 
to between 900 and 1300 GtCO2, and cumulative 
2018–2100 emissions to at most 1200 GtCO2. It is 
consistent with limiting end-of-century warming 
to below about 2.0°C with about 66 per cent or 
greater probability, while limiting peak global 
warming during the twenty-first century to below 
2.0°C with about 66 per cent or greater probability. 
The median estimate of 2030 GHG emissions for 
this scenario is 41 GtCO2e, which is consistent with 
the median 40 GtCO2e estimated for the “lower 2°C” 
scenario category of the IPCC SR1.5 (see table 2.4 
in (Rogelj et al. 2018)).
 ▶ Below 1.8°C scenario:  This scenario l imits 
maximum cumulative CO2 emissions from 2018 
until the time net-zero CO2 emissions are reached 
(or until 2100 if net-zero is not reached before) 
to between 600 and 900 GtCO2 , and cumulative 
2018-2100 emissions to at most 900 GtCO2. It is 
consistent with limiting peak and end-of-century 
warming to below about 1.8°C with about 66 per 
cent or greater probability. This scenario is included 
to provide additional, more granular information 
about how emissions reduction requirements in 
2030 change with gradually increasing stringency 
of global mitigation action.
 ▶ Below 1.5°C in 2100 scenario: This scenario limits 
maximum cumulative CO2 emissions from 2018 
until the time net-zero CO2 emissions are reached 
(all model realizations in this scenario reach net-zero 
before 2100) to below 600 GtCO2, and cumulative 
2018–2100 emissions to at most 380 GtCO2, when 
net negative CO2 emissions in the second half of the 
century are included. It is consistent with limiting 
global warming to below 1.5°C in 2100 with about 
66 per cent probability, while limiting peak global 
warming during the twenty-first century to 1.6–
1.7°C with about 66 per cent or greater probability. 
This class of scenarios is consistent with the 
scenarios in the IPCC 1.5°C Special Report that limit 
warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (as 
explained in box 3.2, UNEP Emissions Gap Report 
2018; see also characteristics in table 3.1). The 
median estimate of 2030 emissions of 25 GtCO2e 
is well within the median estimate range of 22–28 
GtCO2e of the IPCC SR1.5 for the 1.5°C with no or 
limited overshoot (see table 3.1).
Table 3.1 shows the 2030 global GHG emission levels for 
the three scenarios.
4 If a scenario does not achieve net-zero CO2 emissions before 2100 while still holding warming to below a specific temperature threshold, it is 
assumed that global CO2 emissions will reach net-zero emissions immediately or shortly after 2100. 
5 This change was made to be more in line with the decisions made at COP24 in Katowice, where the Parties agreed on AR5 for reporting reasons. A 
full switch to AR5 GWP was not yet possible because the literature is not yet up-to-date regarding this decision. 
6 The numbers are based on the estimates of UNEP (2015) of 60 GtCO2e (range of 58–62 GtCO2e), assuming 100-year GWP values of the IPCC SAR. 
Here, these estimates are converted using 100-year GWP values of the IPCC AR4, leading to an adjustment of 1.5 GtCO2e.
3.3 The 2030 emissions gap
In line with previous reports, the emissions gap for 2030 is 
defined as the difference between global total GHG emissions 
from least-cost scenarios that keep global warming to 
2°C and 1.5°C with varying levels of likelihood and the 
estimated global total GHG emissions resulting from a full 
implementation of the NDCs. To allow for a more nuanced 
interpretation of the Paris Agreement’s temperature targets, 
this assessment includes a below 1.8°C scenario. This 
section updates the gap based on estimated levels of GHG 
emissions in 2030 for the scenarios described in section 3.2. 
Table 3.1 provides a full overview of 2030 emission levels for 
the seven scenarios considered in this assessment, as well 
as the resulting emissions gap. A change compared to 2018 
is that all emission projections have been aggregated with 
the 100-year global warming potential (GWP) values of the 
IPCC AR45, whereas UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2018 used 
the GWP values of the Second Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC SAR). The 
difference between SAR and AR4 GWPs leads to a difference 
in both scenarios for 2°C, 1.8 °C and 1.5°C and current policy 
and NDC levels (typically 1–2 GtCO2e), so that the effect on 
the size of the emissions gap will be limited.
Table 3.1 indicates that in the absence of further climate 
action since 2005 – that is, under a 2005-policies scenario 
– the global total GHG emissions in 2030 would be 64 GtCO2e 
(range of 60–68 GtCO2e). Current policies are estimated to 
reduce global emissions in 2030 to around 60 GtCO2e, which 
is 4 GtCO2e lower compared to the 2005-policies scenario.
The estimates of global emissions in 2030 under the current 
policy scenario have decreased slightly since 2015, when 
the UNEP Emissions Gap Report first introduced the current 
policies emission projection until 2030. The UNEP Emissions 
Gap Report 2015 estimated global emissions under a current 
policy scenario projection of about 62 GtCO2e6 (range of 
59.5–63.5 GtCO2e) in 2030 (UNEP 2015), which has been 
lowered to 60 GtCO2e (range of 58–64 GtCO2e) in 2019, 
indicating that studies show slight progress of about 2 GtCO2e 
(range of 0.5–2 GtCO2e) in policy implementation since the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement. The emissions projections 
of the current policies scenario of the Climate Action Tracker 
and PBL show a similar decrease over time. The current policy 
scenario estimate for 2030 is around 0.5 GtCO2e lower than 
the 2018 report estimate, when the implications of switching 
to the GWP values of the IPCC AR4 are taken into account, 
which is similar to the updated estimates of individual studies 
from the Climate Action Tracker and PBL. Overall, this implies 
that countries are still not on track to deliver their NDCs (see 
chapter 2 and chapter 4 for a discussion of G20 members’ 
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Table 3.1. Global total greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 under different scenarios (median and 10th to 90th percentile 
range), temperature implications and the resulting emissions gap. 
Note: The gap numbers and ranges are calculated based on the original numbers (without rounding), and these may differ from the rounded 
numbers (third column) in the table. Numbers are rounded to full GtCO2e. GHG emissions have been aggregated with 100-year GWP 
values of the IPCC AR4 (to be consistent with Table 2.4 of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, whereas UNEP Emissions Gap 
Report 2018 used GWP values of IPCC SAR). The NDC and current policy emission projections are updated from the presented numbers in 
cross-chapter Box 11 of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (Bertoldi et al. 2018), with new studies that were published after 
the literature cut-off date of IPCC. Pathways were grouped into three categories depending on whether their maximum cumulative CO2 
emissions were less than 600, 600–900 or 900–1300 GtCO2, respectively, from 2018 onwards until net-zero CO2 emissions are reached, or 
until the end of the century if the net-zero point is not reached before. The estimated temperature outcomes represent estimates of global 
average surface air temperature (GSAT), most consistent with the impact assessment of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report. Pathways 
assume limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation thereafter. Estimated temperature outcomes are based on the IPCC AR5 
method (Meinshausen, Raper and Wigley 2011; Clarke et al. 2014).
Scenario
(rounded to 
the nearest 
gigaton)
Number 
of 
scenarios 
in set
Global 
total 
emissions 
in 2030 
[GtCO2e]
Estimated temperature outcomes Closest 
corresponding
IPCC SR1.5 
scenario class
Emissions Gap in 2030 
[GtCO2e] 
50% 
probability
66% 
probability
90% 
probability
Below 
2.0°C 
Below 
1.8°C
Below 
1.5°C in 
2100
2005-policies 6
64 
(60–68)
Current 
policy
8
60 
(58–64)
18 
(17–23)
24 
(23–29)
35 
(34–39)
Unconditional 
NDCs
11
56 
(54–60)
15 
(12–18)
21 
(18–24)
32 
(29–35)
Conditional 
NDCs
12
54 
(51–56)
12 
(9–14)
18 
(15–21)
29 
(26–31)
Below 2.0°C
(66% 
probability)
29
41 
(39–46)
Peak:  
1.7-1.8°C 
In 2100:
1.6-1.7°C
Peak:  
1.9-2.0°C 
In 2100:
1.8-1.9°C
Peak:  
2.4-2.6°C 
In 2100:
2.3-2.5°C
Higher-2°C 
pathways
Below 1.8°C
(66% 
probability) 
43
35 
(31–41)
Peak:  
1.6-1.7°C 
In 2100:
1.3-1.6°C
Peak:  
1.7-1.8°C 
In 2100:
1.5-1.7°C
Peak:  
2.1-2.3°C 
In 2100:
1.9-2.2°C
Lower-2°C 
pathways
Below 1.5°C 
in 2100
and peak 
below 
1.7°C (both 
with 66% 
probability) 
13
25 
(22–31)
Peak:  
1.5-1.6°C
In 2100:
1.2-1-3°C
Peak:  
1.6-1.7°C
In 2100:
1.4-1.5°C
Peak:  
2.0-2.1°C
In 2100:
1.8-1.9°C
1.5°C with 
no or limited 
overshoot
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status and progress). Full implementation of the unconditional 
and conditional NDCs is estimated to reduce global emissions 
in 2030 by about 4 and 6 GtCO2e, respectively, compared to the 
current policy scenario (table 3.1).
The emissions gap between estimated total global 
emissions in 2030 under the NDC scenarios and under 
pathways limiting warming to below 2°C and 1.5°C is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. The full implementation of the 
unconditional NDCs is estimated to result in a gap in 2030 
of 15 GtCO2e (range of 12–18) compared to the below 2°C 
scenario with a 66 per cent probability that warming stays 
below 2°C. The emissions gap between unconditional NDCs 
and below 1.5°C pathways is about 32 GtCO2e
 (range of 
29–35). Taking into consideration the full implementation 
of both unconditional and conditional NDCs would reduce 
this gap by about 3 GtCO2e. The estimates are similar to 
the gap assessed in the 2018 UNEP Emissions Gap Report. 
The only change compared to the 2018 report is that the 
gap between the conditional NDCs and the 2°C scenario is 
1 GtCO2e lower in 2019.
7 This statement is based on the quantitative evidence that conditional NDCs would reduce global GHG emissions relative to projections of current policies by 
6 GtCO2e, while the gap between current policies and the 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios amounts to 18 and more than 30 GtCO2e, respectively (see table 3.1). This 
translates in the efforts that are currently being made to move from current policies to the conditional NDCs having to be multiplied by a factor of three and 
greater than five for global GHG emissions to be in line with a pathway towards limiting warming to around 2°C and 1.5°C, respectively. 
In summary, the updated analysis and review of the progress 
set against national commitments under the Paris Agreement 
makes clear that the current pace of national action is 
insufficient for achieving the Paris Long-term Temperature 
Goal or even for achieving the emissions reductions implied 
by the NDC pledges. Increased emissions and lagging action 
mean that the gap figure for the 2019 report remains very 
large, and similar to the 2018 report. Translated into climate 
action, the analysis reconfirms that nations must triple their 
current efforts, – as reflected in the difference in projected 
emissions between current policies and conditional NDCs – 
to limit warming to 2°C and multiply their current efforts by at 
least five times to align global climate action and emissions 
with limiting warming close to 1.5°C7.
3.4 Implications of the emissions gap
3.4.1 Implications of postponing action
There are several implications of the projected 2030 GHG 
emissions under the current policies scenario and the 
Box 3.1. The remaining carbon budget as a tool for 
scenario classification
The IPCC SR1.5 provided an updated assessment of 
the remaining carbon budget, that is, the total amount 
of carbon dioxide that can be emitted if global warming 
is to be kept to a specific level relative to pre-industrial 
levels (Rogelj et al. 2018). Owing to advances and 
improvements in methods to estimate remaining carbon 
budgets, the IPCC SR1.5 reported median estimates that 
were larger than those reported five years earlier by the 
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (Stocker et al. 2013; IPCC 
2014). Despite these larger estimates of the remaining 
carbon budget by the IPCC, the emission pathways 
corresponding to the Paris Agreement limits used in the 
UNEP Emissions Gap Reports did not require a strong 
adjustment. How can this be the case?
The updates of the remaining carbon budget estimates in 
the IPCC SR1.5 were based on three main methodological 
advancements (Rogelj et al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2019): (i) 
accounting for the latest estimates of anthropogenic 
global warming to date (Allen et al. 2018); (ii) a more 
formal description of the uncertainty in the ratio of global 
warming projected per cumulative ton of CO2 (Stocker et 
al. 2013); and (iii) a more precise estimate of the warming 
due to emissions other than CO2 at the time of peak 
warming (Rogelj et al. 2018; Huppmann et al. 2018a).
However, each of these methodological improvements 
were to some degree already taken into account in the 
emission pathways of the UNEP Emissions Gap Reports, 
which previously used a reduced-complexity climate 
model set up (Meinshausen et al. 2009; Meinshausen, 
Raper and Wigley 2011; Rogelj et al. 2014; Clarke et al. 
2014). This model set up applied the methodological 
improvements that formed the basis for updating 
the IPCC SR1.5 carbon budgets. Specifically, it (i) 
accounted for recent estimates of warming to date by 
expressing temperature projections relative to a recent 
reference period (the 1986–2005 period) (Clarke et al. 
2014); (ii) had a better coverage of the uncertainty 
in the ratio of global warming to cumulative CO2 
emissions by using an observationally constrained 
probabilistic climate model set up (Meinshausen et al. 
2009); and (iii) used integrated assessment mitigation 
scenarios with internally consistent evolutions of all 
GHGs, also at the time of peak warming (Clarke et al. 
2014). Previous UNEP Emissions Gap Reports were 
thus based on assumptions regarding temperature 
projections that were to some degree consistent 
with the methodological improvements implemented 
for the SR1.5 remaining carbon budget assessment, 
explaining why the emission pathways of the UNEP 
Emissions Gap Reports have not changed so much. 
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Figure 3.1. Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030 (median estimate 
and 10th to 90th percentile range).
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Figure 3.1 —  Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030 
(median estimate and 10th to 90th percentile range).
NDC scenarios. The high GHG emissions until 2030 result 
in a higher reliance on CDR, stronger potential trade-offs 
with sustainable development goals and lock-in of carbon-
intensive infrastructure, which will make subsequent 
emissions reductions harder and more costly. Section 3.5 of 
the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2018 provides an overview 
of these issues.
The long-term implications and the inadequacy of the 
current policies and NDCs are also apparent if viewed from 
a slightly broader perspective and when considering the 
required global emissions reductions until mid-century. The 
lower (“zoom-out”) part of figure 3.1 indicates how a failure 
to reduce GHG emissions adequately in the next decade will 
frustrate and undermine the possibility of achieving the deep 
emissions reductions that are required by 2050 in order to 
keep emissions in line with the temperature goal of the Paris 
Agreement.
The implications of postponing adequate climate action 
are clear from the past decade of UNEP Emissions Gap 
Reports. The data underlying the gap assessment indicate 
that had serious climate action begun in 2010, the emissions 
reductions required per year to meet the emissions levels in 
2030 consistent with the 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios would only 
have been 0.7 per cent and 3.3 per cent per year on average. 
However, since this did not happen, the required cuts in 
emissions are now 2.7 per cent per year from 2020 to year-
2030 for the 2°C goal and 7.6 per cent per year on average for 
the 1.5°C goal.
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3.4.2 Temperature implications
Emissions until 2030 do not fully determine the warming 
until the end of the century, but the trend until 2030 can 
be used to project the warming, assuming this trend would 
continue until 2100. As in previous UNEP Emissions Gap 
Reports, this report uses internally consistent long-term 
emissions projections and relates the GHG emissions in 
the year 2030 to outcomes over the entire century (Rogelj 
et al. 2016). This approach provides temperature estimates 
for a wide range of 2030 GHG emissions levels (Jeffery 
et al. 2018) that are consistent with the wider integrated 
scenario literature.
Assuming that climate action continues consistently 
throughout the twenty-first century, a continuation of 
current policies would lead to a global mean temperature 
rise of 3.5°C by 2100 (range of 3.4–3.9°C, 66 per cent 
probability). This corresponds roughly to a tripling of 
the current level of warming as assessed by the IPCC 
(2018). The current unconditional NDCs as assessed in 
this report are consistent with limiting warming likely to 
3.2°C (range 3.0–3.5°C) by the end of the century (66 
per cent probability). These values are reduced by about 
0.2°C if both conditional and unconditional NDCs are 
implemented. It is clear that neither current policies nor 
NDCs are adequate to limit warming to the temperature 
limits included in the Paris Agreement.
Temperature implications of the current NDCs can also be 
looked at from the perspective of the carbon budget that 
would be emitted until 2030 under the current NDCs. The 
8 Note that the “below 1.5°C in 2100“ scenario category applies a peak carbon budget limit of 600 GtCO2, which in itself is not sufficient to limit 
warming to 1.5°C with a high likelihood, but it limits peak warming with greater than 66 per cent probability to no more than 1.7°C (see table 3.1). 
In addition, the “below 1.5°C in 2100” scenario category applies an end-of-century carbon budget limit of 380 GtCO2 to limit warming to 1.5°C with 
a high likelihood. This reflects the 420 GtCO2 remaining carbon budget for limiting warming to 1.5°C with 66 per cent probability, which is further 
reduced by specific Earth system feedbacks. A value of about 40 GtCO2 is applied for this correction because the stringency of these scenarios 
suggest a lower impact of these processes than the 100 GtCO2 that was assessed for warming up to 2°C.
IPCC SR1.5 reported that for limiting warming to 1.5°C with 
50 per cent probability, the remaining carbon budget from 
2018 onward amounts to 580 GtCO2. This would be further 
reduced to 420 GtCO2 for having a 66 per cent probability 
of success of limiting warming to 1.5°C. Further taking 
into account reinforcing Earth-system components, such 
as permafrost thawing, could reduce these estimates by a 
further 100 GtCO28. Starting from a current level of global 
CO2 emissions of 41.6 GtCO2 in 2018 (Le Quéré et al. 2018) 
and assuming a straight trajectory to 2030, the current 
unconditional NDC scenario implies cumulative emissions 
of about 510 GtCO2 (range of 495–528 GtCO2) until 2030. 
Therefore, current unconditional NDCs until 2030 already 
go beyond the carbon budget limits set for 1.5°C. Together 
with the knowledge that the current status of policies and 
measures that are being implemented by countries would 
lead to even more emissions, this leaves no doubt that 
the current NDCs are blatantly inadequate to achieve the 
climate goals of the Paris Agreement.
Box 3.2. Comparing emission estimates 
across chapters - Part II
Under the current policies scenario used for the 
assessment of the emissions gap, global GHG 
emissions in 2018 are estimated to be about 53.2 
GtCO2e. This is lower than the 2018 estimate of global 
GHG emissions of 55.3 GtCO2e provided in chapter 2 
(see also box 2.1). Although this difference is relatively 
small and well within the uncertainty range surrounding 
the emissions estimates, it is worth exploring. Both 
estimates show a similar increase of about 10–15 per 
cent compared with 2010 levels. 
There could be multiple reasons why the median 
emissions projections of the models are lower than 
the estimates of the historical emissions database. 
Some models may be calibrated to an earlier base-
year. For example, for 2010, the calibration may be 
based on other emissions databases (such as IEA or 
PRIMAP), or the models may not include all emissions 
sources, or use the latest emissions factors. The six 
global models used for the current policies scenario 
of the UNEP Emissions Gap Report show a wide range 
in global GHG emissions in 2010 of [46;50] GtCO2e, 
whereas the historical emissions database has an 
estimate of 50 GtCO2e.
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4.1 Introduction
In the lead-up to the 2019 Climate Action Summit, United 
Nations Secretary-General António Guterres called on 
leaders to “announce the plans that they will set next year to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for 2030 and to achieve 
net zero emissions by 2050” (Farand 2019). The Secretary-
General’s message echoed the growing popular movement 
for transformative, ambitious climate action. 
The focus on ambition and action is well founded, as illustrated 
by the gap assessment in Chapter 3. This chapter provides a 
comprehensive overview of recent ambitious climate actions 
by national and subnational governments as well as non-
state actors, and a detailed overview of policy progress and 
opportunities for enhanced mitigation ambition for selected 
G20 members. The objective is to inform the preparation of 
new and updated nationally determined contributions (NDCs) 
that countries are requested to submit by 2020. The chapter 
addresses the following questions:
 ▶ How has the global situation changed since the Paris 
Agreement was adopted and how does this affect 
opportunities to increase ambition?
 ▶ How many and what type of ambitious climate 
commitments have been adopted by national 
governments, as well as by cities, states, regions, 
companies and investors to date?
1 Using the latest inventory data for all G20 members in the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) (Olivier and Peters 2018) and 
latest reported national inventory data for each country for LULUCF emissions.
 ▶ Among selected G20 members, what progress has 
been made recently towards ambitious climate action 
and what are the key opportunities for additional 
action?
The primary focus of this chapter is on ambitious climate 
targets and actions, which are defined as those that 
unambiguously contribute towards the transformations 
required to align global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
pathways with the Paris Agreement goals. Section 4.2 
summarizes the global opportunity to enhance ambition and 
action and provides an overview of the status of ambitious 
climate mitigation commitments made by G20 members as 
well as countries and non-state actors globally.
As G20 members account for 78 per cent of global GHG 
emissions, they largely determine global emission trends 
and the extent to which the 2030 emissions gap will be 
closed. This chapter therefore also pays particular attention 
to G20 members, with section 4.3 focusing on progress 
and opportunities for enhancing mitigation ambition of nine 
selected G20 members: Argentina, Brazil, China, the European 
Union, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa and the United 
States of America, which represented around 56 per cent 
of global GHG emissions in 2017.1 The selection of the G20 
members was based entirely on the availability of expertise 
in the author team. Supplementing this chapter, annex B 
provides a detailed overview of the status of ambitious 
climate mitigation commitments made by G20 members as 
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well as countries and non-state actors globally, while annex 
C provides a detailed update of recent policy developments 
of the nine selected G20 members, considering ambitious 
climate actions, as well as actions that are incremental. 
Both annexes are available online.
4.2 The global opportunity to enhance 
ambition and action
4.2.1 The scale and type of transformation needed to 
enhance climate ambition and action are clear
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] 2018) 
concluded that limiting the temperature increase to 1.5°C 
with no or limited overshoot would mean reducing global 
CO2 emissions by about 45 per cent from 2010 levels by 
2030 and reaching net zero around 2050. To align with the 
2°C limit, global CO2 emissions would need to decline by 
about 25 per cent from 2010 levels by 2030 and reach net 
zero around 2070. 
Under the Paris Agreement, countries are invited to submit 
long-term low GHG emission development strategies by 
2020 and are requested to submit updated or new NDCs 
also by 2020. Considering the update of NDCs in the context 
of the development of long-term mitigation strategies is an 
important means to ensure consistency between short-term 
mitigation policies and targets and long-term goals. The IPCC 
Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C provides clear 
guidance on the economy-wide and sector transformations 
that are needed to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C by 
the end of the century (see also Chapter 5). 
Although the time frame for global emission reductions 
consistent with the 2°C limit is slightly longer, the major 
long-term sectoral transformations needed to reach net 
zero GHG emissions globally are essentially the same and 
can be summarized under the following headings:
 ▶ Full decarbonization of the energy sector, based 
on renewable energy and electrification across 
sectors – this includes phasing out coal-fired 
power plants.
 ▶ Decarbonization of the transport sector in parallel 
with modal shifts to public transportation, cycling 
and walking.
 ▶ Shifts in industry processes towards electricity and 
zero carbon and substitution of carbon-intensive 
products.
 ▶ Decarbonization of the building sector, including 
electrification and greater efficiency.
 ▶ Enhanced agricultural management as well as 
demand-side measures such as dietary shifts to 
more sustainable, plant-based diets and measures 
to reduce food waste.
 ▶ Zero net deforestation and the adoption of policies to 
conserve and restore land carbon stocks and protect 
natural ecosystems, aiming for significant net CO2 
uptake in this sector (IPCC 2018; UNEP 2017).
Transformations in these areas will require major shifts in 
investment patterns and financial flows, as well as several 
sectoral and economy-wide policy targets. The ambitious 
climate targets considered in section 4.2.3 are based on 
these overall areas of transformation and important sub-
targets. A full overview is provided in annex B.
4.2.2  Drivers of ambition have evolved since the 
Paris Agreement
Compared with the run-up to the Paris Agreement in 2015, 
when countries prepared their intended NDCs, many drivers of 
climate action have changed, with several options for ambitious 
climate action becoming less costly, more numerous and 
better understood. Changes within three main categories in 
particular could facilitate greater NDC ambition today (UNEP 
2018) including climate change. Countries will meet again at 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). First, technological and economic developments 
present opportunities to decarbonize the economy, especially 
the energy sector, at a cost that is lower than ever. Second, 
the synergies between climate action and economic growth 
and development objectives, including options for addressing 
distributional impacts, are better understood. Finally, policy 
momentum across various levels of government, as well as a 
surge in climate action commitments by non-state actors, is 
creating opportunities for countries to enhance the ambition 
of their NDCs. 
The cost of renewable energy is declining more rapidly 
than was predicted just a few years ago. Renewables are 
currently the cheapest source of new power generation 
in most of the world, with the global weighted average 
purchase or auction price for new utility-scale solar power 
photovoltaic (PV) systems and utility-scale onshore wind 
turbines projected to compete with the marginal operating 
cost of existing coal plants by next year (International 
Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA] 2019. See also Chapter 
6). These trends are increasingly manifesting in a decline 
in coal plant construction, including the cancellation of 
planned plants, as well as the early retirement of existing 
plants (Jewell et al. 2019; Smouse et al. 2018). Moreover, 
real-life cost declines are outpacing projections. The 2019 
costs of onshore wind and solar PV power are 8 and 13 per 
cent lower respectively than IRENA predictions from just 
one year ago in 2018 (IRENA 2019). These cost declines, 
along with those of battery storage, are opening possibilities 
for utility-scale solar power.
Although technological progress has been uneven across 
sectors, with the industry and buildings sectors in particular 
lagging behind (International Energy Agency [IEA] 2019), the 
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benefits extend beyond power generation. For example, as a 
result of falling battery costs, predictions forecast that electric 
vehicles will achieve price parity with internal combustion 
engine vehicles by the mid-2020s and lead global sales 
between 2035 and 2040 (Bloomberg NEF 2018).
Aside from advancements in technology, a growing body 
of research has documented that ambitious climate action, 
economic growth and sustainable development can go 
hand-in-hand when well managed. Analysis by the Global 
Commission on the Economy and Climate estimates that 
ambitious climate action could generate US$26 trillion in 
economic benefits between now and 2030 and create 65 
million jobs by 2030, while avoiding 700,000 premature 
deaths from air pollution (The New Climate Economy 2018). 
Similarly, the IPCC (2018) found that, if managed responsibly, 
most mitigation options consistent with limiting warming 
to 1.5°C could have strong synergies with the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), especially those related to 
health, clean energy, cities and communities, responsible 
consumption and production, and oceans (IPCC 2018. See 
also chapter 5).
Momentum at all levels of government and parts of the 
business sector increases the potential to reflect greater 
ambition in the NDCs. At the subnational level, for example, 
over 70 large cities housing 425 million people have 
committed to go carbon-neutral by 2050 or sooner (see table 
B-1). At the national level, 13 countries have communicated 
long-term, low GHG emissions development strategies 
to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2019), with many more under 
development or developed at the national level but not 
communicated internationally (WRI 2019). At the international 
level, the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol outlines 
phase-down schedules for production and consumption of 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Businesses are increasingly 
moving towards zero emissions, 100 per cent renewables and 
100 per cent emission-free transport (see annex B).
Taken together, cost-competitive technologies, potential 
synergies with development and economic growth, and 
strong action from the subnational to international levels 
provide a strong basis for more ambitious NDCs by 2020.
4.2.3 An increasing number of countries and 
regions are adopting ambitious goals in line 
with the transformation needed, but the scale 
and pace are far from sufficient
Several national and subnational governments and 
non-state actors have embarked on ambitious climate 
action in different policy areas that can help initiate the 
transformational change required to meet the long-
term goals of the Paris Agreement. Although recent 
developments send promising signals, the adoption of 
ambitious climate targets is far from the scale and rate 
urgently required. 
2  For this reason, reference is made to ‘zero emissions targets’ and the reader is referred to annex B, table B-1 for further detail. 
This section presents an overview of the extent to which 
G20 members, as well as and countries and regions 
worldwide, have committed or are in the process of 
committing to ambitious climate targets and actions. 
These targets and actions are defined as unambiguously 
supporting a move towards the major long-term sectoral 
transformations required to meet the well-below 2°C 
and 1.5°C temperature limits of the Paris Agreement, as 
outlined in section 4.2.1. Expanding on the key types of 
policy targets and actions that would support such major 
transformations, this section provides an overview of the 
status of commitments to the following ambitious climate 
targets organized in six main categories (table 4.1). A 
detailed overview of commitments made as of October 
2019 for the above targets by individual countries, regions, 
businesses and investors is provided in annex B. 
It should be noted that the overview of targets and 
commitments provided in this section and in the annex 
is not exhaustive. Rather, it builds on a broad range of 
literature to identify ambitious climate action in the 
different categories (Kuramochi et al. 2018), but given 
the scope of existing policies and rapid changes in 
policymaking, the overview may not be completely up-to-
date. The list of targets is also incomplete. Notably, it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an overview 
of ambitious climate targets and commitments for 
agriculture. Finally, no attempt has been made to assess 
whether individual commitments are aligned with global 
least cost-effective emissions pathways to the 1.5°C or 
2°C targets. Commitments differ in various respects, 
including the extent to which they are legally binding, 
the percentages and target years adopted, whether they 
refer to GHG or CO2 emissions and whether they are net 
targets.2 These specifications are important for a detailed 
picture of the individual commitments and are provided 
in annex B.
Ambitious climate targets and actions adopted by countries 
and regions to date are prime examples of climate action 
that others can follow. Dynamics to adopt legally binding 
targets differ between target categories and sectors. 
Most of the recent increase in national and subnational 
commitments is related to the adoption of economy-wide 
zero emission targets by 2050 or sooner (see figure 4.1), 
100 per cent renewable energy or electricity targets (see 
figure 4.2) and a 100 per cent share of new zero-emission 
motorbikes, cars and/or buses (see figure 4.3). To date, 
countries, regions and subnational actors have mostly 
refrained from adopting legally binding ambitious targets 
in other sectors, such as industry, buildings or heavy 
transport, except for a few first movers.   
Overall, the number of countries and states that are 
committing to zero emission targets is increasing fast, 
though it is still far from the scale and pace required, as 
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Overarching economy-wide climate actions Countries Regions Cities Businesses
Achieve zero emissions by year x 71 11 >100 >500
Implement ambitious comprehensive CO2 
pricing in all sectors by year x 
(32 but not 
comprehensive)
(25 but not 
comprehensive)
Phase out all fossil-fuel subsidies by year x (Decision by G20 
in 2009 yet to be 
implemented)
Make all finance flows consistent with the Paris 
Agreement goals by year x
(>1 initial steps) >10
Electricity production
Reach 100 per cent renewable electricity or 100 
per cent carbon-free electricity by year x
53 33 >120 >180
Phase out coal-fired power plants by year x with 
just a transition plan 
13 16 6 28
Stop financing and insuring coal-fired power 
plants elsewhere as of year x
- >20
Other energy industry
Stop new fossil-fuel explorations and 
production as of year x
6 >5
Commit to zero fugitive emissions target for 
year x
(32 support zero 
routine flaring)
>14
Industry
Ensure all new installations are low- carbon/
zero-emission and maximize material efficiency 
as of year x
- >3
Implement ambitious carbon pricing for 
industry by year x 
1 -
Transport
Shift to x per cent public transport by year x 4 - >5
Shift to 100 per cent share of new zero-
emission motorbikes, cars and/or buses as of 
year x
21 5 >52 >50
Shift to 100 per cent carbon-free heavy goods 
transport and ships as of year x
- - >10
Shift to 100 per cent carbon-free aviation as of 
year x
(1 short haul) (1 domestic) -
Buildings
Shift to 100 per cent (near-) zero energy 
buildings for new buildings as of year x 
3 7 >23 >23
Fully decarbonize the building sector by year x 1 6 >23 >23
Phase out fossil fuels (for example, gas) for 
residential heating by year x 
1 - >3
Increase the rate of zero-energy renovations to 
x per cent per year
(1 public 
building)
-
Agriculture and forestry
Zero net deforestation by year x >67 21 >12
Table 4.1. Overview of the number of ambitious climate actions and targets by countries, regions, cities and businesses 
Note: Greyed cells indicate that no (relevant) data is available. For full details, see annex B. Given the scope of existing policies and rapid 
change in policymaking, the table makes no claim to be exhaustive.  
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Figure 1 — Here we're missing the headline and description of the fi gure
OVERARCHING
Target categories G20 countries Country level Regional level
Zero emissions 
by year x
2 G20 members (France, UK) have passed 
legislation
3 G20 members (EU and Germany and 
Italy as part of EU1) currently in process of 
passing legislation
15 G20 members have no binding (net-)
zero-emission targets
71 countries 11 regions
          
          
   
Ambitious 
comprehensive 
CO2 pricing in 
all sectors by 
year x 2
No G20 member has implemented 
ambitious comprehensive CO2 pricing 
in all sectors, but 9 G20 members have 
implemented carbon pricing as ETS or 
carbon tax with partial coverage and/or 
lower CO2 prices (as at August 2019) 
No country 

No regions

Phase out all 
fossil fuel sub-
sidies by year x
No G20 member has existing reform plans 
to fully phase out all fossil fuel subsidies, 
but the G20 took a decision in 2009 to 
gradually phase out fossil fuel subsides 
with an annual peer-review among G20 
members
No country 

No regions

Make all fi nance 
flows consistent 
with the Paris 
Agreement goals 
by year x
No G20 member has made all fi nance 
flows fully aligned with the Paris 
Agreement goals, but the UK has 
published a Green Finance Strategy 
in 2019 as an example of intermediate 
action
No country 

No regions

An increasing number of countries and regions are commiting to zero carbon dioxide or 
greenhouse gas emission targets, but not at the scale and pace required. Other economy-
wide climate action such as completely phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, introducing 
comprehensive and ambitious carbon pricing and making all fi nance flows consistent 
with the Paris Agreement remains inadequate.
*
* Non-state actor example
10 Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) 
are currently working towards aligning 
their fi nancing activities with the Paris 
Agreement goals. The MDBs will develop 
relevant methods and tools with the 
objective of presenting a joint Paris alignment 
approach and individual MDB progress towards 
alignment at COP 25 in 2019.
More information:  
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/784141543806348331/Joint-
Declaration-MDBs-Alignment-Approach-to-Paris-Agreement-
COP24-Final.pdf
The zero emissions targets include legally binding targets, 
legally binding targets that are currently under consideration, 
and non-legally binding targets.
Zero emissions targets 
i  4.1. Overview of ambitious ov rarching economy-wide climate actions and targets by G20 members, countries and 
regions (for full details, see annex B)  
Note: 1 Italy is not currently pursuing a process to pass national legislation on a zero-emissions target, but will be covered under the European 
Union target, if adopted. 
2 The Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices of 2018 recommends an average economy-wide price of at least US$40–80/tCO2 
by 2020 and US$50–100/tCO2 by 2030 to close the emissions gap in order to meet the 2°C target (High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices 
2017; UNEP 2018). For this reason, economy-wide carbon prices would need to be higher in the respective years to close the emissions gap 
in order to meet the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal of “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”.
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illustrated in figure 4.1. To date, 71 countries and 11 regions, 
accounting for about 15 per cent of global GHG emissions 
in total3, have long-term objectives to achieve net-zero 
emissions, differing in scope, timing and the degree to which 
they are legally binding. Before the 2019 Climate Action 
Summit, the number of countries and states committing to 
zero emission targets was 21 and 8 respectively. Five G20 
members have committed to long-term net-zero emissions 
targets, of which three (the European Union, and Germany 
and Italy, as part of the European Union) are currently in 
the process of passing legislation, with two G20 members 
(France and the United Kingdom) having recently passed 
legislation. The remaining 15 G20 members have not yet 
committed to net-zero emission targets.
Economy-wide climate action remains extremely limited in 
other areas, such as a complete phase-out of fossil-fuel 
subsidies, comprehensive and ambitious carbon pricing and 
making finance flows consistent with the Paris Agreement. 
In 2009, the G20 members adopted a decision to gradually 
phase out fossil-fuel subsidies, though no country has yet 
committed to fully phasing these out by a specific year. 
Similarly, while carbon pricing is expanding, no country has 
established a comprehensive and ambitious system for 
this. At present, carbon tax and emissions trading system 
initiatives at the national and regional levels represent about 
20 per cent of global GHG emissions (World Bank 2019). 
However, only 10 per cent of global emissions from fossil 
fuels are estimated to be priced at a level consistent with 
limiting global warming to 2°C (UNEP 2018). Furthermore, 
no country has explicitly committed to making their finance 
flows consistent with the Paris Agreement, though several 
multilateral development banks are currently working 
towards aligning their financing activities with the Paris 
Agreement goals (World Bank 2018).
In terms of electricity production (figure 4.2), 53 countries 
have committed or are in the process of committing to a 
100 per cent renewables target. The number of countries 
increased from 10 countries before the 2019 Climate 
Action Summit. However, these countries accounted 
for less than 1  per cent of global CO2 emissions from 
electricity generation in 2016.4 Five G20 members have 
also committed to long-term net-zero emissions targets 
and, in turn, to fully decarbonizing their electricity sectors. 
In addition, 33 states and regions, including California (by 
2045), and accounting for around 1 per cent of global from 
electricity generation5 , as well as an increasing number 
of cities and companies, have committed to 100 per cent 
renewable electricity targets.
3 The zero emission targets considered cover legally binding, legally binding but under consideration, and non-legally binding pledges and participa-
tion in respective alliances. The share of these countries has been calculated on latest available EDGAR data and FAO data for LULUCF emissions 
(FAOSTAT 2018; Olivier and Peters 2018). For regions, their self-reported were used. 
4 The share of these countries has been calculated on emissions data for CO2 emission from electricity generation provided by IEA’s CO2 emission 
form fuel combustion dataset (IEA 2018).
5 The share of these regions has been calculated based on self-reported values.
6 The share of these countries has been calculated on emissions data for CO2 emission from coal-based electricity generation provided by IEA’s CO2 
emission from fuel combustion dataset (IEA 2018).
The 13 countries that have currently committed or are in the 
process of committing to a full phase-out of coal accounted 
for around 5 per cent of global CO2 emissions from coal-
based electricity generation in 2016.6 Five G20 members are 
among these 13 countries: Canada, France and Italy have 
already passed legislation, while Germany and the United 
Kingdom are in the process of passing legislation. A few 
non-state actors show high ambition, including 22 banks that 
have stopped direct financing to new coal mine projects and 
23 banks that have stopped direct financing to new coal plant 
projects worldwide.
An increasing number of countries, states and cities are 
pledging to phase out combustion engines for vehicles and 
initiate substantial modal shifts towards public transport, 
though to date, no such commitments have been made for 
aviation, shipping and freight transport (figure 4.3). However, 
there are several interesting examples of non-state actors 
committing to ambitious climate action for these transport 
modes, as the figure shows. For example, Norway is aiming 
to make domestic flights carbon-free by 2040 and several 
companies are working on zero-emission tanker and port 
infrastructure. 
At present, countries and states are largely refraining from 
ambitious target-setting in the heavy and extractive industry 
sector (see annex B). Six countries, including one G20 member 
(France), are currently committed to stopping new fossil-fuel 
explorations and production. In addition, a few European (re-)
insurance companies have recently implemented policies to 
stop investments, insurance cover and underwriting for new 
and ongoing fossil-fuel projects. No countries have committed 
to zero fugitive emissions targets or to ensuring that all new 
installations are low-carbon or zero emissions and maximize 
material efficiency. Only Sweden has set a target for ambitious 
carbon pricing in the industry sector. Some major steel and 
cement producers have recently pledged to zero emissions by 
2050 for their operations. Such commitments and technology 
road maps could serve as a starting point to define targets in 
the entire industry sector, following the frontrunners.
The buildings sector shows only scattered policy action at high 
levels of mitigation ambition, mainly centred on policymaking 
in the European Union (see annex B). In addition, six states and 
more than 23 cities have recently committed to zero targets 
for the buildings sector as part of the World Green Building 
Council’s Net Zero Carbon Buildings Commitment by 2050. In 
general, there is a lack of targets for phasing out fossil fuels 
in heating, zero emissions in the sector and deep retrofits of 
existing buildings.
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Figure 1 — Here we're missing the headline and description of the fi gure
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION
Target categories G20 countries Country level Regional level
100% renewable 
electricity or 
100% carbon 
free electricity 
by year x
No G20 member has committed to a 
100% renewable electricity or 100% 
carbon-free electricity target, but some 
regions within G20 members such as 
California (by 2045) or Fukushima (by 
2040) have done so. 
53 countries
  
33 regions
  
Phase out 
coal-fi red power 
plants by year x 
with just 
transition plan
3 G20 members (Canada, France, Italy) 
have passed legislation
2 G20 members (Germany, UK) currently 
in process of passing legislation
15 G20 members have no binding phase-
out plan, but some have initiated action 
to limit coal use (e.g. China and India)
13 countries
  
16 regions
  
Stop fi nancing 
and insuring of 
coal-fi red power 
plants elsewhere 
as of year x
No G20 member with legally binding 
legislation to fully stop fi nancing and 
insuring of coal-fi red power plants 
elsewhere
No country 

No regions

Several countries and regions have communicated 100% renewable electricity targets to 
fully decarbonize their electricity supply sector. Several are phasing out coal-fi red power 
plants, but these are predominantly countries with already low shares of coal.
* * Non-state actor example
22 banks have stopped providing direct fi nancing to new coal mine projects worldwide and 
23 banks have stopped directly fi nancing new coal plant projects worldwide as at August 
2019. Some more banks and (national) development banks are currently in the process of 
making such commitments. 
More information:  https://www.banktrack.org/page/list_of_banks_which_have_ended_
direct_fi nance_for_new_coal_minesplants#_
Figure 4.2. Overview of climate actions and targets in the electricity generation sector by G20 members, countries and 
regions (for full details, see annex B)   
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TR ANSPORT
Target categories G20 countries Country level Regional level
100% share 
of new zero-
emission motor-
bikes, cars and/
or buses as 
of year x
5 G20 members (Canada, France, Japan, 
Mexico, UK) have announced target
2 G20 members (India, Indonesia) have 
announced target but conﬁ rmation is 
pending  
13 G20 members have not announced 
target for 100% new zero-emission 
motorbikes, cars and/or buses
21 countries 5 regions
Shift to x% 
public transport 
by year x
3 G20 members (China, India, Indonesia) 
with distinct modal shift targets
No conclusion possible for all other G20 
members
4 countries No regions

100% carbon-
free heavy trans-
port and ships as 
of year x
No G20 member with legally binding 
target for 100% carbon-free heavy 
transport and ships
No country 

No regions

100% carbon-
free aviation as 
of year x
No G20 member with legally binding 
target for 100% carbon free aviation
No country 

No regions

While an increasing number of countries, regions, and cities pledge to phase out 
combustion engines and initiate substantial modal shifts towards public transport, no 
such commitments have been made for aviation, shipping, and freight transport to date. 
*
* Non-state actor example
52 cities have targets for 100% electric cars and/or busses, e.g. Shenzen has already electriﬁ ed all busses and taxis, 
Paris aims for 100% fossil free cars and busses in the city by 2025. 49 companies have pledged to accelerate their 
transition to electric vehicles under the EV100 initiative.
More information:  https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/dec/12/silence-shenzhen-world-ﬁ rst-electric-bus-ﬂ eet
https://www.theclimategroup.org/ev100-members
**
***
** Non-state actor example
Several companies have recently announced their plans to develop zero emission container ships, for example by 
entirely powering tankers by hydrogen produced from renewable energy sources. For example, Maersk, the world’s 
largest container shipping company, has committed to making carbon-neutral vessels commercially viable by 2030 by 
using energy sources such as biofuels and will cut its net carbon emissions to zero by 2050. 
More information:  https://www.maersk.com/news/articles/2019/06/26/towards-a-zero-carbon-future
*** Non-state actor example
Norway and Scotland both aim to decarbonize their domestic aviation sector by 2040. Avinor, Norway’s airport 
operator, has announced a switch to electric air transport for all domestic ﬂ ights as well as those to neighbouring 
Scandinavian capitals. Scotland plans to becoming the world's ﬁ rst net-zero aviation region by 2040, with trials 
of low or zero emission ﬂ ights to begin in 2021.
More information:  http://www.airport-business.com/2019/06/avinor-domestic-air-transport-norway-
electriﬁ ed-2040/
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-49556793?utm_
source=CP+Daily&utm_campaign=66d62ab006-CPdaily03092019&utm_
medium=email&utm_term=0_a9d8834f72-66d62ab006-110247033
Figure 4.3. Overview of ambitious overarching economy-wide climate actions and targets by G20 members, countries and 
regions (for full details, see annex B) 
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Argentina
 ● Refrain from extracting new, alternative fossil-fuel resources
 ● Reallocate fossil-fuel subsidies to support distributed renewable electricity-generation
 ● Shift towards widespread use of public transport in large metropolitan areas
 ● Redirect subsidies granted to companies for the extraction of alternative fossil fuels to building-sector measures
Brazil
 ● Commit to the full decarbonization of the energy supply by 2050
 ● Develop a national strategy for ambitious electric vehicle (EV) uptake aimed at complementing biofuels and at 
100 per cent CO2-free new vehicles
 ● Promote the ‘urban agenda’ by increasing the use of public transport and other low-carbon alternatives
China
 ● Ban all new coal-fired power plants
 ● Continue governmental support for renewables, taking into account cost reductions and accelerate development 
towards a 100 per cent carbon-free electricity system
 ● Further support the shift towards public modes of transport
 ● Support the uptake of electric mobility, aiming at 100 per cent CO2-free new vehicles
 ● Promote near-zero emission building development and integrate it into Government planning
Table 4.2. Selected current opportunities to enhance ambition in seven G20 members in line with ambitious climate actions 
and targets as identified in annex B. For details, see annex C.
Many countries, including most G20 members, have 
committed to zero net deforestation targets in the last 
decades (see annex B), though these commitments are 
often not supported by action on the ground. Countries, 
states, business and investors urgently need to ensure that 
they implement their various commitments, including those 
under the New York Declaration on Forests, the World Wide 
Fund for Nature’s (WWF) call for zero net deforestation by 
2020 and the Soft Commodities Compact.
To summarize, G20 members urgently need to step up their 
commitments on ambitious climate action. As this section 
shows, there are many opportunities to adopt economy-
wide and sector-specific climate action targets as called for 
by the United Nations Climate Summit in September 2019, 
and to reflect such targets in the upcoming ambition-raising 
cycle and submission of long-term strategies under the 
Paris Agreement by 2020. 
The G20 members could follow other national and 
subnational frontrunners driving ambitious climate action 
in several areas. Only a few G20 members, including 
France and the United Kingdom, have recently adopted 
legally binding legislation in multiple sectors, such as 
energy, transport and buildings, in addition to an economy-
wide net-zero emissions target by 2050. The national and 
subnational actors already committed to ambitious climate 
action should inform policymakers in G20 member nations 
to accelerate their target-setting in different sectors of 
the economy. This is particularly true for sectors that are 
difficult to decarbonize, where subnational actors are 
showing promising frontrunner action aimed at long-term 
decarbonization in line with the Paris Agreement. 
4.3 Opportunities to enhance ambition in 
selected G20 members
This section provides a summary of country-specific 
opportunities for enhanced climate ambition and action of 
nine selected G20 members: Argentina, Brazil, China, the 
European Union, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa and the 
United States of America. The selection of G20 members 
is based entirely on the availability of data and expertise 
of the author team. The country-specific opportunities 
represent possible next steps in the policymaking process 
based on the current situation. The list of actions is not 
exhaustive and other actions, including those identified in 
the previous section and in annex B, would also need to be 
implemented to achieve global emission reductions at the 
scale required to maintain progress towards achieving the 
targets set out in the Paris Agreement.
Several steps were followed to identify the opportunities. 
First, an overview of the main policies affecting GHG 
emissions was generated for each country. Annex C, 
available online, provides a detailed update for each G20 
member covered in this chapter. To the extent possible, 
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European Union8
 ● Adopt an EU regulation to refrain from investment in fossil-fuel infrastructure, including new natural gas pipelines
 ● Define a clear endpoint for the EU emissions trading system (ETS) in the form of a cap that must lead to zero emissions
 ● Adjust the framework and policies to enable 100-per cent carbon-free electricity supply by between 2040 and 2050
 ● Step up efforts to phase out coal-fired plants
 ● Define a strategy for zero-emission industrial processes
 ● Reform the EU ETS to more effectively reduce emissions in industrial applications
 ● Ban the sale of Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) cars and buses and/or set targets to move towards 100-per cent of 
new car and bus sales being zero-carbon vehicles in the coming decades 
 ● Shift towards increased use of public transport in line with the most ambitious Member States
 ● Increase the renovation rate for intensive retrofits of existing buildings
India
 ● Plan the transition from coal-fired power plants
 ● Develop an economy-wide green industrialization strategy towards zero-emission technologies
 ● Expand mass public transit systems
 ● Develop domestic electric vehicle targets working towards 100 per cent new sales of zero-emission cars
Japan
 ● Develop a strategic energy plan that includes halting the construction of new freely emitting coal-fired power plants, 
as well as a phase-out schedule of existing plants and a 100 per cent carbon-free electricity supply
 ● Increase the current level of carbon pricing with high priority given to the energy and building sector
 ● Develop a plan to phase out the use of fossil fuels through promoting passenger cars that use electricity from 
renewable energy 
 ● Implement a road map as part of efforts towards net-zero energy buildings and net-zero energy houses
Mexico
 ● Increase the share of clean energy power generation in the electricity mix up to 48 per cent by 2027, 53 per cent by 
2030 and 60 per cent by 2050, which will require the reactivation of the electricity market and the expansion of the 
interconnection grid infrastructure
 ● Phase out coal-based power generation by 2030
 ● Expand sustainable mass public transport and non-motorized options, as well as a transportation demand 
management policy to reduce the motorization rate
 ● Reach the 0 per cent deforestation target by 2030
South Africa
 ● Halt new proposed coal-fired power plants contained in the draft Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) for electricity
 ● Commit to a 2040 target for the phase-out of coal in the power sector
 ● Develop a climate-compatible industrial development plan for the long-term decarbonization of industry
 ● Accelerate the shift of freight transport from road to rail and to low-carbon road transportation such as hydrogen and 
electricity-powered options
 ● Continue to tighten standards to reach zero-emission buildings by 2030 and enforce existing and future standards
USA
 ● Introduce regulations on power plants, clean energy standards and carbon pricing to achieve an electricity supply 
that is 100 per cent carbon-free 
 ● Implement carbon pricing on industrial emissions 
 ● Strengthen vehicle and fuel economy standards to be in line with zero emissions for new cars in 2030
 ● Implement clean building standards so that all new buildings are 100 per cent electrified by 2030
8 As policies in the European Union are already quite advanced, many of the opportunities to enhance ambition are evidently ambitious.
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changes in policies since the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement that are expected to be associated with the 
highest emissions impacts are highlighted in annex C, 
supported by quantitative estimates from the literature 
reviewed to give a sense of the magnitude of the actions. 
No attempt has been made to provide mitigation potential 
per G20 member, as it is difficult to provide values that are 
comparable across members. 
Using the current policy situation in each country as a 
starting point, political areas that would be obvious to 
pursue for development of the next steps were identified. 
For example, consideration was given to whether policy 
proposals had already been put forward by relevant actors. 
Subsequently, the opportunities were checked against the 
major actions that must be taken to put the world on a 
path that is compatible with the Paris Agreement long-
term temperature goal as summarized in section 4.2.3 and 
listed in annex B. Finally, the opportunities were cross-
checked with several country experts. 
Table 4.2 provides an overview of selected opportunities for 
enhancing mitigation ambition identified for the seven G20 
members considered in this publication. The selection is 
based on expert judgements regarding the extent to which 
these opportunities are in line with ambitious climate 
actions and targets as defined and outlined in section 
2.3. The country sections provide additional examples of 
country-specific opportunities. 
We find that the G20 members have ample opportunity to 
increase the ambition of their climate and energy policies, 
considering where they are today. There are some common 
features. For almost all analysed countries, a logical next 
step would be to plan for a 100 per cent emission-free 
electricity sector and an associated phase-out of coal-
fired power plants. All the analysed countries could also 
work on incentivizing modal shift in transport, supporting 
electric vehicles or working towards zero-emission 
buildings. In other areas, the logical next steps are very 
country-specific, for example, prohibiting new fossil fuel 
extractions, eliminating fossil fuel subsidies, enhancing 
action in industry or taking action to reduce deforestation. 
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5.1 The great transformation towards 
net zero greenhouse gas emissions
The previous chapters and the underlying studies of 
development pathways aligned with the goals of the Paris 
Agreement indicate alarming inconsistencies between 
current nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and 
the long-term goal of reaching net zero emissions by 
mid-century.
Closing the emissions gap in 2030 and reaching net 
zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 will 
require unprecedented efforts to transform our societies, 
economies, infrastructures and governance institutions. 
By necessity, this will require profound change in how 
energy, food and other material-intensive services are 
supplied. These systems of provision are entwined with the 
preferences, actions and demands of people as consumers, 
citizens and communities. Deep-rooted shifts in values, 
norms, consumer culture and underlying worldviews 
are inescapably part of the necessary sustainability 
transformation.
Such transformations are disruptive and cannot be 
achieved through an accumulation of incremental and 
gradual improvements, as Schumpeter indicates in his vivid 
example “add as many mail-coaches as you please, you will 
never get a railroad by so doing” (Schumpeter 1935). 
Past and current mitigation efforts have been insufficient 
to slow the global growth of emissions. Chapter 2 showed 
that global GHG emissions increased by 2 per cent in 
2018, which is almost exactly aligned with the long-
term exponential growth rate since the beginning of the 
Industrial Revolution. For many decades, science has made 
it clear that stabilizing temperatures at any level requires 
net zero emissions, as the global mean temperature is 
in the first approximation proportional to cumulative 
emissions (see chapter 3). 
Countries are exceedingly late for achieving pathways to 
close the emissions gap, with most policies and measures 
so far having been incremental and gradual. As a result, deep 
transformations are now needed to peak global emissions 
immediately and commence the rapid decline towards net 
zero emissions by 2050. This has been termed the ‘carbon law’ 
(Rockström et al. 2017) for halving emissions every decade, 
starting with a 50 per cent decline by 2030 (Intergovenmental 
Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] 2018).
Closing the gap in this way could, with proper policy design, 
also enhance the United Nations 2030 Agenda with its 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which provides a 
holistic vision of a sustainable future for all humanity within 
planetary boundaries, and thus acts as a new social contract 
for the world. 
5.2.  Multiple co-benefits of closing 
the emissions gap for sustainable 
development 
There are thousands of pathways in the literature reviewed 
that show which strategies, policies and measures would 
enable fundamental transformations towards complete 
decarbonization. Constructing alternative pathways is an 
important way to understand inherent complexities and 
uncertainties of transformations and to develop robust 
strategies to navigate them. Multiple pathways could 
therefore be taken to achieve global decarbonization across 
spatial and temporal scales.
Pathways can be generated by narrative storytelling, model-
based quantification or a combination of both. Integrated 
modelling is particularly useful for characterizing and 
quantifying interlinkages between options for meeting 
SDGs (IPCC 2018; Nakićenović et al. 2000; Riahi et al. 2017; 
The World in 2050 [TWI2050] 2018; TWI2050 2019; van 
Vuuren et al. 2017).
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
recently synthesized evidence on the sustainable development 
impacts of pathways which limit warming to 1.5°C (Rogelj et 
al. 2018). Figure 5.1 distinguishes interactions between SDGs 
and three sectoral climate change mitigation strategies: (a) 
energy supply (e.g. biomass and non-biomass renewables, 
carbon capture and storage with bioenergy or fossil fuels); 
(b) energy demand (e.g. fuel switching and efficiency in 
transport, industry, and buildings); and (c) land use (e.g. 
sustainable diets and reduced food waste, soil sequestration, 
livestock and manure management, reduced deforestation).
Despite remaining uncertainty about the magnitude and 
likelihood of interactions in some areas, figure 5.1 provides 
two important insights. First, there are multiple benefits from 
achieving climate change goals for other SDGs, with these 
synergies being more pronounced than trade-offs, especially 
if implementation is holistic and concurrent (McCollum et al. 
2018). Second, energy demand-related mitigation strategies 
are most consistently and strongly associated with broader 
sustainability benefits. The World in 2050 (TWI2050) reports 
demonstrate in more detail the synergies between achieving 
deep decarbonization and SDGs in unison (Sachs et al. 2019; 
TWI2050 2018; TWI2050 2019).
The basic strategies for closing the emissions gap are clear. In 
the case of energy supply, a rapid ‘exponential’ transformation 
is required towards zero-emission energy resources, 
particularly renewables (Global Energy Assessment [GEA] 
2012; Rockström et al. 2017). In the case of energy demand, 
a rapid shift is required towards more energy and materially-
efficient services that raise or maintain living standards 
(Grubler et al. 2018) (See also chapter 6 and chapter 7). In 
terms of land, sustainable agriculture and the ‘return’ of land 
to nature are important measures that can also result in net 
negative emissions. 
In all cases, advanced technologies and sustainable 
behaviours are essential for delivering the transformational 
change required. The digital revolution could become an 
important enabler of this transformation if it proves amenable 
to ‘social steering’ towards decarbonization (TWI2050 2019).
The remainder of this chapter explores six exemplary entry 
points for closing the emissions gap through transformational 
change. These entry points are derived from the six major 
transformations developed in TWI2050 (2018): (a) air 
pollution, air quality, health; (b) urbanization; (c) governance, 
education, employment; (d) digitalization; (e) energy- and 
material-efficient services for raising living standards; (f) land 
use, food security, bioenergy.
5.3. Entry points for achieving SDGs with 
climate co-benefits
5.3.1  Air pollution, air quality, health
Indoor air pollution is responsible for around 4 million 
premature deaths each year, with outdoor air pollution 
accounting for a similar number according to the World 
Health Organization (WHO) (2019). Clean cooking and 
universal access to electricity improves health and also 
reduces GHG emissions if traditional fuels are replaced by 
renewables, electricity, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) or 
natural gas (see chapter 6).
Fossil fuel-related emissions account for two thirds of the 
excess mortality rate attributable to outdoor air pollution. 
A global fossil fuel phase-out could avoid over 3 million 
premature deaths each year from outdoor air pollution, 
or well over 5 million premature deaths per year if other 
anthropogenic GHGs, including non-fossil emissions from 
agriculture and industry, are also controlled (Lelieveld 
et al. 2019).
Transformational pathways show huge synergies between 
eliminating air pollution and limiting climate change, as 
well as improving energy security. One study found that the 
annual policy costs of achieving these three energy-related 
challenges together would be about 40 per cent lower than 
the sum of the policy costs for each challenge pursued 
independently (GEA 2012; McCollum et al. 2011).
However, policy has to be done right as there are also 
significant trade-offs. Reducing air pollution from end-
of-pipe particulate matter, sulfur and nitrous oxides can 
increase CO2 emissions. Small particles and sulfur aerosols 
also mask anthropogenic temperature rise. Removing all 
pollution particles could result in an increase of warming 
by around 0.7°C globally, reaching around 2°C regionally 
over North America and North-East Asia, according to one 
estimate (Lelieveld et al. 2019). However, a reduction in 
tropospheric ozone and methane will significantly moderate 
this rise by around 0.35°C. 
5.3.2. Urbanization and settlements
Urban areas are currently home to around 55 per cent of 
the world’s population and 70 per cent of global economic 
output, though these figures are projected to grow to 70 per 
cent and up to 85 per cent respectively by 2050, particularly 
in small to medium-sized cities in the developing world 
(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division 2018). Cities are hotspots of 
the global carbon cycle, with considerable fossil fuel and 
cement-related emissions from the provision (9.2 GtCO2e) 
and use (9.6 GtCO2e) of urban infrastructure equivalent to 
around half of current GHG emissions (Creutzig et al. 2015). 
What happens in existing and emerging cities, towns and 
municipal regions will therefore determine the prospects for 
sustainable development and closing the emissions gap.
Many rapidly growing urban areas are following the least 
sustainable model of all: urban sprawl (Grubler et al. 2012; 
Seto et al. 2014). Sustainable transformation is needed 
across all settlements, not merely in mega-conurbations, 
such as the Tokyo-Osaka corridor, Pearl River Delta or the 
Boston-Washington corridor. Many cities lack the basic 
urban infrastructure needed for economic productivity, 
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Figure 5.1. Potential synergies and trade-offs between the sectoral climate change mitigation options and the SDGs
Note: The strength of positive connections (synergies) and negative connections (trade-offs) across all individual options within a sector 
are aggregated into sectoral potentials for the whole mitigation portfolio. The (white) areas outside the bars, which indicate no interactions, 
have low confidence due to the uncertainty and limited number of studies exploring indirect effects. The bars denote the strength of the 
connection and do not consider the strength of the impact on the SDGs.
Source: Figure SPM4 in IPCC (2018)
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social inclusion and the promise of basic services, such 
as sanitation, electricity, clean heating and cooking fuels, 
education, mobility, security and health care. Informal cities 
and slums account for a quarter of the urban population.
The transformation to sustainable cities and communities 
requires an integrated set of actions in urban areas around 
the world. Transport, buildings and industry are the key 
sources of energy demand and emissions within city 
boundaries. Certain characteristics of urban transformation 
are likely to be shared widely.
First, more compact urban form tends to reduce energy 
consumption and increase opportunities for more efficient 
district heating and cooling systems (Lucon 2014), 
transportation infrastructure and energy supply networks, 
and integrated management across different vectors 
(mobility, electricity, gas, heat).
Second, low-carbon infrastructure, including emissions-free 
electricity, public transportation, broadband connectivity 
and efficient road networks, is essential for delivering high-
quality, affordable and universally accessible public services 
from health care and education to security and utilities 
(power, water, connectivity).
Third, short journeys account for two thirds of transport 
emissions in urban areas and could be replaced by active 
modes (Preston et al. 2013). Electrification of the vehicle 
fleet alongside mass transit and micromobility can replace 
diesel and petrol cars, making cities more liveable with lower 
pollution levels. 
These examples of urban transformations demonstrate 
that there are many opportunities for integrating climate 
protection with initiatives to improve human well-being. 
5.3.3. Governance, equity and social mobilization  
for change
Governance for sustainable development needs to build 
alliances for change, overcome vested interests, invest in 
new governance capacities, create visions of attractive 
futures, ensure justice and promote equity, and adopt a range 
of economic policy instruments to steer the economy and 
society towards the SDGs (TWI2050 2018). Transformative 
governance includes three critical elements.
First, economic instruments and political innovations are the 
tools or means of government. Road maps linking means to 
desired ends help create clear and stable expectations for 
the private sector and citizens alike, and therefore serve as 
coordination mechanisms within government to leverage 
systemic changes. 
Second, the legitimacy of sustainable transformation 
depends on equity, justice and fairness in the distribution 
of costs and benefits at an individual, sectoral or regional 
level (Sachs et al. 2019). A particular challenge for 
transformative governance is how to respond to disruptive 
changes in technologies, economic sectors and labour 
markets (TWI2050 2019). Disruption creates uncertainties, 
instabilities and losers as well as winners, who – if organized 
and powerful – can act as strong barriers to change. In 
other cases, safety nets are needed to manage adverse 
distributional effects until the transformation towards 
sustainability can be achieved for all.
Third, new constellations of actors, partnerships and 
opportunities for citizens, cities, businesses and science 
are needed to drive proactive change and overcome inertias 
and path dependencies in incumbent systems. Large-scale 
transformation depends on social movements to build and 
reflect widespread public acceptance. This, in turn, depends 
on compelling visions of the multiple benefits of sustainable 
lifestyles, an area where research to-date has fallen short 
(Creutzig et al. 2016).
These elements of transformative governance can create 
a virtuous cycle: social movements depend on a widening 
arc of public awareness and understanding in which 
effective science communication can play an important 
role. Widespread social and moral commitment to 
sustainable development challenges interests vested in the 
unsustainable status quo. Civic engagement and popular 
support underpin the strong national alliances needed 
for sustainable development. Likeminded cooperation-
oriented actors – governments, city alliances, civil society 
organizations, scientific institutions – can scale up 
coordinated action, embed joint learning processes and 
support vulnerable populations impacted by climate change. 
Global governance beyond the local and national levels is 
also a necessity to achieve carbon neutrality globally by mid-
century. Joint action and global rules are needed to stabilize 
planetary commons, such as the oceans, biodiversity and 
agricultural soil. Broad-based support for global governance 
comes from transnational alliances of pioneering actors of 
transformative change. 
5.3.4. Digitalization and disruptive technological 
change
Disruptive technological change can enable sustainable 
development with co-benefits for closing the emissions gap, 
but can also exacerbate unsustainable patterns of resource 
use. This is most clearly evidenced by the promises and risks 
of the digital revolution, constituted by ongoing advances 
in information and communication technologies, machine 
learning and artificial intelligence, connectivity, the Internet of 
Things (IoT), additive manufacturing (3D printing), virtual and 
augmented reality, blockchain, robotics and synthetic biology.
TWI2050 (2018; 2019) analysed in depth the impacts 
of digitalization on consumption and production, and 
resulting GHG emissions. Three trends are particularly 
important.
First, additional units of information-based services can 
be provided at an almost zero marginal cost, increasing 
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affordability for poorer segments of society. Virtual 
communication and interaction can also potentially replace 
a large fraction of long-distance and carbon-intensive 
business travel.
Second, the possibility of matching supply and demand in 
real time through digital coordination platforms offers step-
change improvements in asset utilization, improved quality 
of service and potentially lower emissions. This is also the 
underlying principle of a service-based economy in which 
‘ownership’ of goods shifts to ‘usership’ of services (e.g. 
shared vehicle fleets and ride-sharing services, see chapter 
7). Figure 5.2 illustrates the potential resource savings from 
displacing the ownership of many single-purpose analogue 
devices if equivalent services can be accessed through a 
single multifunctional interface.
Third, global communication infrastructures and the next 
generation of virtual spaces can connect people around the 
globe, accelerate global learning processes and support 
transnational alliances for sustainable futures. Just as 
the printing press enabled learning, science, the era of 
enlightenment, democracy and the Industrial Revolution, 
digital infrastructures can pave the way towards a global 
sustainable society.
However, as with all transformational strategies, 
digitalization also carries significant risks. A lack of 
access to digital infrastructure and services reinforces 
the digital divide, marginalization and inequality of 
opportunity. Conversely, cheaper and more accessible 
services could lead to ‘ take -back ’ (or economic 
‘rebound’), which further increases in-service demand 
with resource impacts. Digitalization and automation also 
further reduce the need for human labour. Big data-driven 
applications and services raise privacy concerns and 
enable social control by governments or monopolistic 
technology providers.
Clear governance and ethical and management strategies 
are needed to minimize these risks and avoid digital 
dystopias. Public policy is critical, particularly in the 
early formative phase of developing new technologies 
and business models, in terms of regulating standards, 
data access and privacy, competition, and, above 
all, infrastructure development, as well as ensuring 
equitable access. Effective governance of digitalization 
towards sustainability requires a comprehensive and 
rapid investment in the digital capabilities of public and 
regulatory organizations.
Figure 5.2. The energy and material benefits of accessing services via a multipurpose smartphone (left) over owning an 
array of single-purpose goods (right)
Note: In-use power savings are factor 90 (blue circles), standby power savings are factor 30 (orange), embodied energy savings are factor 
25 (green) for a weight reduction of factor 250 (grey).
Source: Grubler et al. (2018), based on a visualization by Tupy (2012) array of single-purpose goods (right)
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Figure 5.3. Lorenz curves showing inequality in the global distribution of annual per capita GHG emissions for selected 
past years and two NDC scenarios 
Note: The diagonal represents perfect equality. Half of the global population accounts for only 15–20 per cent of global emissions.
Source: Zimm and Nakićenović (2019)
5.3.5. Resource-efficient services for raising  
living standards
A recent low energy demand (LED) scenario explored the 
potential for closing the emissions gap while raising living 
standards in the global South through radical changes in 
the type and efficiency of energy services (Grubler et al. 
2018). Unlike other 1.5°C pathways, the LED scenario shows 
how the ambition of the Paris Agreement is reachable by 
lowering energy demand by 40 per cent, while at the same 
time increasing the provision of energy services without 
having to rely on negative emission technologies or carbon 
capture and storage (Rogelj et al. 2018). The LED scenario 
was found to have the strongest synergies with other SDGs. 
This is consistent with other analysis, which shows that 
energy, land and material-efficient pathways impose the 
fewest trade-offs with other SDGs (Bertram et al. 2018).
The sustainable transformation described by the LED 
scenario is immensely challenging, with the same services 
and quality of life taken for granted in modern developed 
economies becoming available to more people. This 
depends on seven main strategies for resource-efficient 
development: (a) electrify energy end use, including 
vehicles and heat pumps to improve end-use efficiency; (b) 
digitalize energy-using products and services to optimize 
infrastructure and resource use; (c) converge onto fewer 
numbers of multifunctional goods to improve service quality 
and convenience; (d) shift from ownership to usership to 
reduce material needs; (e) utilize consumer goods, vehicles 
and physical infrastructures at higher rates to accelerate the 
introduction of improved alternatives; (f) innovate business 
models offering low energy services to appeal to consumers, 
while making sense commercially; and (g) tighten efficiency 
standards continually upward to deliver cost, performance, 
health and other benefits.
The resulting expansion of energy services in the Global 
South would address historical inequalities created by 
GHG-intensive development in industrialized countries, 
where 2 billion people lack improved sanitation (World 
Health Organization [WHO] and United Nations Children’s 
Fund [UNICEF] 2017), 800 million people go hungry every 
night (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] et al. 2018), 
roughly the same number of people do not have access 
to electricity, and almost 3 billion cook and heat with 
solid fuels (International Energy Agency [IEA] 2018). This 
striking global inequality in living standards is reflected in 
the marked global inequality in GHG emissions (figure 5.3). 
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This emissions inequality has reduced slightly in recent 
history (1990-2015) and looks set to continue through the 
NDCs. Strengthened action to close the emissions gap 
can be consistent with social and economic development 
objectives, if the emissions-intensive development pathways 
of the top emitters can be avoided.
5.3.6. Sustainable land use, food security  
and bioenergy
The biologist and naturalist E.O. Wilson has called for 
protecting half the Earth’s land and seas, a project known as 
Half-Earth (Wilson 2016). Feeding humanity while mitigating 
human-caused environmental degradation must essentially 
occur on already transformed and existing agricultural land. 
This allows the remaining ‘Half-Earth’ to be safeguarded as 
natural forest and other ecosystems providing essential 
services, protecting biodiversity and ensuring resilience.
The global sustainable transformation of agricultural 
systems and fisheries faces the challenge of providing 
more and healthier food through sustainable intensification 
on existing farmland and reducing food waste (TWI2050 
2018). For land in agricultural use as croplands, pastures 
and managed forests, this means widespread adoption of 
agricultural practices that minimize environmental damage 
and maximize resilience, including: precision farming to 
economize on resource inputs while boosting yields; no-
till farming to protect soil quality; agroecology to optimize 
the crop mix in order to sustain biodiversity and resist the 
dangers of pests and pathogens; and improved harvesting 
and storage practices to reduce post-harvest losses.
A revolution is also needed in food consumption culture 
and practices to improve diets and reduce waste, as around 
a third of food produced currently ends up being wasted 
(Gustavsson et al. 2011). Healthier diets can be promoted 
by removing subsidies for harmful production techniques, 
public awareness campaigns and careful management 
of land use, oceans and other environmental resources 
(TWI2050 2018).
This agricultural revolution, encompassing both production 
and consumption, must unfold alongside a massive 
programme of returning land to nature, including tree planting 
on degraded land (Bastin et al. 2019). For example, over 
the last 40 years, China has undertaken major projects to 
enhance soils and regenerate and reforest land (Bryan et al. 
2018). To close the emissions gap, land use must transition 
rapidly from being a net source of emissions to a net sink.
There are clear potential synergies between SDG 2 (zero 
hunger), SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy) and SDG 13 
(climate action). Strategies include increasing agricultural 
productivity, reducing forest clearance for agriculture and 
shifting diets to healthier, less land-intensive and lower 
carbon foods. Conversely, the singular pursuit of SDG 13 
to close the emissions gap without pursuing sustainable 
development more holistically can lead to trade-offs. 
Conversion of agricultural and forest land for bioenergy crop 
production negatively impacts food security. Such tensions 
are a particular hallmark of climate mitigation pathways 
reliant on negative emissions from combining bioenergy 
combustion with carbon capture and storage.
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6.1 Key issues and options for 
transforming the global energy 
system
The energy sector will be essential in the enhanced global 
mitigation efforts required to bridge the emissions gap 
in 2030 and reach net-zero emissions by 2050. This will 
necessitate a complete transformation of the way energy is 
produced and consumed.
To illustrate the scale of the challenge, coal-fired power plants 
were the single largest contributor to emissions growth in 2018, 
an increase of 2.9 per cent compared with the previous year and 
surpassing annual total emissions of 10 GtCO2 (International 
Energy Agency [IEA] 2019a).
The transformation will be challenged by the fact that demand 
for energy services will grow 30 per cent by 2040, according to 
the IEA (2018a). However, primary energy demand will grow by 
a lesser rate or actually fall, depending on the achieved rate of 
energy efficiency improvement.
The current global energy system is still highly carbon-
intensive with coal, oil and natural gas meeting 85 per cent of 
all energy needs (IEA 2019e). If the necessary transition does 
not occur, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will continue to 
increase year-on-year.
In light of this, what needs to happen? Long-term scenarios all 
point to rapid upscaling of renewables and energy efficiency, in 
combination with electrification of many new end-uses, as the 
key ingredients of a successful energy transition driving down 
energy-related CO2 emissions (Gambhir et al. 2019; Bogdanov 
et al. 2019).
This chapter reviews five key transition options, based on 
their relevance to a wide range of countries, clear co-benefit 
opportunities and potential to deliver significant emission 
reductions. Each transition corresponds to a particular policy 
rationale or motivation, namely:
1) Easy wins: expanding renewable energy for 
electrification
2) Broad policy consensus: coal phase-out for rapid 
decarbonization of the energy system
3) Large co-benefits: decarbonizing transport
4) Hard to abate: decarbonizing energy-intensive 
industry
5) Leapfrogging potential: avoiding future emissions 
and ensuring energy access
6.2 Options to decarbonize the energy 
sector
The energy transition will include several elements, while 
approaches to transition will vary from one region and country 
to another. Transition strategies will need to be developed and 
adapted to fit the specific context, as few parts can be directly 
copied. Sharing and learning will be important for rapid action.
6.2.1  Easy wins: expanding renewable energy for 
electrification
Technologically speaking, the three pillars of any strategy 
to decarbonize the power sector are: i) a vast expansion of 
renewable electricity generation; ii) a smarter and much more 
flexible electricity grid, and iii) huge increases in the numbers 
of products and processes that run on electricity (in buildings, 
transport and industry). The basic technologies needed 
for expanding electrification based on renewable energy 
technologies already exist and thus represent a relatively “easy 
win” for substantial short-term reductions of energy-related 
CO2 emissions.
Regarding renewable energy expansion, the world added 
a record 167 gigawatts (GW) of new capacity in 2018 
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(excluding large hydropower), with solar photovoltaic (PV) 
additions hitting a record of 108 GW and wind power an 
estimated 50 GW. Global investment in renewable energy 
capacity in 2018 was US$272.9 billion, which was about 
three times higher than investment in coal and gas-fired 
generation capacity combined. This allowed for renewable 
energy (excluding large hydropower) to raise its share of 
global electricity generation to 12.9 per cent in 2018, helping 
the world to avoid an estimated 2 gigatons of carbon dioxide 
emissions (Frankfurt School-United Nations Environment 
Programme [UNEP] Collaborating Centre and BloombergNEF 
[BNEF] 2019). Yet, renewables need to grow six times faster 
to meet climate targets (International Renewable Energy 
Agency [IRENA] 2019a).
The main enabler for the accelerated deployment of 
renewable energy in the last decade has been the 
continued and rapid decline in capital costs. In most parts 
of the world today, renewables have become the lowest-
cost source of new power generation and are generally 
competitive without incentives when directly compared 
with fossil alternatives. Since 2010, the global weighted-
average levelized costs of electricity (LCOE) from solar 
photovoltaic, onshore and offshore wind projects, bioenergy 
and geothermal, have all reduced and are approaching the 
lower range of fossil-fuel-fired power generation costs 
(figure 6.1). Continued cost declines are expected during 
the following decades (IRENA 2019c). The key to integrating 
larger shares of variable renewable energy into the power 
supply is system flexibility. Electricity systems with large 
shares of renewables require investments to address the 
short- and medium-term variability of both solar and wind 
energy. There are several categories of power system 
assets that can be utilized to provide flexibility. Conventional 
power plants, gas-fired generation and hydropower with 
reservoirs are currently the predominant sources of system 
flexibility in modern power systems, but other options 
will increasingly become important such as electricity 
networks, battery storage, distributed energy resources 
and enhanced predictability. Studies show that the cost of 
flexibility to integrate variable renewable energy is generally 
quite small (+5 to +13 US$/MWh), with higher values for 
inflexible systems with dominant shares of coal or nuclear 
generation (Agora Energiewende 2015). However, beyond 
enhanced power infrastructure, measures to support power 
system flexibility can be readily applied and adapted to 
power systems. These include modifications to “energy 
strategies, legal frameworks, policies and programmes, 
regulatory frameworks, market rules, system operation 
protocols, and connection codes” (IEA 2019c). There are 
now several examples of countries that have achieved 100 
per cent renewable energy electricity for short periods of 
time (days), with large shares of variable solar and wind 
(for example, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ireland and Uruguay).
      
:8	
P<M
'NTJSJWL^ ,JTYMJWRFQ -^IWT 8TQFWUMTYT[TQYFNH (TSHJSYWFYNSLXTQFWUT\JW 4KKXMTWJ\NSI 4SXMTWJ\NSI
+TXXNQKZJQHTXYWFSLJ
 
 
 
 
 
 

Figure 6.1. Global LCOE of utility-scale renewable power generation technologies, 2010-2018 
Source: International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2019c).
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Harnessing the synergy between low-cost renewable power 
and enhanced end-use electrification is key to driving down 
energy-related CO2. According to the International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA), renewable energy and electrification 
can deliver 75 per cent of the required emission reductions 
to bring the temperature rise to the well-below 2°C climate 
goal (IRENA 2019a). This means that by 2050, 86 per cent 
of electricity generation would need to be renewable and 
that the share of electricity in final energy would increase 
from just 20 per cent today (IRENA 2019a) to almost 50 per 
cent by 2050. The share of electricity consumed in industry 
and buildings would need to double (mainly through electric 
heating and cooling), with transport seeing potentially the 
largest transformation (see section 6.2.3).
The electrification of the energy system creates the need 
for enhanced digitalization of end-use technologies, large-
scale electrical and heat storage technologies and the need 
to develop “electro fuels” with green electricity, to be able 
to substitute liquid fossil fuels (IRENA 2019b). All these 
technologies exist and are rapidly spreading, especially within 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) economies, and also serve to mitigate the risk of 
blackouts caused by unfavourable weather.
6.2.2  Broad policy consensus: coal phase-out for 
rapid decarbonization of the energy system
The combustion of coal currently accounts for 30 per cent of 
global CO2 emissions (IEA 2019a). Behind these figures is the 
reality that globally, about 27 per cent of primary energy needs 
are met by coal, including around 40 per cent of all electricity 
generation (BP 2019). After declining consecutively for three 
years, global coal production increased by 2.8 per cent to 7,428 
Mt in 2017 and then rose again by a marginal 0.2 per cent 
to 7,575 Mt in 2018 (Enerdata 2019), resulting from stronger 
global economic growth leading to increased industrial output 
and electricity use. This highlights two obvious but critical 
points: i) much of the growth in demand was concentrated in 
Asia, showing a regional shift in consumption and production 
and thus some headroom for growth; ii) the rapid rate of 
growth in electricity demand limits the pace at which the 
power sector can decarbonize, even with high uptake rates 
of renewables, which reinforces the importance of energy 
efficiency to keep total demand within the reach of achievable 
renewables growth.
If operated until the end of their lifetime and not retrofitted with 
carbon capture and storage (CCS), “committed emissions” 
from existing coal-fired power plants, built before the end of 
2016, are estimated to emit roughly 200 GtCO2 by 2050 (Rogeli 
et al. 2018). Coal-based power plants that are planned or under 
construction would add a further 100–150 GtCO2 (Edenhofer 
et al. 2018), effectively using up a large share of the remaining 
carbon budget to stay below two degrees.
Therefore, one of the main challenges for the required 
energy sector transformation will be to find nationally 
appropriate solutions for the fast and socially responsible 
reduction in coal-fired power generation by 2030 and a 
phase-out by 2050 (Rogeli et al. 2018). Box 1 illustrates 
the complexity of such a phase-out process, using the 
experience of Germany.
Box 6.1. Germany’s coal phase-out
Despite growing its share of renewables in electricity 
generation from 20 per cent in 2011 to 37.8 per cent 
in 2018, Germany is Europe’s largest coal consumer, 
accounting for 35 per cent of total power sector 
emissions in 2018, with 42.6 GW of lignite and hard 
coal-fired power generation capacity. This means that 
Germany will most certainly not reach its national 
target of 40 per cent GHG reduction by 2020 compared 
with 1990 levels (Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety [BMU] 2018).
In January 2019, following a long consultation process, 
a Government-appointed commission proposed a total 
phase-out of coal in Germany by 2038 (Federal Ministry 
for Economic Affairs and Energy [BMWi] 2019). The 
proposed decommissioning road map foresees a net 
reduction of 12.5 GW of coal capacity by 2022. By 
2030, total coal power capacity should be reduced 
to a maximum of 17 GW, equal to a total reduction of 
25.6 GW compared with 2017. Reviews are proposed 
for 2023, 2026 and 2029 to take stock of progress and 
to address concerns over security of supply, especially 
since Germany has committed to decommission all 
nuclear power by 2022.
The most important proposed measures to implement 
the coal phase-out are to cancel the industry’s CO2 
certificates issued within the European Emission 
Trading Scheme and to ensure the expansion of 
renewable electricity to a share of 65 per cent by 2030. 
The phase-out plan includes a €40 billion economic 
package offered to affected coal regions, including 
alternative industry investment projects and state aid 
for coal workers.
The Commission’s proposal is now in the legislative 
process. The federal Government has already decided on 
the law for financing structural change in the coal regions 
and will officially adopt the decision to phase-out coal by 
2038 in November (Cabinet of Germany 2019)
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Policy challenge Example policy approach
Supply side
Demand side
Importance of the coal sector as a (regional) 
employer and generator of added value
 
Importance of export revenues from coal export
Economic and technological aspects of 
substitution to move away from coal use
Regional diversification plans or coal sector 
restructuring plans
Economic diversification strategies
Payments for closure of coal plants; carbon pricing; 
renewables support schemes 
Table 6.1. Framework of policy challenges related to coal transition
Source: Spencer et al. (2018)
Policies should also look beyond the demand-side 
considerations to include supply-side interventions 
(Spencer et al. 2018; table 6.1). Supply-oriented 
considerations are critical given the importance of the coal 
mining sector in terms of employment, revenues and its 
place within broader regional economies. Hence, managing 
coal transitions means not just focusing on “stranded 
assets”, as relating to physical or financial capital in the 
demand-side policy literature, but also to paying attention 
to the notion of “stranded regions” where workers, regional 
governments and the regional economy more broadly are 
dependent on the coal sector (Spencer et al. 2018). This 
holistic vision is at the heart of a “ just transition” that 
considers the impact of technological change on workers 
and communities (Caldecott et al. 2017), as well as the 
coal owners and industry, as a way to negotiate a politically 
feasible reduction in coal power generation, and eventually 
phase it out altogether (Jordaan et al. 2017).
6.2.3  Large co-benefits: decarbonizing transport
Transport accounted for 28 per cent of global final energy 
demand and 23 per cent of global energy-related CO2 
emissions in 2014 (IEA 2017b). Transport sector emissions 
are growing rapidly and increased by 2.5 per cent annually 
between 2010 and 2015 (Rogeli et al. 2018), largely driven 
by economic growth, behavioural changes and population 
increase. The sector accounts for about 65 per cent of 
global oil demand, with 92 per cent of final transport 
energy demand consisting of oil products, making it the 
least diversified of the major energy end-use sectors.
Deep decarbonization of the transport sector will require 
a radical shift in the nature and structure of transport 
demand, major improvements in energy efficiency, 
changing vehicle types and significant and rapid transitions 
in the energy mix used (see also chapters 4 and 7).
Aggressive action now would lay the foundation and 
maintain a healthy momentum towards the longer-term goal. 
Some of the transport-related climate change mitigation 
actions that can yield substantial decarbonization as well 
as economic benefits include: i) compact urban planning; ii) 
reducing passenger travel demand; iii) shifting passenger 
travel modes and expanding public transit; iv) improving 
passenger car efficiency and shifting to electrical engines; 
v) improving freight logistics; and vi) improving freight 
vehicle efficiency and electrification (Dhar, Pathak and 
Shukla 2018; Gouldson et al. 2018).
One of the key technical mitigation options, namely 
electrification of the transport sector, is projected to 
play a major role in meeting ambitious climate targets. 
Rapid growth in electric passenger vehicles (EVs) across 
the members of the G20 has been occurring since 2010, 
with global cumulative sales of light-duty plug-in vehicles 
exceeding 5 million units at the end of December 2018 
(Vieweg et al. 2018; Watson 2019). This amounts to a 
market share of 2.1 per cent (compared with less than 1 
per cent in 2016). China has the largest fleet of EVs with 
over 2.2 million units, while Norway leads in terms of 
the market share for new cars, approaching 60 per cent 
(Williams 2019). In road freight transport (trucks), systemic 
improvements (for example, in supply chains, logistics, and 
routing) would also benefit from these innovations, but 
would need to be combined with efficiency improvement 
of vehicles.
Shipping and aviation account for 40 per cent of all 
transport-related emissions but will be significantly 
more challenging to decarbonize and electrify than road 
transport (Martinez Romera 2016). Both modes will see 
high demand growth and would need to pursue ambitious 
efficiency improvements and use of low-carbon fuels. This 
would mean the use of advanced biofuels and low-carbon 
liquid fuels (synthetic fuels) in the near and medium term, 
with hydrogen fuel for shipping a likely solution in the 
longer term (IRENA 2019a; IEA 2017b).
While progress has been made, it is far from the scale 
required to decarbonize transport. Specifically, it will 
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require the share of electricity in final energy for transport 
to increase from just 1 per cent today to 40 per cent by 
2050 (IRENA 2019a)1.
At the same time, decarbonizing transport can deliver 
multiple significant co-benefits and is one of the sectors 
in which there are strong links between local and 
global pollution and human well-being. Specifically, the 
transportation sector is a major source of particulate 
matter (PM2.5), ozone and nitrogen dioxide concentrations, 
which are major causes of premature deaths. In 2015, 
emissions attributed to transport contributed to 385,000 
premature deaths out of which 114,000 and 74,000 were 
in China and India, respectively (Anenberg et al. 2019). 
With vehicle numbers projected to double by 2040, the 
costs associated with premature mortality are likely 
to increase in both these countries. However, some 
solutions are beginning to emerge. For example, there is 
significant potential for electric two- and three-wheelers 
as a short-distance transport solution in India, which could 
enable India to develop a large EV industry and stimulate 
investment in charging infrastructure that can facilitate 
diffusion of larger EVs (Dhar, Pathak and Shukla 2017; 
see also chapter 7).
6.2.4  Hard to abate: decarbonizing energy-intensive 
industries
Energy-intensive industries, such as steel and cement, account 
for about 17 per cent of total CO2 emissions from energy 
and industrial sources (Energy Transitions Commission 
[ETC] 2019). These sectors are difficult to decarbonize for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, there are technical barriers, due to 
the lack of cost-effective mitigation technologies to reduce 
emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels to provide 
high-grade process heat or from the industrial process itself. 
Secondly, there are political economy barriers, due notably to 
the international competition for some of these industries and 
hence the risk of “carbon leakage”, as well as the low level of 
innovation and stock turnover in these sectors2. As a result, 
energy-intensive industries have typically been exempted 
from national climate policies. Competitiveness pressures 
and the importance of energy as an input have, however, 
driven significant energy efficiency improvements, but this 
has not been enough to move towards decarbonization of 
these sectors. For example, while the CO2 intensity of global 
electricity production has declined by 9.3 per cent between 
2000 and 2016, the CO2 intensity of global crude steel 
production has increased by 2.8 per cent in the same period3.
This is concerning because the significant demand for 
materials will continue, as countries like India and many 
African countries develop the infrastructure and housing 
required as a result of their development. Without further 
1 This is consistent with REN21 (2018) as the bulk of renewable energy used in the sector is biogasoline at 2.5 per cent; biodiesel at 1.4 per cent; and 
renewable electricity at 0.3 per cent of demand in 2016. 
2 For an excellent summary of the challenges of mitigation in the energy intensive industries, see Bataille et al. (2018).
3 Calculated on the basis of data from Enerdata (2019) and World Steel Association (2018). 
4 For a comprehensive survey of cement mitigation options, see Scrivener et al. (2018).
policy, emissions from the heavy industry sectors could 
increase from 17 per cent of global emissions today to 20 
per cent by 2050 (ETC 2019). Mitigation of energy-intensive 
industries requires going beyond incremental improvements 
in energy efficiency and moving towards more fundamental 
mitigation options.
Broadly speaking, these options can be broken down into 
three categories. The first is demand reduction through 
recycling, materials substitution and dematerialization 
(see chapter 7). An example of the latter would be 
lightweighting of automobiles while improving fuel economy 
and downsizing the powertrain, in order to reduce steel 
consumption. Significant potential exists to reduce virgin 
material demand, which could cut emissions from heavy 
industry by 40 per cent by 2050, compared with a business 
as usual (BAU) case (ETC 2019; also discussed extensively 
in chapter 7). This can have the benefit of reducing reliance 
on more costly mitigation options like carbon capture and 
storage/use (CCSU) (IEA 2019b).
The second category involves mitigation of emissions in 
the context of the existing industrial process, the archetypal 
example of which is the deployment of CCSU. While 
alternatives to CCSU are emerging in some heavy industry 
sectors, the deployment of CCSU is likely to be necessary 
in the cement industry, even given aggressive deployment 
of clinker substitutes and the development of currently 
non-commercial alternative cement technologies4. The 
third category of options entails a fundamental transition 
in the industrial process itself, an example of which would 
be the substitution of coking coal as a fuel and reducing 
agent in steel manufacture with hydrogen produced from 
zero-carbon electricity (Vogl et al. 2018).
Therefore, what are the prospects for energy-intensive 
industry mitigation? The first point to note is that the available 
technological options are currently at a low level of commercial 
readiness, necessitating significant progress in research, 
demonstration and commercialization. Secondly, unlike in 
other sectors where zero-carbon options may be economically 
competitive with their fossil alternatives (for example, 
renewable electricity or electric vehicles), decarbonization of 
energy-intensive industry appears likely to entail net costs. 
These costs are likely to be negligible at the level of the 
macroeconomy and the end-consumer, but significant at the 
producer level (ETC 2019). This raises questions of managing 
the implementation of stringent policies to decarbonize heavy 
industry in the absence of stronger global climate policies and 
a level playing field. Some form of trade protective measures, 
such as border adjustments, may be required. Finally, a 
comprehensive portfolio of policies is likely to be required, 
ranging from carbon pricing and research and demonstration 
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funding to standards and regulation, for example, to promote 
material demand reduction. For all of this to occur, the 
salience of energy-intensive industry decarbonization needs 
to increase in global and national policy discussions.
6.2.5 Leapfrogging potential: avoiding future 
emissions and ensuring energy access
The issue of energy access and energy poverty is now on top 
of the global policy agenda. Among Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs), over 60 per cent of the population have no access to 
electricity with the figure rising to 80 per cent for people in 
rural areas (Least Developed Countries Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency Initiative for Sustainable Development [LDC 
REEEI] 2019). In non-LDC developing countries, the figure is 
still significant, at 10 per cent of the population. Those who do 
have access to electricity often endure problems of unreliable 
access and frequent blackouts. Beyond electricity, nearly three 
billion people rely on traditional fuels (such as wood or charcoal) 
and technologies for cooking and heating. This has severe 
implications for health (especially the health of women and 
children), economic livelihoods and the environment, both at a 
global and local level (Batchelor et al. 2019). The burning of non-
renewable biomass fuels5 alone generates a gigaton of CO2e 
per year (Bailis et al. 2015), about a 2 per cent share of global 
emissions (see chapter 2). Box 2 discusses the GHG emissions 
associated with cooking and potential trends for the future.
5 To imply the extraction of biomass from a land area is not sustainable where carbon stocks on the land area decrease over time. 
6 The NPS accounts for current and planned policies with a high likelihood of being implemented, including the GHG- and energy-related compo-
nents of the NDCs pledged under the Paris Agreement. The SDS combines the fundamentals of sectoral energy policy with three closely associated 
but distinct policy objectives related to the SDG 7 (energy access), SDG 3 (air pollution) and SDG 13 (climate action). 
Improving access to reliable energy services for households 
and for productive purposes is thus a central policy objective 
in many LDCs and developing countries. This is explicitly 
recognized by United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 
7 (SDG 7) that calls for action to “ensure access to affordable, 
reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all”, which include 
targets on renewable energy and energy efficiency. As such, 
there is evidence of synergies between about 85 per cent of 
the SDG targets and efforts to achieve SDG 7, as well as some 
evidence of trade-offs between SDG 7 and about 35 per cent 
of the SDG targets (Fuso-Nerini et al. 2018). However, despite 
the energy sector’s large share of global GHG emissions, 
achieving universal access to modern energy does not lead 
to increases in global GHG emissions (Dagnachew et al. 
2018; IEA et al. 2019). Using two scenarios, the New Policies 
Scenario (NPS) and the Sustainable Development Scenario 
(SDS)6 derived from the IEA’s World Energy Outlook, reflect 
the simultaneous pursuit of universal access in sub-Saharan 
Africa for both electricity and clean cooking solutions yielding 
net savings of GHG emissions amounting to 45 MtCO2e and 
200 MtCO2e, respectively.
Going beyond addressing energy for basic human needs (i.e. 
lighting and cooking) to pushing mechanical power, mobility 
and energy for other productive uses required to drive 
development and transformation will generate increasing 
Box 6.2. Clean cooking as an important mitigation 
option
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
Special Report on 1.5°C (IPCC SR1.5) states that 
lack of access to clean and affordable energy 
for cooking is a major policy concern in many 
countries where major parts of the population still 
rely primarily on solid fuels for cooking (Roy et al. 
2018). The amount of fuelwood burned across Africa 
is estimated to be over 400 million m3 a year (May-
Tobin 2011), releasing over 760 million tons of CO2e 
into the atmosphere*, and globally non-renewable 
biomass fuels alone account for signif icant 
emissions. This will continue to increase with the 
rise in population, as the population of sub-Saharan 
Africa is projected to double by 2050 (United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UN 
DESA] 2019). Black carbon from residential solid 
fuel burning is estimated to add the equivalent of 
another 8–16 per cent of the global warming caused by 
CO2 (Bailis et al. 2015). It is also important to recognize 
the complexity associated with accounting in terms of 
the time it takes for replacement trees to sequester 
the CO2 emitted by burning a felled tree, and the rate 
of change in CO2 sequestration as trees mature. Clean 
cooking solutions address the most basic needs of the 
poor. Furthermore, reducing black carbon, methane 
and other short-lived climate pollutants would have 
substantial co-benefits on health and local air quality, 
but can in the short-term contribute significantly to 
limiting global warming to 2°C and 1.5°C (de Coninck 
et al. 2018; Batchelor et al. 2019). A key driver is the 
trajectory of costs that show “clean” cooking (i.e. 
with electric or gas) has the potential to reach a price 
point of affordability with associated reliability and 
sustainability within a few years.
* Burning 1 kg wood emits 1.9 kg of CO2. See https://www.transitionculture.org/2008/05/19/is-burning-wood-really-a-long-term-energy-
descent-strategy/. 
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Option Major components Instruments Co-benefits Annual GHG emissions 
reduction potential 
of renewables, 
electrification, energy 
efficiency and other 
measures by 2050
Renewable 
energy 
electricity 
expansion
 ● Plan for large shares 
of variable renewable 
energy
 ● Electricity becomes 
the main energy 
source by 2050, 
supplying at least 50 
per cent of total final 
energy consumption 
(TFEC)
 ● Share of renewable 
energy in electricity 
up to 85 per cent by 
2050
 ● Transition
 ● Flexibility measures 
to take on larger 
shares of variable 
renewable energy
 ● Support for 
deployment of 
distributed energy
 ● Innovative 
measures: cost 
reflective tariff 
structures, targeted 
subsidies, reverse 
auctions, net 
metering
 ● Greater efficiency 
in end-use energy 
demand
 ● Health benefits
 ● Energy access and 
security
 ● Employment
 ● Power sector: 8.1 
GtCO2
 ● Building sector: 
2.1 GtCO2
 ● District heat and 
others: 1.9 GtCO2
Coal 
phase-out
 ● Plan and implement 
phase-out of coal
 ● Coal to renewable 
energy transition
 ● Expand carbon 
capture usage and 
storage systems
 ● Improve system-wide 
efficiency
 ● Regional support 
programmes
 ● Tax breaks, 
subsidies
 ● Carbon pricing
 ● Moratorium policies
 ● De-risking of clean 
energy investments
 ● Relocation of coal 
workers (mines and 
power plants)
 ● Lower health 
hazards (air, water, 
land pollution)
 ● Future skills and 
job creation
 ● Share of the power 
emissions reduction 
from a coal phase-
out:  4 GtCO2 (range: 
3.6–4.4 GtCO2), with 
1 GtCO2 from the 
OECD and 3 GtCO2 
from the rest of the 
world
Decarbonize 
transport
 ● Reduce energy for 
transport
 ● Electrify transport
 ● Fuels substitution 
(bioenergy, hydrogen)
 ● Modal shift
 ● Pathways for non-
motorized transport
 ● Standards for 
vehicle emissions
 ● Establishing of 
charging stations
 ● Eliminating of fossil-
fuel subsidies
 ● Investments in 
public transport
 ● Increased public 
health from more 
physical activity, 
less air pollution 
 ● Energy security
 ● Reduced fuel 
spending
 ● Less congestion
 ● Electrification of 
transport: 6.1 GtCO2 
Table 6.2. Transition options and their elements
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Decarbonize
industry
 ● Demand reduction 
(circular economy, 
modal shifts and 
logistics)
 ● Electrify heat 
processes
 ● Improve energy 
efficiency
 ● Direct use of biomass/
biofuels
 ● Carbon pricing
 ● Standards and 
regulations, 
especially on 
materials demand 
reduction
 ● Energy security
 ● Savings and 
competitiveness
 ● Industry: 4.8 GtCO2 
Avoid future 
emissions 
and energy 
access
 ● Link energy access 
with emission 
reductions for 3.5 
billion energy-poor 
people
 ● FiT and auctions
 ● Standards and 
regulations
 ● Targeted subsidies
 ● Support for 
entrepreneurs
 ● Better access
 ● Meet basic needs 
and SDGs
 ● N/A
Source: Energy Transitions Commission (2017, 2018); International Renewable Energy Agency (2019a); Climate Analytics (2016)
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energy demand. Poor but fast-growing countries in east 
and south-east Asia have traditionally deployed emissions-
intensive coal to meet this demand. However, for countries 
and regions that host the world’s energy-poor, there remains 
significant scope to shape their energy transitions as they 
are yet to be locked into a particular pathway (Mulugetta, Ben 
Hagan and Kammen 2018). Moreover, rapid technological 
progress in renewable energy is opening up an unprecedented 
opportunity for a wide range of applications and business 
models, including electrification through decentralized 
generation and mini-grids, with rapidly declining costs for 
photovoltaic modules, batteries, LEDs, smart metering, 
mini-grids and pay-as-you-go technology (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] 2017).
Policymakers in developing countries understand that making 
a rapid transition sometimes relies on a much slower process 
of technological and organizational change, for example, 
to build capacities and knowledge about the technologies 
required to ‘leapfrog’. Moreover, the quality of the transition 
matters in terms of creating additional value beyond the 
provision of energy such as good quality jobs and building 
industrial capacity. For example, while the growth in solar 
PV markets across Africa is to be welcomed from an energy 
delivery perspective, a significant proportion of the global 
value chain for PV has been captured elsewhere, for example, 
in manufacturing (principally China), as well as financing and 
engineering services, often provided by institutions in OECD 
countries (Byrne, Mbeva and Ockwell 2018; Lema et al. 2018; 
Ockwell et al. 2018).
More broadly, effort is required to actively connect private 
business leaders with government-led and donor-backed 
forums to communicate and unlock new commercial 
opportunities in PV systems, as has occurred successfully 
in Kenya and Uganda (Bhamidipati, Haselip and Hansen 
2019). However, this requires building innovation systems 
with the mission to strengthen knowledge and skills base, 
raise patient capital and mobilize technical assistance, 
to build strong partnerships with financial providers and 
domestic entrepreneurs with a deep interest in new and 
clean technologies (Truffer, Murphy and Raven 2015; 
Wieczorek 2017).
6.3 Beyond technical measures: 
pursuing system-wide 
transformation
There is a qualitative difference between past energy transitions 
and the necessary future transition. For one thing, previous 
transitions were not constrained by time as a key factor for 
rapid change. More concretely, historical transitions were more 
“opportunity-driven”, whereas low-carbon transitions are more 
“problem-driven” – the problem being the collective good (i.e. the 
climate) (Sovacool and Geels 2016). Furthermore, historically, 
energy “transitions” have occurred only in percentage terms 
(firstly, coal displacing biomass, then oil displacing coal and 
now natural gas and renewables displacing oil and coal). In 
terms of total energy use, the trends have more accurately 
reflected energy “additions” as all forms of energy rise to 
meet growing energy demand. Today we consume more coal, 
gas, oil, nuclear and renewables than ever before. Reducing 
emissions, however, requires that total hydrocarbon use 
decline with great expansion of renewable energy (along with 
technologies to capture or remove their emissions) (University 
of Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy 2019).
The depth of technological and institutional lock-in of 
the incumbent energy system is so profound it creates 
major obstacles or inertia, holding back much needed 
structural change (Jackson 2016). The rapid and systemic 
changes needed are radically different from what 
institutions are accustomed to withstanding. For example, 
switching to EVs requires multiple changes in the socio-
technical system, which involve multi-actor processes of 
interactions across and between energy and transport 
regimes. Given the need for these complex and systemic 
changes, a sector-focused or silo approach will need 
to give way to decisions and policies that reach across 
sectoral, geographical and political boundaries. One way 
to do this is through mission-oriented policies, defined as 
systemic public policies that draw on frontier knowledge 
to attain specific goals, often to address “big problems” 
such as climate change that demand radical innovations 
and a multi-actor coordination (Mazzucato 2018). This 
also recognizes the catalytic role that governments can 
play in creating policies that can shape markets and direct 
them to meet major societal goals.
Given that energy is an enabler, and thus cuts across 
sectoral boundaries, low-carbon energy transitions can 
be well served by being directly linked to opportunities in 
other sectors such as electrifying transport and heating 
(including cooking) and decarbonizing energy-intensive 
industries. Equally important will be linking transitions with 
their associated co-benefits and costs and how these can 
be evaluated to provide supplementary information to serve 
as additional impetus for policymakers, decision makers 
and civil society to co-own and build consensus around the 
options (table 6.2).
The sheer scale of investment needed for accelerating 
energy transitions is very large. Global renewable energy 
investment in 2018, excluding large hydroelectric projects, 
exceeded the US$250 billion for a fifth successive year 
Frankfurt School-UNEP Collaborating Centre and BNEF 
2019). However, climate policies that are consistent with 
the 1.5°C target require upscaling of energy system supply-
side investments (resource extraction, power generation, 
fuel conversion, pipelines/transmission and energy 
storage), reaching levels of between US$1.6–3.8 trillion per 
year globally on average over the 2016–2050 time frame 
(McCollum et al. 2018).
The call to redirect investment to low-carbon energy 
systems raises a number of issues. Firstly, the high 
upfront capital outlay and low operating costs of 
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renewables is a new terrain in finance where further 
innovation is required. Secondly, while the historically 
low interest rates over the past 10 years have provided a 
very conducive environment for investment in renewable 
energy technologies (RETs), energy investment was 
mostly concentrated in high and upper-middle income 
countries (IEA 2019d). Thirdly, the high investment 
requirement in developing countries is being hampered 
by the high perception of risk, little opportunity for patient 
capital, and unstable political and regulatory regimes. To 
this end, multilateral, regional and national development 
banks could play a major role in leveraging larger finance 
by helping to de-risk investments. However, this would 
need to be co-developed where country policymakers 
play a deeper role by creating stable policy and regulatory 
conditions to encourage investment. This would also 
mean appealing to the immediate concerns of decision 
and policymakers, for example, integrating transport 
policy with air quality and climate policy and with vehicle 
emissions regulation. Policies should be harmonized 
wherever possible to take advantage of interdependencies 
and prevent undesirable outcomes such as CO2 “leakage” 
from one sector to another.
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7.1  Introduction
The production of materials is a significant source of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (figure 7.1). In 2015, 
materials production caused GHG emissions of 11 
GtCO2e, up from 5 GtCO2e in 1995, with the contribution 
of such production increasing from 15 per cent to 23 per 
cent of total global emissions over this period (Hertwich 
2019). The largest contribution stems from bulk materials 
production, such as iron and steel, cement, lime and 
plaster, other minerals mostly used as construction 
products, as well as plastics and rubber (figure 7.1). Two 
thirds of the materials are used to make capital goods, 
with buildings and vehicles among the most important 
(figure 7.1). While the production of materials consumed 
in industrialized countries remained within the range 
of 2–3 GtCO2e in the 1995-2015 period, there was rapid 
growth in material-related emissions among developing 
and emerging economies (Hertwich 2019). Growth in 
investments is associated with a strong growth in metal 
consumption. Developing countries have stronger growth 
in metal consumption with gross domestic product (GDP) 
than industrialized countries, as a higher share of their GDP 
comprises investments (Zheng et al. 2018). 
Options to mitigate emissions from materials production 
include supply-side measures, such as improved energy 
efficiency in production processes, the use of alternative 
production routes and raw materials with lower embodied 
GHG emissions, a shift towards cleaner energy sources 
and reductants, and CO2 capture. Reducing the demand for 
materials is also an option to mitigate emissions and can be 
achieved through improving their efficiency (International 
Energy Agency [IEA] 2019a; Worrell et al. 2016).
Recent efforts have been made to evaluate the potential 
contribution of material efficiency to meet climate targets 
more broadly. In the Clean Technology Scenario of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), compared with the 
baseline, steel demand is reduced by 24 per cent, cement 
by 15 per cent and aluminium by 17 per cent, which in total 
comprises around 30 per cent of the combined emission 
reductions for these materials. Other emission reductions 
were due to energy efficiency, innovative processes, 
cleaner energy and CO2 capture and storage (IEA 2019a). 
Despite their effectiveness, material efficiency strategies 
have been systematically overlooked in climate policies 
(Hernandez et al. 2018).
Research on and development of demand-side material 
efficiency and substitution strategies has progressed 
substantially in the past decade (Allwood et al. 2017; Worrell 
et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2018). Such research addresses the 
specific technical application of materials in buildings and 
other structures (Serrenho et al. 2019; Dunant et al. 2018), 
machinery (Milford et al. 2013) and vehicles (Løvik et al. 
2014). Recent research combining insights from several 
bottom-up studies across different applications has identified 
that material efficiency could reduce emissions from steel 
production by half (Milford et al. 2013). 
Material efficiency and substitution strategies affect not only 
energy demand and emissions during material production, 
but also potentially the operational energy use of the material 
products. Analysis of such strategies therefore requires a 
systems or life cycle perspective. Several investigations 
into material efficiency have focused on strategies that 
have little impact on operations, meaning that trade-offs 
and synergies have been ignored. Many energy efficiency 
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Figure 7.1. GHG emissions in GtCO2e associated with materials production by material (left) and by the first use of materials 
in subsequent production processes or final consumption (right)
Note: The data excludes emissions from land-use change and credits for carbon storage.
Source: Based on Hertwich et al. (2019).
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strategies have implications for the materials used, such as 
increased insulation demand for buildings or a shift to more 
energy-intensive materials in the lightweighting of vehicles. 
While these additional, material-related emissions are well 
understood from technology studies, they are often not fully 
captured in the integrated assessment models that produce 
scenario results, such as those discussed in this report 
(Pauliuk et al. 2017).
In this chapter, focus is placed on residential buildings and 
cars, which are the most important individual products in terms 
of materials and energy use. Material efficiency strategies 
are reviewed with quantitative results presented of a recent 
modelling exercise for the implementation of such strategies 
in the G7 members (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America), China and 
India, based on findings from an International Resource Panel 
study (International Resource Panel forthcoming). These 
countries were selected because they represent individually 
significant economies with varied development levels.
The following demand-side strategies for increased material 
efficiency in product design and manufacturing, use and end 
of life are considered for both residential buildings and cars 
(Allwood et al. 2011)
1) Product lightweighting and material substitution of 
high-carbon materials with low-carbon materials to 
reduce material-related GHG emissions associated 
with product production, as well as operational 
energy consumption of vehicles.
2) Improvements in the yield of material production 
and product manufacture, thus reducing the share 
of material that becomes waste in the production 
process.
3) More intensive use, lifetime extension, component 
reuse, remanufacturing and repair as strategies to 
obtain more service from material-based products.
4) Enhanced recycling and reuse so that secondary 
materials reduce the need to produce more 
emission-intensive primary materials.
7.2 Material-efficient housing
Global construction of buildings and infrastructure and the 
associated material supply caused 7 GtCO2e of GHG emissions 
in 2015, of which 4 GtCO2e were associated with the use of 
materials in construction (Hertwich 2019). In comparison, 
direct CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in buildings were 
3 GtCO2, while emissions associated with the production of 
electricity consumed in buildings were 6.5 GtCO2 (IEA 2019b). 
Although current statistics do not disaggregate construction-
related emissions into residential and commercial buildings or 
consider infrastructure at a global scale, country-level results 
and material-use data suggest that residential buildings 
contribute 50–65 per cent of such emissions (Hertwich et 
al. 2019). In 2015, about 70 per cent of construction-related 
emissions were from developing countries (Hertwich 2019). 
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Despite this, studies of material efficiency options almost 
exclusively focus on industrialized countries, with just a few 
studies addressing China. Housing demand, construction 
style and building lifetimes are important drivers for material-
related emissions of residential buildings. Research provides 
insight on the scope of various material efficiency strategies 
for residential buildings.
7.2.1 Product lightweighting and material 
substitution
Buildings often contain more energy-intensive materials such 
as concrete, steel and glass than technically required. There 
is a documented tendency for overdesign in larger steel-
frame structures of around 20–30 per cent (Dunant et al. 
2018). Cement, a major building material, is often used more 
than necessary in various applications, including concrete 
mixing, where fillers and other cementitious materials 
can substitute part of the cement with fewer emissions 
(John et al. 2018; Shanks et al. 2019). Finally, instead of 
using reinforced cement, masonry or steel frames, timber, 
bamboo and other plant fibres can be used as building 
materials, which has the potential to significantly reduce 
lifecycle GHG emissions in materials production and carbon 
storage, even when considering a potential trade-off with 
operational energy use (Heeren et al. 2015). New technology 
allows for a wider use of timber, even for tall structures. In 
some regions, building codes are being adapted to recognize 
these advances and facilitate the increased use of wood in 
buildings (Mahapatra et al. 2012). Large-scale use of wood 
as construction material necessitates that the forests from 
which the timber is obtained are managed sustainably (Kane 
and Yee 2017; Oliver et al. 2014). The International Resource 
Panel (forthcoming) estimates that through lightweighting 
structures, 8–10 per cent of GHG emissions related to 
materials in residential building construction in the G7 
and China can be saved, with an even larger share in India 
(figure 7.2). An increased market penetration of wood could 
also reduce emissions or sequester carbon, corresponding 
to 10 per cent of GHG emissions from residential building 
materials, with savings reaching up to 30 per cent in India. 
At present, the country hardly uses timber in construction 
and lacks local resources and expertise.
Building codes, which have long been used to improve 
energy efficiency, present a potential model and platform for 
developing policies that support lighter-weight structures, 
the reuse of components and timber-based construction.
 
The rapid growth of certification systems for construction 
and building, such as Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design (LEED) and Building Research Establishment 
Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM), and their 
adoption into building codes by governments worldwide has 
been an important policy driver for changes in construction 
practices (de Wilde 2014; Doan et al. 2017; Menezes et 
al. 2012). At present, certification is more widely applied 
to commercial buildings than to residential dwellings. 
However, the spread of certification systems and their use 
in building codes presents an opportunity to introduce or 
enhance material efficiency policies for homes that might 
not otherwise be politically feasible. The details of such 
certification systems therefore need to be monitored and 
evaluated and explicit attention should be given to the use of 
building codes as a policy instrument for material efficiency. 
At the residential level and particularly for single family 
homes, minimum standards for energy efficiency, such as 
the International Energy Conservation Code (IECC) in the 
United States of America (International Code Council [ICC] 
2012), have great potential to reduce operational energy 
consumption at the cost of increased material use. However, 
increased energy efficiency in buildings is achieved 
by adding additional or better insulation material and 
additional building technology, such as heat exchangers in 
ventilation systems. Compared with conventional buildings, 
energy-efficient buildings have lower lifecycle emissions, 
as energy demand is typically the main driver (Karimpour 
et al. 2014; Kristjansdottir et al. 2018). Some suggestions 
have been made to include embodied carbon in codes for 
new construction, with a focus on cement in concrete in 
California as one example (King 2018). Although it is unclear 
how quickly such stipulations will be adopted globally, they 
could significantly enhance reduced material use and the 
utilization of low-carbon materials.
7.2.2 Improvements in the yield of material 
production and product manufacturing 
The use of building information systems and of 
prefabrication can reduce waste in the construction 
process, thus reducing the amount of primary materials 
required (Hertwich et al. 2019). 
7.2.3 More intensive use and lifetime extension 
Housing demand tends to increase with a growing income, 
but varies widely across similar GDP/capita levels, from 
34 m2 per person in the United Kingdom to 68 m2 in the 
United States. Such demand is influenced by tradition, 
planning rules, tax laws and available space. Multifamily 
and urban residences tend to be smaller than single family, 
suburban and rural residences. In most countries, the 
trend is shifting towards a smaller household size, which 
is leading to an increase in required space as facilities 
are shared between fewer people. Several studies show 
that future floor area demand is a crucial variable for 
GHG emissions and that more intensive use can result 
in significant reductions of both material and energy 
related emissions (Serrenho et al. 2019; Cao et al. 2018; 
Pauliuk et al. 2013). Such a reduction might be the result 
of urbanization (Güneralp et al. 2017), with populations 
moving from single family rural and suburban residences 
to multifamily houses in denser urban areas, increases 
in household size or cohabitation, the smarter design of 
buildings that allow resizing and tax or other incentives 
that encourage residents to downsize their residence after 
changes in family size (Lorek and Spangenberg 2018). The 
International Resource Panel (forthcoming) suggests that 
reducing per capita floor space by 20 per cent compared 
with a scenario that converges an industrialized-country’s 
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floor space could reduce the emissions associated with 
the production of building materials for homes in G7 
members by 50–60 per cent by 2050, given the already 
existing building stock. It would also reduce heating 
and cooling demand by up to 20 per cent, pending the 
retrofitting of existing buildings.
Policies that support homeownership may have the 
undesirable effect of subsidizing large residences through 
tax breaks and other measures. In some locations, 
spatial planning prevents the construction of multifamily 
residences and locks in suburban forms at high social 
and environmental costs. A reform of planning rules could 
bring about multiple benefits in this regard (Jones et al. 
2018). One mechanism to increase the intensity of use is to 
strengthen incentives for older residents to downsize when 
children move out. Property taxes as well as an elimination 
of taxes on property transactions, such as the stamp duty 
in the United Kingdom, can have such an effect. 
There is a wide variation in building lifetimes, from less than 
25 years in some East Asian countries to more than 100 
years in Europe. Extending building lifetimes can therefore 
have widely different effect. In China, extending the lifespan 
of buildings to 50 years could reduce CO2 emissions by 400 
Mt per year or about 20 per cent of construction-related 
emissions (Cai et al. 2015). In Europe, new buildings have 
lower energy use due to improvements in building standards 
and technology, with lifetime extensions resulting in higher 
total emissions compared with replacement buildings, 
unless the building are retrofit to a high energy standard 
(Serrenho et al. 2019). If only new, efficient buildings have 
Figure 7.2. Annual emissions from the construction and operations of buildings in the G7 and in China and India, in a 
scenario that follows Shared Socioeconomic Pathway SSP1 to mitigate emissions to below 2°C 
Source: International Resource Panel (forthcoming).
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their lifetime extended, more modest savings will be had 
(figure 7.2) (International Resource Panel forthcoming). 
Policies requiring energy retrofit during building renovations, 
such as those of the European Union, could alleviate the 
trade-off between emissions savings from lifetime extension 
and operational energy use (International Energy Agency 
2019b), though optimal strategies can only be identified on 
a case-by-case basis (Itard and Klunder 2007). 
7.2.4 Enhanced recycling and reuse 
Recycling of valuable materials is already widespread; reuse 
of building components is less common. When I-beams are 
reused, GHG savings can be significant, though there is 
the substantial logistical challenge of matching supply and 
demand, with reuse practices currently in decline (Densley 
Tingley et al. 2017). The recycling of construction and 
demolition waste from residential buildings offsets about 
13–19 per cent of GHG emissions from building-material 
production in the G7. Metals are widely recycled and there 
is some recycling of timber and plastics. The use of concrete 
and other minerals as aggregates can still be improved, but 
emission savings are less. 
Some policy levers are both well-studied and subject to 
overt policy worldwide. As is the case for recycling of 
construction and demolition waste (Brantwood Consulting 
2016; Deloitte 2017), many are regulated to achieve other 
social or environmental goals (for example, limits on short-
term lodging in residences), though some are still largely at 
the exploratory stage (disassembly of buildings).
7.3  Material-efficient cars
In 2015, light-duty vehicles (LDVs) contributed around 14 
per cent or 7.5 GtCO2e to global GHG emissions. Of the 
emissions, 4.7 GtCO2e occurred during the operation of the 
vehicles (International Transport Forum 2019), 1.4 GtCO2e 
was associated with the production of fuels and another 
1.4 GtCO2e was associated with the production of the 
vehicles (Hertwich 2019). Only about half of new vehicles 
replaced retired vehicles, with the remainder reflecting a 
growth in vehicle stock. G7 members were responsible for 
close to 40 per cent of the LDV-related GHG emissions, with 
the United States of America representing one quarter of 
global LDV emissions.
7.3.1 Product lightweighting and material 
substitution 
Under a business-as-usual scenario, lightweighting vehicles 
with materials such as high-strength steel, aluminium or 
carbon fibre offers significant emission reductions of 
3–6 per cent, if proper recycling of these materials can 
be instituted (Løvik et al. 2014; Milovanoff et al. 2019). 
The relative emission reductions from lightweighting are 
smaller for electric vehicles due to their lower operational 
emissions. Fuel-efficiency standards, fuel taxes and 
registration fees tied to the fuel economy are policy 
instruments that support vehicle lightweighting.
Downsizing the average size of vehicles is another 
important opportunity. In recent years, there has been a 
trend towards larger, heavier vehicles, such as sports-utility 
vehicles (SUVs) and pick-up trucks, which require more 
materials and higher operational energy use. Reversing 
that trend would reduce emissions substantially. Reducing 
the share of SUVs and light trucks in the United States of 
America from the current 53 per cent to 32 per cent by 2050 
would reduce emissions from the production and operation 
of cars by 10 per cent. Registration fees tied to CO2 
emissions in some European countries have successfully 
reduced the CO2 emissions rating of the average new 
vehicle, in part through shifting demand to smaller vehicles 
(D’Haultfœuille et al. 2016; Yan and Eskeland 2018). Fleets 
of shared vehicles tend to be smaller, but still provide users 
with transport capacity when it is needed. Encouraging 
collective rather than individual vehicle ownership could 
therefore help reduce vehicle mass and with this both 
material-related and operational emissions.
7.3.2 Improvements in the yield of material 
production and car manufacturing 
Improvements in the yield of material production and car 
manufacturing can contribute modest reductions in material 
use and associated emissions (Milford et al. 2013).
7.3.3 More intensive use and lifetime extension
Car sharing, ride sharing and other measures to reduce 
individual automobility in favour of shared and collective 
transport can substantially reduce material use (Shaheen 
and Cohen 2019). Early evidence suggests that car sharing 
reduces household vehicle ownership and the average 
vehicle size (Chan and Shaheen 2012; Nijland and van 
Meerkerk 2017), though it also attracts users of public 
transport (Becker et al. 2018). There is also evidence to 
suggest that ride-hailing services, such as Uber and Lyft, 
can have an adverse effect and lead to increased traffic 
and vehicle size (Schaller 2017; Yin et al. 2018). Policies 
that discourage low-occupancy shared vehicles or penalize 
the increased congestion resulting from ride hailing, such 
as priority lanes for cars with three or more occupants 
or congestion pricing, can improve their environmental 
impact and material efficiency (Schaller 2018).
The International Resource Panel (forthcoming) estimates 
that having 25 per cent of drivers shift to car sharing would 
reduce emissions by 10 per cent, while shifting 25 per cent 
of trips to shared rides would reduce emissions by 20 per 
cent (figure 7.3). In some rich countries, car ownership is 
already starting to reduce, especially among younger urban 
populations, a trend that can be furthered by tax policies, 
parking fees and regulatory and institutional support for 
shared mobility. Most policies on shared mobility, however, 
currently focus on regulating drivers and services, rather 
than on environmental impacts and use of resources.
Extending the life of materials, through repair, reuse and 
remanufacturing, may reduce material-related emissions, 
but could also increase operational emissions when a 
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newer car may be more efficient or use a cleaner fuel 
(Kagawa et al. 2013; Lenski et al. 2013). Much vehicle reuse 
is connected to the export of vehicles from wealthier to 
poorer countries, where vehicle recycling is not as well 
established or sophisticated. In such cases, reuse may 
meet unmet needs but at the expense of increasing 
material-related emissions. 
In the future, it is anticipated that individual car ownership 
may be replaced by fleets of self-driving vehicles (Greenblatt 
and Saxena 2015; Jones and Leibowicz 2019), which could 
result in a decrease in the number of vehicles needed and an 
increase in the use of such vehicles. If unregulated, such a 
trend will also likely increase driving distances which would 
impact emissions and may move people away from using 
more efficient public transport. With a policy that discourages 
individual ownership and enhances interoperability among 
public transport systems, self-driving cars could offer more 
ride-sharing services and be used as last-mile solutions in 
public transport systems (Hertwich et al. 2019). 
7.3.4 Enhanced recycling and reuse 
Current recycling of metals from end-of-life vehicles (ELV) 
is well established. The International Resource Panel 
(forthcoming) estimates that recycling of ELV offsets 
about half of the emissions in the primary production 
of the materials used to make the vehicle. Strengthening 
the reuse of components also offers significant savings 
(International Resource Panel forthcoming; Milford et al. 
2013). Within policies, recycling is typically measured in 
terms of recycling rates and landfill diversion rather than 
GHG emissions (Sawyer‐Beaulieu and Tam 2006). Adjusting 
ELV policies to incorporate considerations of embodied 
carbon warrants attention. The recovery of vehicle parts 
Figure 7.3. Annual emissions from the manufacturing and use of passenger vehicles in the G7 and in China and India, in a 
scenario that follows the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway SSP1 to mitigate emissions to below 2°C 
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and the alloy-specific (closed-loop) recycling of metals may 
have a larger emissions pay-off than current shredding 
practices (Ohno et al. 2017; Sato et al. 2019). This could 
be achieved by developing reuse regulations and through 
more standardization across manufacturers. Some GHG 
reduction potential is missed because much of the steel 
in cars is downcycled to uses that are tolerant to copper 
contamination generated in the shredding of ELVs, such as, 
for example, reinforcing bar (Daehn et al. 2017). If the mixing 
of steel and copper in the recycling process were reduced, 
recycled steel could be used for higher value uses, such as 
car bodies, thereby reducing GHG emissions.
7.4  Summary and link to policy
Research has shown that demand-side material efficiency 
offers substantial GHG mitigation opportunities that are 
complementary to those obtained through an energy system 
transformation (see chapter 6). The potential of purely 
technical strategies is limited, but considered relatively easy 
to achieve, whereas the more intense use of housing and 
vehicles has larger potential, though it would impact social 
structures and lifestyles. Demand-side material efficiency 
widens the spectrum of emissions mitigation strategies and 
may therefore reduce the need for other risky, contested, 
unproven or expensive technologies. 
Knowledge gaps regarding the link between material 
efficiency and climate change mitigation continue to 
exist, especially regarding the efficacy of policies where 
the focus of material efficiency has largely been confined 
to the end-of-life stage, such as targets for increased 
recycling. Socioeconomic transformations are crucial 
to harnessing the full potential of material efficiency, as, 
for example, greater intensity of use implies significant 
changes in use patterns or car ownership. The feasibility 
of and pathway towards such transformations in a carbon-
constrained world requires further investigation. More 
intensive use is likely have a rebound effect, with money 
saved on car ownership being used for vacation travels or 
other high-emission activities (Makov and Font Vivanco 
2018; Underwood and Fremstad 2018). Carbon pricing is 
a policy tool that can help minimize a rebound effect. It is 
important to gain a better understanding of other products 
and the coupling of sectors and cascading of materials, 
including implications to material quality resulting from 
increased reuse and recycling. Furthermore, the influence 
of the urban form, land-use planning and policies on 
service demand and consumption patterns need to be 
better understood.
Demand-side material efficiency and related reductions in 
energy consumption and GHG emissions could be achieved 
through a number of policies, including carbon taxation 
on bulk materials (Neuhoff et al. 2016), eco-design laws 
(Official Journal of the European Union 2009), green public 
procurement (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Economic Development [OECD] 2015) or circular economy 
strategies (Material Economics 2018), as well as sector-
specific approaches, such as changes in building codes 
(ICC 2018). However, not all policies aimed at resource 
efficiency or circular economy automatically have co-
benefits with climate change mitigation. For example, a 
prolonged product lifetime as a result of policies may under 
certain circumstances actually delay the introduction of 
more efficient products, thus leading to higher system-
wide emissions. Use of life cycle assessments and related 
forms of systems measurement, as well as careful and 
integrative policy design and evaluation are necessary for 
the more efficient use of resources, which will also lead to 
reduced emissions.
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